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Corporate social responsibility has become an increasingly significant concept. The 
rising number of literature has sought to provide an understanding of CSR from various 
industrial and theoretical perspectives. However, CSR in contentious industries from 
a legal and African context remains limited. The research augments this position by 
resting on the argument that one way of solving the governance gap or institutional 
void is to embrace a regulatory framework by government and business. To this end, 
the research examines the adequacy of the tobacco regulatory framework at 
regulating the activities of transnational tobacco corporations (TTCs), and to establish 
what role, if any, CSR could serve to mitigate any potential gap in the regulatory 
framework. The approach taken is an analysis of relevant legal instruments regulating 
the tobacco industry and CSR engagement in the tobacco industry in Nigeria. The 
findings reveal the limitations of the regulatory framework, including the issue of 
enforcement and corruption. It underscores the complementary role of CSR as a 
useful tool in the tobacco control framework so far TTCs consider a recommitment to 
the ‘social contract’ of corporate social responsibility. The findings and 
recommendations could enable the tobacco control framework, contribute to the CSR 















Table of Contents 
 
Declaration Statement ............................................................................................................................ ii 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................................. iii 
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................... iv 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................... vii 
Table of Cases ...................................................................................................................................... viii 
Table of International and Regional Instruments ................................................................................... x 
Table of Statutes .................................................................................................................................... xi 
Table of Abbreviations .......................................................................................................................... xii 
Chapter One. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Background................................................................................................................................. 1 
1.2 Research Focus and Relevance ............................................................................................. 3 
1.3 Methodology ............................................................................................................................... 5 
1.6 Overall Aim and Objectives of the Research ........................................................................ 9 
Chapter Two. Corporate Social Responsibility: a general overview .......................................... 10 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 10 
2.2 The Concept of CSR ............................................................................................................... 10 
2.3 Analytical Theories, Related Themes and the CSR Paradigm. ....................................... 14 
2.4 Stakeholder and Shareholder Primacy and its impact on the CSR Discourse. ............. 27 
2.5 The Interaction between Law and CSR ............................................................................... 32 
2.6 Voluntary and Legally Mandating CSR ................................................................................ 39 
2.7 Transnational Tobacco Companies and CSR ..................................................................... 45 
2.8 Conclusion. ............................................................................................................................... 51 
Chapter Three. Legal and Institutional Framework: Nigerian Tobacco Industry I                     
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 54 
3.1.1 Tobacco Regulation in Nigeria: An Overview .................................................................. 54 
3.1.2 Tobacco Industry in Nigeria: An Overview ....................................................................... 55 
3.2 National Tobacco Control Act of 2015. .................................................................................... 58 
3.2.1 NTCA 2015 and its relationship with WHO FCTC 2005. ............................................... 58 
3.2.1.1 Part IV: Regulation of Smoking ................................................................................... 60 
3.2.1.2 Part V: Prohibition of Tobacco Advertising, Promotion and Sponsorship ............ 62 
3.2.1.3 Parts VI-IX: Sales and Product Regulation; Licensing. ........................................... 65 
3.2.1.4 Parts X – XII: Enforcement; Education & Public Awareness; Price and Tax 




3.3 NTCA 2015: Challenges from the TTCs .................................................................................. 73 
3.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 82 
Chapter Four. Legal and Institutional Framework: Nigerian Tobacco Industry II. .................... 84 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 84 
4.2 Nigerian Company Law and the Regulation of TTCs. ....................................................... 84 
4.3 Common Law. .......................................................................................................................... 86 
4.4 Criminal Code........................................................................................................................... 88 
4.5 Environmental Sustainability in Nigeria and Tobacco Regulation. .................................. 91 
4.5.1 National Environmental Standards and Regulatory Enforcement Agency 
(NESREA) Act ............................................................................................................................. 93 
4.5.2 Biodiversity Laws .............................................................................................................. 95 
4.5.3 National Environmental (Food, Beverages and Tobacco Sector) Regulations, 
2009.............................................................................................................................................. 97 
4.5.4 Environmental Impact Assessment Decree 1992 (EIA) ............................................. 98 
4.6 National Tobacco Control Committee and the Tobacco Control Fund ......................... 102 
4.7 Ministry of Health and the Tobacco Control Unit .............................................................. 104 
4.8 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 107 
Chapter Five. Anti-Corruption and Tobacco Regulation. ........................................................... 110 
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 110 
5.2 Corruption and the Search for Scope. ................................................................................ 110 
5.3 Anti-Corruption, Unethical Practises, and TTCs. .............................................................. 114 
5.4 Nigeria’s Efforts in Combatting Corruption and Its Impact on Tobacco Regulation. ... 121 
5.4.1 The Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000. ............................... 131 
5.4.2 The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission 
(ICPC) and The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). ......................... 134 
5.4.3 The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) ............................... 139 
5.4.4 The African Union (AU) Anti-Corruption Convention. ............................................... 142 
5.5 Contribution of the International Community in Combating Corruption in Nigeria ....... 143 
5.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 150 
Chapter Six. Tobacco Control, Human Rights and TTCs .......................................................... 152 
6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 152 
6.2 Categories of Human Rights Vulnerable to The Activities of TTCs. .............................. 153 
6.2.1 Right to Life and Health ................................................................................................. 154 
6.2.2 Right to A Healthy Environment. .................................................................................. 160 




6.2.4 Economic and Social Rights ......................................................................................... 173 
6.3 Nigeria’s Human Rights Responsibilities under the Nigerian Constitution. .................. 175 
6.4 Nigeria’s Human Rights Responsibilities under International law. ................................. 178 
6.5 Human Rights Responsibilities of Transnational Tobacco Corporations. ..................... 186 
6.6 Voluntary Codes of Conduct and TTCs. ............................................................................ 189 
6.7 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 198 
Chapter Seven. General Conclusion and Recommendations................................................... 200 



















My sincere gratitude goes to my supervisors: Dr Shabir Korotana and Dr Ayesha 
Shahid for their unflinching support and encouragement. I am also grateful to Dr 
Olufemi Amao for his constructive criticism. 
My sincere appreciation to my mum for her unstinting love and steadfast prayers. 
I am most indebted to my wife, Temi, who has been my bedrock. Without her, this 
thesis would have been impossible to complete.  
To ‘Tamilore, ‘Tenire and ‘Tomisire Olaiya for being my source of inspiration, and I 
hope this study motivates you too. 


















Table of Cases 
Abacha v Fawehinmi (2000) S.C. 45/1997; FWLR (pt. 4) 533 ............................................................. 165 
AG Ondo State v. AG Federation (2002) 9 Nigerian Weekly Law Report (part 772) 222 ................... 156 
Agbakoba v. Director State Security Services (1994) 6 Nigerian Weekly Law Report 475. ................ 182 
Baker v T E Hopkins & Son Ltd [1959] 3 ALL ER 225 (CA) ...................................................................... 87 
Bank Mellat v Her Majesty's Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39 .............................................................. 79 
Bank of the United States v Deveaux (1809) 9 US (5 Ranch) 61. .......................................................... 31 
BAT Australia Ltd et. al. v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] HCA 43 ................................................ 73 
BAT South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Health (463/2011) [2012] ZASCA 107; [2012] 3 All SA 593 
(SCA) (20 June 2012) ......................................................................................................................... 81 
BAT Uganda Ltd v. AG & ors (2019) No 46 of 2016, Constitutional Court of Uganda. ......................... 73 
BAT v Cabinet Secretary for Kenya, Civil Appeal No. 112 of 2016, 17 Feb. 2017 (Court of Appeal 
Kenya) ............................................................................................................................................... 80 
British-American Tobacco (Holdings) Ltd v The Commissioners for HM’s Revenue & Customs [2017] 
UKFTT 190 (TC) ................................................................................................................................ 117 
Caparo v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 ....................................................................................................... 87 
Case 174/84 Commission v Federal Republic of Germany [1987] ECR 1262 ........................................ 80 
Case C-473/98 Kemikalieinspektionen v Toolex Alpha AB [2000] ECR I 5702 ...................................... 80 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric corp v Public Service Commission of New York (1980) 447 US 557, 566, 
100 S Ct 2343, 65 L Ed 2d 341; No 79-565 ........................................................................................ 76 
Chandler v Cape [2012] EWCA civ 525 .................................................................................................. 86 
Cheranci v Cheranci [1960] NRNLR 24 (High court, Northern Region of Nigeria) ................................ 74 
Commission v. Brazil (1984) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case 7615 ................... 159 
Corner House Research v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin); [2008] NPC 
42 .................................................................................................................................................... 112 
Daraydan Holdings Ltd v Solland International Ltd [2005] Chancery 119 .......................................... 113 
Dodge v. Ford Motor 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ........................................................................ 29 
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100 ............................................................................................. 87 
Energy Ventures Partner Ltd v Malabu Oil and Gas Ltd [2013] EWHC 2118 (Comm) ........................ 136 
Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22 ................................................................ 74 
Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Joshua Dariye FCT/HC/CR/81/07 ........................................................ 137 
Four Seasons Holdings Incorporated v Brownlie [2017] UKSC 80 ........................................................ 88 
Gbemre v. Shell and others Suit No. FHC/B/CS/53/05, FHC, Benin Judicial Division, 14/11/05 ........ 177 
Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd [2001] QB 201 (QB). ............................................................................ 70 
Guerra and others v. Italy 26 Essex Human Rights Review 357 .......................................................... 183 
Hutton v West Cork Railway co (1883) Ch D 654. ................................................................................. 30 
Inspector-General of Police v ANPP and ors (2007) African Human Rights Law Reports 179 .............. 74 
Lenders v Anderson (1883) 12 QBD 50 ................................................................................................. 70 
Lopez Ostra v Spain (1994) 20 Essex Human Rights Review 277 ........................................................ 182 
M. O Kanu and Sons v. FBN Plc (1998) 11 NWLR (pt.572) 116 ............................................................. 85 
Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal v Okonkwo [2001] WRN 1; (2002) AHRLR 159
 .......................................................................................................................................................... 74 
Milieudefensie v Royal Dutch Shell Plc, Court of Appeal of the Hague, Case No. 200.126.149 ........... 86 
Mobil Producing (Nig.) v Monokpo (2003) 18 Nigerian Weekly Law Report (pt. 852) 346 .................. 85 




Nemi v The State (1996) 6 Nigeria Weekly Law Report (pt452) 42 .................................................... 182 
Okojie v. AG Lagos State (1981) 2 NCLR 337 ....................................................................................... 176 
Okpabi and others v Royal Dutch Shell Plc and another [2021] UKSC 3 ............................................... 86 
Philip Morris SARL et al. v Oriental Rep. of Uruguay (ICSID CASE NO. ARB/10/7)................................ 80 
Purohit & Another v The Gambia (2003) African Human Rights Law Report 96 ................................ 157 
R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2006] UKHL 12 ............................................... 74 
R (on the application of BAT & ors, Philip Morris Brands SARL & ors, JT International SA and another) 
v Secretary of State for Health [2016] EWHC 1169 (Admin) .......................................................... 121 
R (on the application of Lumsdon & ors) v Legal Services Board [2015] UKSC 41 ................................ 79 
R v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2008] 4 All England Law Reports 927 ................................ 113 
R v Jordan (1956) 40 Cr App R 152 (CA) ................................................................................................ 87 
R v Smith [1959] 2 QB ........................................................................................................................... 87 
R v. Director of SFO; ex parte Smith [1993] AC 1 ................................................................................ 133 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and ors v Food & Drug Administration 696 F 3d 1205 (2012) .......... 76 
Re Horsley & Weight Ltd [1982] Ch 442 ............................................................................................... 30 
Salomon v Salomon and co. (1897) AC 22 ............................................................................................ 85 
SEC v ENI, S.p.A & anor Civil Action No. 4:10-cv-2414, US District Court, Southern District of Texas, 
Houston Division ............................................................................................................................. 145 
See R v Jones (Margaret) [2006] UKHL 16, [2007] 1 AC 136 [83] ......................................................... 69 
SERAC & CESR v. Nigeria (2001), Communication No. 155/96 (African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights); (2001) African Human Rights Law Report 60 ...................................................... 183 
Serious Fraud Office (SFO): R v Sweett Group plc (unreported) ......................................................... 148 
Serious Fraud Office v Rolls-Royce Plc & Rolls-Royce Energy Systems Inc (2017) case no: U20170036
 ........................................................................................................................................................ 148 
Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Another v Sudan (2009) AHRLR 153 (ACHPR 2009) ................ 155 
Teck Corporation Ltd v Millar (1972) 33 DLR (3d) 288 .......................................................................... 30 
Trower & Sons Ltd v Ripstein [1944] AC 254 ........................................................................................ 70 
Trustees of Dartmouth College v Woodward (1819) 17 US 518 .......................................................... 31 
United States of America v. Universal Leaf Tabacos Criminal Case No. 3:10-cr-00225 REP, Document 
1, Filed 08/06/10 (USA) ................................................................................................................... 116 
United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 9F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006); Civil Action No. 99-CV-2496 
(2017) .............................................................................................................................................. 114 
Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh & ors. (1993) 4 Law Reports on Crime 234 ..................... 178 
USA v. Mohammed Sani et al Case 1:13-cv-01832-JDB Document 1 Filed 11/18/13 ........................ 137 
Vedanta v Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20 ..................................................................................................... 86 
Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras Judgement of 29 July 1988, Inter-American Court on Human Rights 
Series C. No. 4 (1988); (1989) 28 ILM 294 ...................................................................................... 183 
Vlaamse Liga tegen Kanker (Flemish Anti-Cancer League) et al. v Belgium Council of Ministers, Arrêt 
n° 37/2011 du 15 mars 2011, Constitutional Court of Belgium (2011) .......................................... 152 
Williams v Majekodunmi, (1962) FSC 166/1962 ................................................................................... 75 






Table of International and Regional Instruments 
 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights .................................................................. 155, 160, 181 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child ..................................................................... 169 
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption ............................... 134, 142, 143 
Charter of the United Nations, 1 U.N.T.S. XVL (24 October 1945) ..................................................... 161 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ........................ 161, 179 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ....................................................................... 179 
International Bill of Human Rights ...................................................................................................... 191 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention ......................................................................... 163 
International Labour Organisation’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work .... 192 
Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products ........................................................................ 67 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development ........................................................................... 192 
Stockholm Declaration of 1972 ........................................................................................................... 161 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights ....................................................................... 153 
UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 ............................................................................... 155 
United Nations Convention against Corruption ......................................................................... 134, 139 












Table of Statutes 
Child Rights Act (CRA) 2003 ................................................................................................................ 170 
Companies and Allied Matters Act, Cap 59, LFRN 1990 ....................................................................... 32 
Companies Ordinance of 1912 .............................................................................................................. 85 
Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 ........................................................... 131, 135 
Corrupt Practices Decree of 1975 ....................................................................................................... 131 
Criminal Code Act, Chapter 77, Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1990 .................................. 140 
Criminal Law Act 1967 (UK) .................................................................................................................. 69 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment, Etc) Act 2004 ...................................... 135 
Endangered Species (Control of International Trade and Traffic) Act 1985 ......................................... 96 
Environmental Impact Assessment Decree 1992 ................................................................................. 98 
Forfeiture of Assets, etc. (Certain Persons) Decree No 53 of 1999 .................................................... 131 
Freedom of Information Act 2011, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria ............................................... 142 
India Companies Act 2013 .................................................................................................................... 43 
Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011 ......................................................................................... 141 
National Environmental Standards and Regulatory Enforcement Agency Act ................................... 201 
National Park Decree 1991 ................................................................................................................... 96 
Nigerian Criminal Code ................................................................................................................. 70, 140 
Nigerian National Tobacco Control Act 2015 .................................................................................. 48, 78 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 ................................................................................................. 69 
Sea Fisheries Decree 1992 .................................................................................................................... 96 
The National Park Decree 1991 ............................................................................................................ 96 
The Public Officer (Investigation of Assets Decree No 5 of 1976) ...................................................... 131 
Tobacco Smoking (Control) Act 1990 .................................................................................................... 58 
UK Bribery Act 2010 .............................................................................................................................. 45 




Table of Abbreviations 
AC   Appeal Cases (Law Reports) 
ACHPR   African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
AHRLR   African Human Rights Law Reports 
ALL ER   All England Law Reports 
BAT   British American Tobacco 
BBC   British Broadcasting Corporation 
CAMA   Companies and Allied Matters Act 
CEDWA Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women 
Ch D   Chancery Division (Law Reports) 
Cr App R  Criminal Appeal Reports 
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child 
CSR    Corporate Social Responsibility 
CUP   Cambridge University Press 
ECHR   European Convention on Human Rights 
ECJ   European Court of Justice 
ECR   European Court Reports 
ECtHR   European Court of Human Rights 
EFCC   Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
EHRR   European Human Rights Reports 
EIA   Environmental Impact Assessment 
EU   European Union 
EWHC (Admin)  England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) 
FRN   Federal Republic of Nigeria 
FSC   Federal Supreme Court Reports (Nigeria) 
FTSE   Financial Times and Stock Exchange 




HCA   High Court of Australia 
HRLRA   Human Rights Law Reports of Africa 
ICCPR   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICERD International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
ICESCR   International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
ICPC   Independent Corrupt Practices Commission 
ICSID   International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
ILM   International Law Reports 
ILO   International Labour Organization 
JTI   Japan Tobacco International 
LFN   Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
NCLR   Nigerian Constitutional Law Reports 
NCP   National Contact Point 
NGO   Non-governmental Organisation 
NRNLR   Northern Region of Nigeria Law Reports 
NTCA   National Tobacco Control Act 2015 
NWLR   Nigerian Weekly Law Report 
OECD   Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OUP   Oxford University Press 
PMI   Philip Morris International 
PLOS med  Public Library of Science Medicine 
QB   Queen’s Bench 
RSLR   Rivers State Law Reports (Nigeria) 
SC   Supreme Court 
TTCs   Transnational Tobacco Corporations 
UDHR   Universal Declaration of Human Rights 




UKHL   United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions 
UKSC   United Kingdom Supreme Court 
UNCAC   United Nations Convention against Corruption 
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme 
UNEP   United Nations Environmental Programme 
WHO FCTC  World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
WRN   Weekly Reports of Nigeria 





Chapter One. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background  
Transnational tobacco corporations (TTCs) have expanded into new markets 
based on the liberal global trade.1 These new frontiers—Asia, Africa, and the Middle 
East—have witnessed a rise in tobacco consumption, mainly attributed to intense 
lobbying,2 weak tobacco control, and the reduction of tobacco prevalence in developed 
countries.3 Although transnational activities contribute to the social and economic 
development,4 the cost to health, however, erodes such potential benefits. For 
instance, the World Health Organization’s factsheet reveals tobacco kills up to half of 
its users or nearly 6 million people each year, of which more than 5 million are users 
and ex-users.5 In addition, treating smoking-related illnesses is a costly business. The 
overall financial burden of tobacco use in the UK is estimated at £13.74 billion a year.6 
Similarly, the Nigerian economy lost an estimated $591 million in the form of medical 
treatments and loss of productivity from tobacco-related diseases.7 Such extreme 
revelations have bolstered the call for stringent tobacco regulatory framework in 
Nigeria.8 As a result, Nigeria introduced a tobacco regulatory framework, comprising 
government agents, institutions, and a national tobacco legislation, with the aim of 
reducing tobacco prevalence. The framework, in general, is part of a wider solution 
that protects citizens and the environment against the negative impact of transnational 
tobacco corporations, but how adequate is the regulatory framework against the well-
resourced transnational tobacco corporations? Scherer & Palazzo, for instance, 
 
1 D Yach, ‘Globalisation of tobacco industry influence and new global responses’ (2000) 9 Tobacco Control 206.  
2 R Masironi, ‘Smoking control strategies in developing countries: Report of a WHO expert committee, (1984) 
9(1) World Smoking Health 4; JL Mackay, ‘The fight against tobacco in developing countries’ (1994) 75(1) Tuber 
Lung Dis 8-24.  
3 Action on Smoking and Health, ‘ASH fact sheet: tobacco and the developing world’ (Ash.org.uk, July 2019) 
<http://ash.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/ASH-Factsheet_Developing-World_v3.pdf> accessed 31 
December 2012. 
4 J Michie (ed), The hand book of globalisation (3rd edn, Edward Edgar 2019). 
5 World Health Organization, ‘WHO Fact sheet No.339’ (WHO, 27 May 2020) 
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs339/en/index.html> accessed 23 May 2021. 
6 UK Dept of Health, ‘3rd UK implementation Report to WHO FCTC’, (dh.gov.uk, October 2010)  
<http://www.who.int/fctc/reporting/party_reports/gbr/en/index.html> accessed 4 January 2012. 
7 Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa (CSEA), A Scoping Study of Nigeria’s Tobacco Market and 
Policy Space (CSEA 2019) <https://www.africaportal.org/publications/scoping-study-nigerias-tobacco-market-
and-policy-space/> accessed 21 October 2019. 




contend that global regulatory frameworks are sometimes fragile and incomplete.9 
Ruggie claims that national laws where transnational corporations operate are 
sometimes weak, poorly enforced or non-existent.10 He argues, nonetheless, that 
there is a solution to this governance gap or institutional void through a regulatory 
partnership between government and business.11 This partnership posited by Ruggie 
creates a regulatory framework consisting of two sides: one side comprises non-state 
regulatory process, which involves organisations governing12 and coordinating their 
actions, including professional codes of ethics and corporate social responsibility; the 
second side is the state regulatory process, which requires government entities, under 
their primary duty to protect, to regulate the activities of businesses, including through 
legislation, regulations, and administrative rules issued by government entities.  
In the context of Ruggie’s regulatory partnership between government and 
business, the research will focus on state and non-state regulatory actions. The state 
regulatory action will include legislations relevant to the research, while the non-state 
regulatory action will include corporate social responsibility (CSR),13 given that CSR 
is an internal regulatory process or control, where an organisation elects to act 









9 AG Scherer & G Palazzo, ‘Globalisation and corporate social responsibility’. In A Crane et al., The Oxford 
Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (OUP 2008) 413 – 431. 
10 John G Ruggie, ‘Multinational as global institution: power, authority and relative autonomy’ (2018) 12(3) 
Regulation and Governance 317. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Examples include voluntary agreements and peer pressure.  




1.2 Research Focus and Relevance 
 
Nigeria maintains the position as one of the most important countries in Africa, 
taking leadership on many public health issues.14 It is the most populous state in Africa 
and remains at the forefront on many African issues, with some of its achievements 
translating into ‘soft’ influence on other African countries.15 As Africa’s economic 
centre, Nigeria is projected to be the 20th largest economy in the world by 2030, a 
projection favoured by transnational tobacco corporations.16 
Transnational Tobacco Corporations regard developing countries as the new 
frontier for tobacco trade due to declining tobacco prevalence in Western countries.17 
As a result, major transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) have gained presence in 
Nigeria, including British American Tobacco (BAT), the predominant tobacco 
corporation in Nigeria;18 Scandinavian Tobacco; Phillip Morris Limited; and Japan 
Tobacco International (known locally as Habanera Limited).  
Nigeria consumes large amount of tobacco products. In 2015, 110 million 
cigarettes were consumed daily, accounting for over 40 billion cigarettes per year.19 
These figures are expected to rise, with the increasing exposure of the younger 
population to smoking.20 More than 25000 children (10 – 14 years old) and about 7.5 
million adults (15+ years) continue to use tobacco each day,21 leading to an estimated 
death of 246 men per week.22 
 
14 President Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by President Obama and President Buhari of Nigeria Before Bilateral 
Meeting’ (White House Office of the Press Secretary, 20 July 2015). 
15 John Campbell & Matthew T Page, Nigeria: what everyone needs to know (Oxford University Press 2018). 
See also the World Bank data on Nigeria. 
16 Ibid. 
17 WHO FCTC, ‘DECISION: International cooperation for the implementation of the WHO FCTC, including 
Human Rights’ (FCTC/COP7(26), 7th session, India, 7-12 Nov 2016); see also, J Mackay and J Crofton, ‘Tobacco 
and the Developing World’ (1996) 52(1) British Medical Bulletin 206. 
18 CSEA (note 7) 6. 
19 D Adeloye and others, ‘Current prevalence pattern of tobacco smoking in Nigeria: a systematic review and 
meta-analysis’ (2019) 19(1) BMC Public Health 1719. 
20 Ibid. See also BO Adeniyi and others, Knowledge of the health consequences of tobacco smoking among 
Nigerians smokers: a secondary analysis of the Global Tobacco Survey’ (2017) 23(4) African Journal of Thoracic 
and Critical Care Medicine 113.  
21 Tobacco Atlas, ‘fact sheet: Nigeria’ (tobacco atlas, 2021) <tobaccoatlas.org/country/nigeria> accessed 2 





As with most sub-Saharan African nations, Nigeria perceives itself as a 
democratic, multicultural, free-market economy, albeit with its own unique 
circumstances, and research findings in Nigeria could benefit other sub-Saharan 
African countries. In addition, Nigeria is a member of the World Health Organization 
and a signatory to the conventions of the World Health Assembly (WHA). One of these 
conventions is the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 2003 (WHO 
FCTC), the first international treaty that promotes public health through tobacco 
control. The Convention serves as a new legal dimension for international health 
cooperation,23 shaping Nigeria’s legal and non-legal (for instance, tax rises on tobacco 
products) tobacco regulatory solutions.   
However, these solutions are one-sided: they are government’s response to 
tobacco control. Contrary to this unilateral approach, Ruggie argues that a bilateral 
approach—that is, a regulatory partnership between government and business—
enhances the regulatory framework.24 Building on Ruggie’s claim, the research will 
focus on evaluating both governmental response (tobacco regulations) and business 
response (CSR) to tobacco control. From the evaluation, the research will proffer 
solutions in the form of recommendations, with the ultimate aim to enable the tobacco 
regulatory framework. The suggested recommendations could inform policies and, 
consequently, reduce the numerous deaths and illnesses associated with tobacco 
prevalence. 
CSR research in Nigeria is mainly associated with the oil and gas industry, and 
few are associated with the tobacco industry. Instances of the few CSR tobacco-
related research include Egbe et al.25 and Jakpor,26 whose research are based on the 
attempts of tobacco companies to undermine tobacco control policies; and Ojo27 and 
Ihugbao,28 whose work involve normative CSR approach in the tobacco industry. 
 
23 O Oladepo et al., ‘Analysis of tobacco control policies in Nigeria: historical development and application of 
multi-sectoral action’ (2018) 18(1) British Medical Council Public Health 78. 
24 Ruggie (note 10). 
25 CO Egbe, ‘Role of stakeholders in Nigeria’s tobacco control journey after the FCTC: lessons for tobacco 
control advocacy in low-income and middle-income countries’ (2019) 28 Tobacco Control 386. 
26 P Jakpor, ‘How BAT undermines the WHO FCTC through agricultural initiatives’ (2012) 21(2) Tobacco control 
220. 
27 O Ojo (2019) ‘Nigeria: CSR as a vehicle for economic development’. In SO Idowu & WL Filho (eds), Global 
Practices of CSR (Springer-Verlag 2009) 393. 
28 B Ihugbao, ‘CSR stakeholder engagement and Nigerian tobacco manufacturing sub-sector’ (2012) 3(1) 




Thus, researchers’ understanding of the current tobacco regulatory framework 
remains incomplete, because previous work has not examined the regulatory 
framework using this bilateral approach. This research aims to fill that gap by 
contributing several novel industry-specific context, benefiting not only Nigeria but also 
sub-Saharan Africa and other nations with comparable situation.  
 
1.3 Methodology  
 
The approach will involve— (1) analysing three major elements: tobacco control 
legislation, tobacco control institution, and other laws that could serve as an auxiliary 
benefit to the overall tobacco regulatory framework; (2) analysing CSR policy 
framework of the dominant transnational tobacco corporations in Nigeria; and (3) 
drawing conclusions and recommendations to provide answers to the research 
questions.  
The research will rely on primary sources, including the Nigerian Constitution, 
national legislation, judicial decisions, regional and international instruments, as well 
as an extensive review of secondary sources such as books, journal articles, 
newspapers, internet documents, and internal documents of the tobacco industry. The 
Truth Tobacco Industry Documents (TTID) will provide data on the internal operations 
of transnational tobacco corporations. The TTID is an online archive containing 
permanent access to tobacco industry internal corporate documents produced during 
litigation between U.S. States and the seven major tobacco industry organisations and 
other sources. These internal documents give insights into the operations of the 
tobacco industry, including transnational tobacco corporations present in Nigeria.29 
International guidelines and principles, including domestic laws, will set a benchmark 
to prevent ‘subjectivity’ associated with the CSR agenda.30  
 
29 UCSF Library, ‘About The Truth Tobacco Industry Documents’ (UCSF.edu, year unknown) 
<https://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/about/history/> accessed 22 Jan 2018. 
30 European Commission, ‘A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for corporate social responsibility, COM (2011) 681 




Primary and secondary law data were sourced from the following libraries: 
Brunel University, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies London, and the British Library.  
1.4 Research Outline 
Chapter 1 
This chapter provides a background for an enhanced tobacco regulatory 
framework, including the reason to combine tobacco industry and corporate social 
responsibility, which appears to be paradoxical at first glance. The research questions 
and the focus of the research are discussed and justified. In addition, the overall 
research aim, and individual research objectives are identified. The chapter discusses 
the research methodology, adopting a strategy that entails a content-analysis of CSR 
statements of transnational tobacco corporations and primary legal sources 
concerning tobacco regulation.  
Chapter 2  
This chapter examines the concept of CSR, focusing on the theories and 
various related themes. It discusses the drivers of CSR and clarifies the elements of 
CSR adopted in the research, therefore, providing scope to a dynamic concept. To 
promote a broader understanding to the reader, the chapter focuses on the contending 
issues of CSR, such as the shareholder versus stakeholder primacy, and voluntary 
approach versus mandatory approach to CSR. The chapter explores the relationship 
between CSR and law, demonstrating how they both advance each other. It considers 
the analysis of corporate legal theories so as to appreciate the constraints placed on 
corporate law itself, which prevents the comprehensive application of CSR. Then, it 
analysed the CSR framework of the main transnational tobacco corporations operating 
in Nigeria, and it explores the position of the law on CSR and its effect on the tobacco 
industry. 
Chapter 3  
This chapter analyses the foremost tobacco control legislation in Nigeria: 
National Tobacco Control Act 2005 (NTCA). It reviews the adequacy of the Act by 




Convention for Tobacco Control, a treaty that it purports to domesticate. It then 
provides suggestions to enable the Act. 
Chapter 4 
This chapter explores other national laws that could be ‘promoted’ to benefit the 
NTCA. It provides an analysis of the laws in order to assess its adequacy in fulfilling 
the objectives of the NTCA. In addition, the chapter analysed the tobacco control 
institutions to determine their adequacy to satisfy their objectives.    
Chapter 5 
This chapter centres on corruption, anti-corruption measures, and the impact 
of corruption on the tobacco regulatory framework. It establishes the nexus between 
corruption and the adequacy of tobacco control. The chapter highlights unethical 
practices conducted by transnational tobacco corporations and considers relevant 
foreign case laws that reveals such acts. It then examines national and international 
anti-corruption instruments in regulating international businesses, as well as the 
international efforts to combat corruption in Nigeria. 
Chapter 6  
This chapter examines the relationship between human rights and tobacco 
control, demonstrating that Nigeria could apply a human-rights based approach to 
regulating the industry. It then draws attention to the human rights violations arising 
out of the activities of the tobacco industry. Furthermore, it clarifies the position of 
human rights responsibilities and obligations under the Nigerian constitution and under 
international instruments. Then, it assesses the adequacy of international human 
rights instruments in holding transnational tobacco companies accountable, as well as 
the effect of international initiatives developed to stimulate corporate responsibility.  
Chapter 7  
This chapter concludes the research. It begins by answering the research 
questions.  The chapter also revisits the overall aim and objectives of this research 
study. The findings thereof are summarised and are related to the research objectives. 




and based on these conclusions, recommendations are made. Lastly, the contribution 
of this research to knowledge and its implication is clarified.           
    
1.5 Research Question 
It is often the case society perceives the tobacco trade as a ‘sin industry’31, 
considering the negative health impact on society. For this reason, tobacco control 
advocates have demanded for reforms, ranging from proscribing tobacco products to 
shaping public perception, as well as protecting the public against the industry, 
primarily, through stringent legislative instruments.32 Nigeria, under treaty obligation, 
have bolstered tobacco control legislation, thereby enhancing its tobacco regulatory 
framework. However, how adequate is this framework against the activities of well-
resourced transnational tobacco corporations? This question is what the research 
seeks to answer, and to establish what role, if any, CSR has in the regulatory 
framework. As such, the research aims to answer the following questions:  
1) How adequate is Nigeria’s legal framework at regulating the activities of 
transnational tobacco corporations?  
2) What role corporate social responsibility has in the regulatory framework?   
 
To provide clarity to question one, the legal framework would include the major law 
regulating the tobacco industry and the institutions and agencies established thereof.  
By examining the above research questions, this study seeks to make significant 
contributions to augment the literature on CSR and tobacco control in Nigeria, which 
can also benefit sub-Saharan Africa. The intended outcome of the research questions 
is to create a novel research, enrich discussions and inform policy.  
 
 
31 L Craig et al, ‘Impact of the WHO FCTC on tobacco control: perspectives from stakeholders in 12 countries’ 
(2019) 28(2)Tobacco Control 129; CM Johnson & KJ Meiser, ‘The Wages of Sin: Taxing America’s Legal Vices’ 
(1990) 43(3) Western Political Quarterly 577. 
32 World Health Organisation, Protection from exposure to second-hand tobacco smoke: policy 
recommendations (World Health Organisation 2007); RD Hurt et al., ‘Roadmap to a tobacco epidemic: 





1.6 Overall Aim and Objectives of the Research  
 
a) The overall aim of the research is to enhance the tobacco regulatory framework 
in Nigeria. 
b) Identify legislation and institution that constitute the tobacco regulatory 
framework. 
c) Critically evaluate the adequacy of the regulatory framework to which they 
protect Nigerians against the adverse impact of transnational tobacco 
corporations. 
d) Explore solutions to enhance the regulation of transnational tobacco 
corporations, including through corporate social responsibility.  
e) Formulate recommendations based on the inconsistencies identified, so as to 
improve the regulatory framework. 










CSR means ‘something but not always the same thing to everybody’.33 For this 
reason, this chapter does not define CSR. Instead, it identifies the central themes 
associated with CSR.34 The chapter recognises the various concepts of CSR and 
draws out the main theories, issues, and contrasting debates with the aim of providing 
a greater understanding and scope to an otherwise fluid notion,35 given that a concept 
without a scope in meaning does not lend itself easily to defined agendas.36 The 
identification of the central theme therefore justifies the ability to present a legal 
perspective of CSR relevant to the research agenda. By capturing the symbiotic 
relationship between law—in the context of tobacco regulations—and CSR, the 
research demonstrates how they could both advance each other. Afterwards, it reveals 
the position of the law on how CSR should be practised within the tobacco industry, 
creating an industry-specific form of CSR. In drawing from these experiences, the 
chapter concludes that CSR could drive the context of obligations and responsibilities 
of transnational tobacco corporations, especially in situations where legislative or 
governmental gaps arises.  
 
2.2 The Concept of CSR 
 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has continued to gain prominence.37 It is 
no longer considered as a business subject alone, but equally as a subject for 
 
33 D Votaw, ‘Genius becomes rare: A comment on the Doctrine of Social Responsibility Pt.1’ (1972) 15(2) 
California Management Review 25. 
34 Burchell J, ‘Understanding the Concept of CSR’. In J Burchell, The Corporate Social Responsibility Reader, 
(Routledge 2008) 79. 
35 M Marrewijk, ‘Concepts and definitions of CSR and corporate sustainability: Between agency and 
communion’ (2003) 44(2) Journal of Business Ethics 95. 
36 N Boeger, R Murray and C Villiers (eds), Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility (Edward Elgar 
2008)1.  




government, civil society, academia, and NGOs. Having transformed over the years,38 
CSR has had significant impact on society, economy, and on the environment. On 
corporate impact, for instance, CSR has ‘evolved from how businesses spend their 
money to how they earn it’.39 This expansive nature of CSR, however, serves as both 
a benefit and a burden, a benefit considering that it continues to grow as a positive 
social construct and a burden arising out of, but not limited to, scope and definitional 
issues. On the issue of scope, CSR may have started as a business management 
concept, its tentacles, however, are now rooted in different specialities, ranging from 
psychology40 to legal conceptions. Each constituent actor has redefined the definition 
and reshaped its scope. For instance, climate change, which now forms an integral 
part of CSR, has expanded the scope in the form of a new CSR agenda: corporation 
should aim to minimise their environmental impact. With this expansive nature, the 
scope of CSR now includes water and waste management, alleviating poverty, supply 
chain standard, human rights, philanthropy, employee satisfaction, ethical behaviour, 
transparency, community involvement, sustainable development, and still 
increasing.41  All of these various shades of CSR have had an influence on the flexible 
approach to the language and acronym of CSR, portrayed when representatives of 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the UK indicated that the term 
‘corporate responsibility’ is unfriendly to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
preferring a more inclusive term—responsible business.42 Other references to CSR 
are sustainability, corporate accountability, citizenship, amongst other references.43 
As for definitional issues, this could be demonstrated when the European 
Commission (EC), faced with such a challenge, had to reframe CSR to reflect recent 
changes, as the term continued to evolve. The EC first defined CSR as ‘a concept 
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business 
 
38 For instance, from being a single bottom line to a triple bottom line—that is, from profit to people, planet, 
and profit. 
39 UK Department for Business Innovation & Skills, Corporate Responsibility, Good for Business & Society: 
government response to call for views on corporate responsibility, (BIS, April 2014).  
40 Y Yoon et al., ‘The Effect of CSR Activities on Companies with Bad Reputation’ (2006) 16(4) Journal of 
Consumer Psychology 377.  
41 ISO, ‘ISO 26000:2010, Guidance on Social Responsibility’ (iso.org, Nov 2010) 
<https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:26000:ed-1:v1:en> accessed 25 April 2014.  
42 The UK Department for Business Innovation and Skills refers to the concept as ‘Corporate Responsibility’ at 
(note39); whilst the ISO refers to the concept as ‘Social Responsibility’.  





operations and their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis’.44 Ten 
years after the first definition, the EC depicts CSR as ‘the responsibility of enterprises 
for their impacts on society’.45 This new representation of CSR demonstrates two 
major developments: first, whilst the old definition reflects a rigid form of CSR, the new 
strategic approach captures the fluidity of the concept by focusing on its core 
elements—corporate responsibilities and corporate impact. Supporting this kind of 
approach, Burchell argues that it is beneficial to identify the core elements of CSR 
rather than seeking an all-encompassing definition.46 On the second major 
development, the EC notably excluded the ‘voluntary’ element of CSR from its new 
depiction, an element that has been contentious within the CSR discourse. On the one 
hand, certain countries, including Sweden, have adopted a voluntary approach to 
CSR;47 on the other hand, countries such as India and Mauritius have legislated to 
compel companies to engage in CSR.48  
Positioned between the two opposing approaches is a quasi-mandatory and       
-voluntary approach; that is, an approach where CSR remains voluntary but with 
various degrees of industry-specific or content-specific legislation, aimed at shaping 
corporate behaviour. Denmark, Germany and Canada are examples of countries that 
have employed this approach.49 Jones argues that the voluntary approach to CSR is 
a better option, for it allows market forces or consumers to possess the ultimate power 
and influence to make or break an organisation,50 but scholars such as Baldwin et al. 
view this voluntary approach to CSR as inadequate.51 Villiers has similar concerns that 
when corporate actors regulate their corporation through CSR, it has the effect of 
increasing their power; thus, to harness corporate power effectively, external 
regulation is necessary.52 Nonetheless, the research adopts and aligns scope with the 
 
44 Commission, ‘Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social Responsibility’, (Green Paper) COM 
(2001) 366 final, 18 July 2001.  
45 European Commission, ‘A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility’, COM (2011) 
681 final, 25 October 2011. 
46 J Burchell, ‘Understanding the Concept of CSR’ in J Burchell, The Corporate Social Responsibility Reader, 
(Routledge 2008) 79. 
47 R Schmidpeter et al. (eds), International dimensions of sustainable management (Springer 2019).  
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 D Jones, Who Cares Wins: why good business is better business (Pearson Education Ltd 2012) 106. 
51 R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation (Oxford University Press 1999); J Black, ‘Decentralising 
regulation: the role of regulation and self-regulation in a post-regulatory world’, (2001) 54 Current Legal 
Problems 103-146. 




EC’s representation of CSR which is based on two major characteristics: corporate 
responsibilities and corporate impact. Having approached CSR in this unambiguous 
manner, the EC’s depiction is simple without being simplistic, a reflection of the current 
trends, and flexible enough to advance this research agenda. To elect an extensive 
meaning of CSR would be too broad and self-defeating to the aims and objectives of 
the research. 
Another underlining question with the concept of CSR is how do you measure 
ethical behaviour in organisations without being subjective?53 Research suggests that 
both business sector codes54 and multisector codes, such as OECD Guidelines, UN 
Global Compact and Global Reporting Initiative, are not comprehensive enough.55 
Accordingly, business sector codes are conscientious about the economic health of 
the organisation, protecting the company’s assets, and employees’ relationship with 
the corporate entity, amongst other corporate interests; in contrast, multisector codes 
are mostly silent on such matters but focuses instead on responsibilities to investors 
and relevant stakeholders.56 However, this legal research would evaluate 
responsibilities by seeking, as a point of reference, guidance from legal instruments 
and international initiatives relevant to the research, and would also recognise CSR 
statements by transnational tobacco companies.57  
Having given scope and meaning to an otherwise fluid concept, the research 
will now move on to discuss theories and related themes associated with the CSR 
discourse, aimed to provide academic rigour and an in-depth perspective of the CSR 




53 Aviva Geva, ‘Three models of corporate social responsibility: interrelationships between theory, research, 
and practice’ (2008) 113(1) Business and Society Review 1-41 at p27: one can argue that the notion of the 
‘good of society’ is too abstract to serve as a benchmark for assessing CSR. 
54 CSR codes written by individual companies. 
55 Lynn Paine et al., ‘Up to Code: Does Your Company’s Conduct Meet World Class Standards?’ (2005) 83(12) 
Harvard Business Review 122-133: The research suggests that there is a ‘fault line between codes’ written by 
businesses and those written by non-businesses. 
56 Ibid.  
57 Aviva Geva, ‘Three models of corporate social responsibility: interrelationships between theory, research, 




2.3 Analytical Theories, Related Themes and the CSR Paradigm. 
 
CSR theories are not unified; they are, rather, fragmented theories that are 
generally descriptive or normative.58 A descriptive theory describes what CSR practice 
is or ought to be, while a normative theory examine the rationale for corporations to 
adopt CSR. To wit, a normative theory holds that corporations must adopt CSR 
because it is the morally right thing to do.59 Despite the differences, a fundamental 
CSR consensus among the theories is the idea that organisations have an obligation 
to work for the benefit of society.60 The research will now focus on the CSR theories 
expounded by Garriga and Mele61, and Moir62.  
Garriga and Mele identified four main types of CSR theories: instrumental, 
political, integrative, and ethical theories. Instrumental theories—Under this theory, 
the corporation uses CSR as an instrument for wealth creation, and its social activities 
are only a means to achieve such economic results. Instrumental theory embraces the 
maximisation of shareholder value.63 Modern instrumental theorist advocate for an 
‘enlightened value maximisation’64, accepting that specific social activity may 
contribute to the long-term shareholder value and existence of the corporation. This 
group also includes theories that express corporate social activities in terms of 
competitive advantage, either within a competitive context65 or through an expansion 
into a new market66 It also covers theories placing CSR as a marketing tool and 
integral to the brand perception that translates to corporate profit.    
 
58 A Okoye, Legal Approaches and Corporate Social Responsibility: Towards a Llewellyn’s Law-Jobs Approach 
(Routledge 2017) 47. 
59 Aviva Geva (note 57) 12.  
60 T Campbell, ‘The Normative Ground of Corporate Social Responsibility: A human rights approach in D 
McBarnet et al (eds), The New Corporate Accountability: CSR and the Law (Cambridge University Press 2007) 
530.  
61 E Garriga and D Mele, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the Territory’ (2004) 53(1-2) 
Journal of Business Ethics 51-71.  
62 L Moir, ‘What do we mean by corporate social responsibility?’ (2001) 1(2) Corporate Governance: The 
international journal of business in society 16. 
63 This concept refers to the increase in monetary value or other forms of asset appreciation, of shareholders’ 
investment in an organisation.  
64 H Ward, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in Law and Policy’. In N Boeger et al. (eds), Perspectives on 
Corporate Social Responsibilities (Edward Elgar 2008) 8-38. 
65 R Pillay, The Changing Nature of Corporate Social Responsibility: CSR and development in context – the case 
of Mauritius (Routledge 2015) 10-21. 




Political theories are concerned with the power of corporations in society and 
the responsible use of this power in the political arena. Political theorists highlight the 
notion of corporate power and its relationship with the responsibility within society. The 
relationship between corporations and the political system is fragmented and 
somewhat multifaceted. On the one hand, the political system defines the institutional 
context in which corporations are embedded and also incentivises or restricts 
corporate behaviour.67 On the other hand, corporations influence the institutional 
context by various means; thus, becoming political actors themselves.68 Reich’s 
narrative is that corporations have become increasingly involved in politics and are 
now taking a keen role in the political arena by hiring a plethora of lobbyists, lawyers, 
and public-relations specialists to shape government regulations to their advantage or 
to the disadvantage of their competition.69 According to Reich, this is now the status 
quo because many politicians need financial resources from the corporate sector to 
sustain or achieve political power (e.g. electioneering) and when ‘top corporate 
executives… want something from politicians they have backed, those politicians are 
likely to respond positively’.70   
Focusing on the tobacco industry, TTCs have engaged in CSR activities to gain 
access to policymakers, enabling them to realign industrial issues in their favour.71 
Documents made available following the public litigation against TTCs have 
established how the industry deliberately used CSR in a way that has obstructed 
health-related policies and legislation, which would have otherwise restricted financial 
 
67 G Jackson and R Deeg, ‘Comparing capitalisms: institutional diversity and its implications for international 
business’ (2008) 39 Journal of International Business Studies 540. 
68AJ Hillman et al., ‘Corporate political activity: a review and research agenda’ (2004) 30 Journal of 
Management 837. 
69 RB Reich, Supercapitalism: the battle for democracy in an age of big business (Icon Books Ltd 2009). Reich is 
a professor of public policy. He served in the administration of three US presidents and was Secretary of 
Labour (1993- 1997) under President Bill Clinton. His observations also rein true in other similar democratic, 
capitalist States including Nigeria. See also, CO Egbe et al., ‘Avoiding “a massive spin-off in West Africa and 
beyond”: the tobacco industry stymies tobacco control in Nigeria’ (2017) 19(7) Nicotine Tobacco Research 877, 
the article concludes that tobacco lobbyist and front groups successfully blocked and weaken Nigeria’s tobacco 
control especially the Tobacco Smoking (Control) Decree 20 of 1990 and efforts to strengthen it in 1995.  
70 RB Reich, Beyond Outrage: what has gone wrong with our economy and our democracy, and how to fix it 
(Vintage Books 2012) xiv.  See also Reich, Ibid. at 223-5. 
71 G Palazzo and U Richter, ‘CSR Business as Usual? The case of the tobacco industry’ (2005) 61(4) Journal of 




freedom and profitability.72 This strategic use of CSR to influence political power is the 
account of ‘political CSR’ postulated by Fooks et al.73  
Generally, corporations do not operate in isolation. Instead, they can become 
an intrinsic part of the political system, if they assume a political role.74 The exercise 
of this ‘unelected’ political role through influencing the polity, if not regulated, may lead 
to exploitation and tobacco company interference. This political role of corporations 
has been discussed in various subsets of management studies, including corporate 
political activity75, political CSR76 and corporate citizenship77, and they all have a 
varied position on the political role of corporations. The latter two, according to 
Scherer, are more recent CSR conceptions, concentrating on the role of corporations 
in providing public goods, defining public rules, and enforcing such rules.78The 
analysis of these two concepts involves corporation satisfying governmental gaps in 
providing public goods and service, where state agencies are unwilling or unable to 
provide public goods. The concepts emphasize the state-like role of multinational 
corporations distinguishable from the instrumental approaches that focus on the 
business case of CSR.79 The two theoretical conceptions are rooted in political 
theories and are both normative theories because they incorporate values, and these 
values are explicit for critical reflection (they propose how research should change 
social reality and why).80 Political CSR scholarship developed a critical research 
agenda on the responsibilities of business and dissociated itself from the instrumental 
approach to CSR.81 Frynas and Stephens define political CSR as ‘activities where 
 
72 T Coombs, ‘Origin Stories in CSR: genesis of CSR at British American Tobacco’ (2017) 22(2) Corporate 
Communications 178. 
73 G Fooks et al., ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Access to Policy Elites: An Analysis of Tobacco Industry 
Documents’ (2011) 8(8) PLoS Medicine 1-12: The findings suggest that tobacco company’s CSR strategies 
enables access to and dialogue with policymakers and provide opportunities for issue definition; see also 
World Health Organisation, WHO FCTF: 10 years of implementation in the African region (WHO Region Office 
for Africa 2015) 9,43-4. 
74 AG Scherer et al., ‘The Business Firm as a Political Actor: a new theory of the firm for a globalised world’ 
(2014) 53 Business and Society 143. 
75 AJ Hillman (note 68). 
76 AG Scherer and G Palazzo, ‘The new political role of business in a globalized world: a review of a new 
perspective on CSR and its implications for the firm, governance and democracy’ (2011) 48 Journal of 
Management Studies 899–931. 
77 D Matten and A Crane, ‘Corporate citizenship: toward an extended theoretical conceptualization’ (2005) 30 
Academy of Management Review 166–179. 
78 AG Scherer, ‘Theory assessment and agenda setting in political CSR’ (2017) 20(2) International Journal of 
Management Reviews 1-27. 
79 Ibid. 





CSR has an intended or unintended political impact, or where intended or unintended 
political impacts on CSR exist’, and the impacts defined are about the functioning of 
the state as a sphere of activity that is distinctive from business activity.82 However, 
Frynas and Stephens did not give an explicit account of the meaning of ‘political’ and 
its normative implications. Scherer stated that Frynas and Stephens way of a definition 
does not help to clarify the notion of ‘political’.83 This lack of clarity further adds to the 
complexity of political CSR .  
Corporate citizenship (CC) as a type of political theory is sometimes used 
synonymously with CSR and has therefore taken on various meanings. However, its 
foundation is rooted in the perception of a corporation as a citizen in society with rights 
and responsibilities.84 Literature suggests three views of CC:85 one that equates 
corporate citizen with corporate philanthropy86; another equates CC with CSR.87 The 
third one extends the concept of CC by defining the role of the corporation with the 
administration of citizens’ rights for the individual,88 which has been criticised as ‘an 
idea whose time has not yet come’,89 given the lack of ‘credible accountability 
mechanisms’.90 In summary, two approaches to political theories are identified: one 
as an organisation fulfilling the role of government, and the second as an organisation 
influencing the political class to advance their cause.  
Integrated theories: This group of theories expresses how business integrates 
social demands. It contends that business depends on society for its existence, 
continuity, and growth. Social demands are generally considered to be how society 
interacts with business, and how society gives it legitimacy.91 Corporate management, 
therefore, considers social demands and integrates them in such a way that the 
business operates by social values. The theories of this group focus on the detection 
of, and response to, the social demands that achieve social legitimacy and greater 
 
82 JG Frynas and S Stephens, ‘Political corporate social responsibility: reviewing theories and setting new 
agendas (2015) 17 International Journal of Management Reviews 483, 485. 
83 AG Scherer (note 78). 
84 WB Gallie, ‘Essential contested concepts’ (1958) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 167-198. In M 
Black (ed), The Importance of Language (Prentice-Hall 1962) 121-146. 
85 Ibid. at p123.   
86 Ibid. at p125 and p136. 
87 Gallie (note 84) 135. 
88 WE Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse (3rd ed., Blackwell, 1993) 29. 
89 M Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory – A Conceptual Approach (Oxford University Press 1998) 56. 
90 A Okoye, Legal Approaches and CSR: towards a Llewellyn’s Law-Jobs Approach (Routledge 2017) 49. 




social acceptance. The theory embodies public responsibility92, corporate social 
performance, stakeholder management and descriptive theories that focus on the 
corporate response to CSR. In addition, Freeman93 and other stakeholder theorists, 
such as Moir,94 expound an approach where management takes cognisance of 
stakeholders who affect, or are affected by, the corporation policies and practices. 
Furthermore, corporate social performance as an embodiment of integrated theory 
adopts the principle of CSR and the processes of corporate social responsiveness 
together with the outcomes of corporate behaviour.95 Integrative theories, therefore, 
represent a synthesis of other categories of theories to provide a framework for 
assessing corporate response, analysis, and corporate policy development.96 
Ethical theories are based on the principles of an organisation ‘doing good’ in 
its triple bottom line approach—people, planet, and profit.97 That is, what is right for 
society. The different approach under the ethical theory includes normative 
stakeholder theory, universal human rights, sustainable development98 and ‘the 
common good approach’;99 however, the approaches are susceptible to various forms 
of interpretations, as with most CSR theories.100  
Moir identified three theories to explain active CSR: (1) stakeholder theory to 
explain how; (2) social contract theory, which is closely aligned with (3) legitimacy 
theory, to explain why.101 A summary of these theories is presented below. 
Stakeholder theory contends that business can be understood as a set of 
relationships among groups that have a stake in the activities of a business 
 
92 Gallie (note 84) 135. 
93 Moir (note 101). 
94 Freeman (note 102). 
95 Gallie (note 84) 136. 
96 Okoye (note 90) 50. 
97 JJ Graafland et al., ‘Benchmarking of Corporate Social Responsibility: Methodological Problems and 
Robustness’ (2004) 53(1-2) Journal of Business Ethics 137, 138. 
98 The World Business Council for Sustainable Development defines the trend towards sustainability as ‘forms 
of progress that meets the needs of the presence without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their needs.’ Cited in John Manners-Bell, Supply chain ethics: using CSR and sustainability to create 
competitive advantage (Kogan Page 2017) 12.  
99 The Common good approach holds the common good of society as the referential value for CSR and 
maintains that business, as with any other social group or individual in society, should contribute to the 
common good, because it is a part of society, see Garriga and Mele (note 61) 62. 
100 See Graafland et al. (note 97). 
101  Lance Moir, ‘What do we mean by corporate social responsibility?’ (2001) 1(2) Corporate Governance: The 




organisation. Stakeholders are individuals or groups that can affect or be affected by 
the core purpose of an organisation, given that a business is successful insofar as it 
creates value for, and satisfies, key stakeholders continually over time.102 According 
to Freeman, a stakeholder affects, or is affected, by the firm’s objectives or 
activities.103 With this perception, stakeholders include shareholders, creditors, 
employees, public interest groups and government. Stakeholders are typically divided 
into primary and secondary stakeholders.104 Primary stakeholders, according to 
Clarkson, are those whose participation directly affects the survival of an organisation 
as a going concern.105 This group includes shareholders and investors, employees 
and customers, and what Clarkson refers to as the public stakeholder group: the 
governments and communities that provide infrastructures, markets, and the enabling 
legal framework.106 The secondary groups are those who affect or are affected by the 
corporation, but the central characterisation of the group is that they are not engaged 
in transactions with the corporation nor essential for its survival.107 
 Stakeholder theorists are divided on whether to consider the theory as 
normative, which is mostly based on ethical propositions, or as empirical/instrumental/ 
descriptive theory.108 Inquiries that have shaped the debate on CSR theories in this 
area is twofold: first, the determination to consider whether stakeholder theory is part 
of the motivation for businesses to act responsibly; secondly, the identification of 
relevant stakeholders to be taken into consideration by business managers. Regarding 
the latter, Mitchell et al. developed a model of stakeholder identification based on 
stakeholders possessing one or more of the attributes of power, legitimacy, and 
urgency.109 We might therefore anticipate that firms would pay most attention to those 
legitimate stakeholders who have power and urgency. In practice, this may mean that 
firms with problems over employee retention would attend to employee issues 
 
102 Edward Freeman and Bidhan Parmar, ‘Stakeholder Theory’. In Wayne Visser et al. (eds), The A to Z of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (John Wiley 2007). 
103 Cited in RW Roberts, ‘Determinants of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: An application of 
Stakeholder Theory’ (1992) 17(6) Accounting Organisations and Society 595. 
104 MBE Clarkeson, ‘A Stakeholder Framework for Analysing and evaluating Corporate Social Performance’ 
(1995) 20 Academy of Management Review 92. 
105 Ibid. at p106. 
106 Ibid.  
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(urgency) and those in consumer markets would have regard to matters that affect 
reputation (power and legitimacy). Within the stakeholder framework, the difference 
between the social and economic goals of a corporation is no longer relevant because 
the core issue is the survival of the corporation affected not only by shareholders but 
also by stakeholders, including employees, governments, and customers.110  
In addition, an empirical study by Berman et al. articulate two distinct 
perspectives in stakeholder theory: the strategic stakeholder model and the intrinsic 
stakeholder model.111 Their findings suggest that the strategic stakeholder model, 
which is based on the business case logic of CSR, have more empirical support than 
the intrinsic stakeholder model, which emphasised the moral aspect of CSR.112 
Similarly, Hino and Zennyo acknowledged two broad categories of CSR in literature 
reviews: the constitutive approach (intrinsic stakeholder model) and instrumental 
approach (strategic stakeholder model).113 Under the constitutive approach, CSR is 
an element of corporate governance based on the stakeholder theory. In this instance, 
CSR is regarded as a social norm114 or endogenous to the company; hence, reliance 
is placed on the determination to create fiduciary relationships and satisfy the interests 
of all stakeholders. According to this view, CSR is not an instrument for a separate 
goal but, rather, a part of the firm’s goals established from the social contract between 
all stakeholders.115 In contrast, the instrumental approach regards CSR as an 
instrument of the firm’s strategy to maximise profits. 
However, stakeholder theories have been classified as a system of ideas not 
clearly defined. This unclear definition is because it partly lacks in scope as it matches 
the discourse of being descriptive, instrumental and normative.116 Scherer also points 
out that there are different and sometimes incoherent assumptions and approaches 
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that compete with one another.117 Thus, there is a considerable fragmentation within 
the stakeholder discourse that prevails leading to Freeman to concede that ‘[t]here is 
no such thing as the stakeholder theory […] it is a genre of stories about how we could 
live.’118 Further analysis of shareholder and stakeholder primacy will be discussed in 
the next section. 
Legitimacy Theory. According to Suchman, legitimacy theory is ‘a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and 
definitions.’119 The primary argument of legitimacy theory is that external factors 
influence corporate management to seek to legitimise activities. Suchman also 
identified three critical challenges of legitimacy management faced by organisations: 
gaining legitimacy, maintaining legitimacy and repairing legitimacy.120 It has been 
observed that legitimacy is not necessarily a good process for organisations to obtain 
legitimacy from society.121 When faced with a legitimacy threat, an organisation has 
the option of four legitimation strategy: it may choose to educate its stakeholders about 
its intention to improve the organisation’s performance; it may seek to change the 
organisation’s perception of the event without changing performance; it may divert 
attention from the event, or it may choose to change external expectations of its 
performance.122 As such, legitimacy may be seen as a critical reason, but not the only 
reason, for undertaking corporate social responsibility.123  
It has also been argued that because society grants power to business 
organisations, society expects that power to be used responsibly,124 given that 
business organisations are regarded as resource-dependent.125 Such a view builds on 
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Phillips’ distinction between normative legitimacy and derivative legitimacy, which 
are significantly distinct from one another.126 Normative legitimacy, on the one hand, 
hinges on the moral obligation owed to other (normative) stakeholders; on the other 
hand, derivative legitimacy transpires when stakeholders exercise ‘the ability to affect 
the organisation’ as legitimate. Derivative legitimacy results from the influence that 
specific stakeholders can levy against the organisation.127 For instance, normatively, 
the tobacco industry’s CSR is rooted in the moral obligation to provide products with 
minimal or no health impact on consumer stakeholders. Derivatively, the tobacco 
industry’s environmental impact is imposed by the government’s regulation. 
Social Contract Theory is a series of interaction between members of society 
and society itself.128 In this context of CSR, business carries out their activities in a 
responsible manner, not because of commercial interest but by being part of how 
society expects business to operate. It is acknowledged that organisations do not exist 
in a vacuum. Therefore, they will have to interact with the surrounding society and to 
incorporate environmental and social approaches into their business operations, thus, 
ensuring long term organisational sustainability rather than seeking profit 
maximisation alone.129 
Building on the integrated social contracts theory, Donaldson and Dunfee 
differentiated between macrosocial contracts and microsocial contracts.130 A 
macrosocial contract in the context of communities, for example, would be an 
expectation that business provides some support to its local community and the 
specific form of involvement would be the microsocial contract. As a result, companies 
who adopt a view of social contracts would describe their involvement as an integral 
part of societal expectation or a ‘license to operate’131. From this perspective, CSR is 
described as the obligation entrenched from the implicit ‘social contract’ between 
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business and society. It is business responsiveness to society’s long-term needs and 
wants by optimising the positive effects and minimising its adverse effects on 
society.132 However, Lantos criticised the social contract theory, among others, for 
being vague, given that it is an unwritten social contract that varies from location to 
location.133  
ISO 2600:2010 Guidance on social responsibility (SR) is not a CSR theory. 
It serves to guide how business and organisations can operate in a socially 
responsible way through the display of ethical and transparent behaviour that 
contributes to the health and welfare of society.134 SR is not intended to certify but, 
instead, to assist organisations in contributing to sustainable development and 
encouraging activities that go beyond legal compliance.135 It is built on the foundation 
of best practices developed by an international consortium of different stakeholder 
groups focused on defining the meaning of social responsibility with universal 
clarity.136 It recognises that compliance with the law is a fundamental duty of any 
organisation as an essential part of CSR. The standard seeks to promote a common 
understanding of social responsibility while complementing – but not replacing – other 
existing tools and initiatives. The ISO 26000 states that organisations should integrate 
societal, environmental, legal, cultural, political, and organisational diversity as well as 
differences in economic conditions while being consistent with international norms of 
behaviour. SR can be applied in conjunction with other CSR programs, including 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011) and the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI);137 conversely, it has been criticised for being too broad in scope, time‐
consuming and costly.138 
SR identifies three stakeholder139 relationships as part of the CSR approach: 
Business and Society relationship, involves organisations identifying how its decisions 
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and activities impact on society and the environment or its ‘sphere of influence’;140 
Business and Stakeholder relationship, the awareness of its various stakeholders, 
including individuals or groups whose interests could be affected by the decisions and 
activities of the business organisation; and Stakeholder and Society relationship, 
which entails understanding the relationship between the stakeholders' interests that 
are affected by the enterprise, on the one hand, and the expectations of society, on 
the other. Even though stakeholders are part of society, stakeholders may have an 
interest that is conflicting with the expectations of society.141Additionally, SR 
recognises seven fundamental principles of social responsibility: accountability, 
transparency, ethical behaviour, the respect for stakeholder’s interest, human rights, 
the rule of law, and international norms of behaviour. Furthermore, SR acknowledges 
seven core subjects of social responsibility: fair operating practices, human rights, the 
environment, consumer issues, business governance, labour practices and 
community involvement and development.142 The core subjects are embedded with 
their associated issues under clause 6 of the SR guidance. These core subjects are 
involved with the quality and characteristics of relationships between the organisation 
and other stakeholders that generate satisfactory results, especially ethics. The core 
subjects address actions, such as to prevent corruption, encourage transparency and 
fair competition, respect associated rights and obligations, so that interactions 
between the organisation and other stakeholders are legitimate and productive. 
Reoccurring characteristics of CSR is identifiable at this stage of the research. 
An examination of literature, including the characteristics of the classified theories, ISO 
SR and the EU revised strategy of CSR,143 reveals contemporary indigenous themes 
that will benefit the research. At its core, there is a consistency with CSR even though 
this may sound paradoxical: in its inconsistency, there is a thread of consistency. The 
foundational element of CSR is the drive for legitimacy via organisational ‘good’ 
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responsibilities towards stakeholders.144 Essentially, CSR could be summarised under 
the subjects and issues of the SR to include Human rights (most of the associated 
issues under human rights include civil & political rights and economic, social & cultural 
rights); Labour Practices (associated issues on health and safety issue); Environment 
(associated issues including environmental protection, biodiversity and preventing 
pollution); Fair operating practices (associated issues will focus on anti-corruption 
including responsible political involvement and promoting social responsibility in value 
chain issues); Consumer Issues (the focus issue on protecting consumer’s health); 
and Community Involvement and Development (associated issue will focus on health). 
In addition, the research will apply international guidelines and domestic laws with the 
relevant core subjects and issues to evaluate TTCs performances and policies. 
According to the EU, there is a resounding acceptance to benchmark a company’s 
performance against principles and guidelines supported by public authorities;145 
besides, to benchmark is to prevent ‘subjectivity’ associated within the CSR agenda.146   
External Factors influencing CSR. External factors could influence and 
shape the CSR activities of any organisation. According to Vashchenko, these three 
groups of external factors—government-related, business-related, and society-
related—acknowledged organisational stakeholders and the institutional 
environment.147   
The government-related factor highlights political aspects of the organisational 
context. These external factors influence organisational CSR-related behaviour 
through legal mechanisms. That is, through either hard law or soft law.148 Under hard 
law, enforcement and regulations tend to influence organisations to act responsibly, 
avoiding bad publicity from contravening the law.149 Hard law also acts as a sort of 
baseline from which a company can build on, by doing more and beyond the required 
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standard set under the law or legislation. Soft laws, to a large extent, are a product of 
intergovernmental organisations capable of forcing companies to consider CSR as an 
essential issue, albeit voluntary.150 For instance, the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights have been adopted by leading TTCs.151 Moreover, some 
of the soft laws—international law—may become hard law if member states 
domesticate the international law, or other forms of soft law. Nigeria’s adoption of the 
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) into municipal law 
under the auspices of the National Tobacco Control Act 2015 serves as an example. 
The business-related factor describes the external organisational business 
context and represents market conditions and mechanisms.152 These economic 
interests exercise market power to influence organisational CSR policymaking. As 
such, TTCs are less likely to act in socially responsible ways if they operate in a climate 
where, according to Campbell, ‘inflation is high, productivity growth is low, consumer 
confidence is weak and, in sum, it appears that it will be relatively difficult for firms to 
turn a healthy profit in the near term’.153 A country with weak law enforcement may 
probably restrain CSR outcomes. Examples of stakeholders with market power include 
institutional investors, professional associations, suppliers, and business partners. 
Under this factor, the company’s consumer plays a crucial role. For instance, 
customers may boycott or promote products, so companies are likely to take 
consumers’ concerns into account when making CSR decisions.154 Competitor’s CSR 
strategies and the level of competition are also among the forces that can influence 
organisational CSR choices. Companies monitor the competition, and when a 
competitor implements CSR principles, it may as well prompt other market players to 
follow suit. Further, Vashchenko argues that intense competition and weak 
competition are equally detrimental conditions for CSR development: the first one 
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emerges when profit margins are too narrow and organisational survival is under risk, 
companies try to cut expenses wherever possible; the second one occurs when a lack 
of alternatives, organisational reputation and customer loyalty do not affect the 
success of the organisation.155  
According to Vashchenko, the influencing factors from the third group, the 
society-related factors, represents a company's external social context. These factors 
evaluate CSR-related decisions and outcomes against certain norms, subsequently, 
providing or withdrawing ‘social legitimacy’.156 NGOs are considered within this group, 
especially as they have become politically significant and active in modern society.157  
The media is acknowledged to be another influential actor in the external environment 
that monitors and focuses on the ‘spotlight’ on organisations.158 The media, in a free 
and fair society, can serve as a watchdog informing both government and the public 
about socially irresponsible corporate activities, which could inevitably lead to the 
withdrawal of social legitimacy.159 Others in this category include business education 
and professional publications. 
 
2.4 Stakeholder and Shareholder Primacy and its impact on the CSR Discourse. 
 
The debate over the purpose of a public corporation appears to have begun in 
1932 with opposing articles between Dodd160 and Berle161 in a Harvard Law Review 
Symposium titled, For Whom Are Corporate Trustees?162 Berle held that the 
management of a corporation is to make maximum profits for its shareholders.163 
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Although Berle agrees that corporate managers can legally recognise other interests 
than those of the shareholders, he argues that this does not give them the right to 
consider those interests, considering that managers only represent the interest of 
shareholders.164 He asserts that the stakeholder principle runs counter to the 
fundamental principle of the law of business corporations.165 Berle’s perception is that 
directors and other agents are fiduciaries of the business.166 In other words, the 
directors and managers are trustees of the corporation while the shareholders are the 
beneficiaries.167 Similarly, Friedman, a prominent shareholder theorist, also argues 
that corporations should be managed solely for the benefit of its shareholders, which 
is to ultimately make profit.168 For that reason, he relates CSR—perceived as a 
concept for the benefit of stakeholders rather than shareholders169—with socialism, 
and if unchecked, may undermine capitalism.170  
Researchers have disapproved Friedman’s concept of corporate social 
responsibility for being so narrow.171 From another perspective, Friedman’s position 
could be overly broad. It could mean that for a business to be considered socially 
responsible, it would need to respond to social problems that were beyond its 
responsibilities or capabilities;172 that is, corporations would be trying to replace the 
government in their duties.173 Friedman’s assumptions of the corporation, according 
to Schrader, represents a naive view of the modern corporation because managers 
lead corporations without taking into account shareholders’ approval, at least in the 
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more like lenders rather than owners because they have their portfolios diversified, 
committing only a small portion of their wealth to any one firm.  
Contrary to the shareholder supremacy, Freeman argues that contemporary 
managers should have a pro-active attitude necessary towards both primary and 
secondary stakeholder groups.177 Likewise, Dodd argues that corporations are 
accountable to its stakeholders, such as its shareholders and the society.178 Dodd’s 
position is that corporations should have both a social service as well as a profit-
making function.179  To disregard stakeholders, corporations will emerge in successive 
upheavals, which may ultimately lead to its downfall.180 For instance, the spotlight on 
Google, Amazon and Starbucks for tax avoidance, albeit not a criminal offence, led to 
extensive criticism by governments, press, and the public, with suggestions of 
boycotting and ‘tax shaming’ the organisations.181  Another notable example is the 
case of Shell Nigeria, where its exploration was disrupted by the local community due 
to claims ranging from environmental degradation to failure to engage with the local 
community. This tension culminated in the arrest and execution of the environmental 
activist, Ken Saro Wiwa, by the then military government of Nigeria.182 The chain of 
events conveyed a global outcry of Shell’s environmental and human rights policies.183  
Litigants have also dragged the judicial courts into the shareholder–stakeholder 
supremacy debate. In the US case between Dodge v. Ford Motor184, Henry Ford and 
the directors of the Ford Motor Co. had decided not to pay a dividend despite 
substantial retained earnings in the company and substantial profits in the year in 
question. The reason for the decision, expressed by Henry Ford, was to expand the 
Ford industrial system for the benefit of society. The court, however, rejected Ford’s 
argument and held that a business corporation is ‘primarily for the profit of the 
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stockholders’.185 The court’s expression was that a refusal to pay a dividend had to be 
based on the best interests of the corporation, and the decisions that are in the best 
interests of the corporation were assumed to be those that promoted future 
profits. Similarly, the UK case between Hutton v West Cork Railway co186, Bowen, L.J 
stated that ‘charity has no business to sit at boards of directors’. This case concerns 
the limit of a director's discretion to spend company funds for the benefit of non-
shareholders regarding insolvency proceedings. It appears the courts would have 
decided the case differently today due to the changes in the English company law. 
Section 172 of the Companies Act (CA) 2006, states that directors should have regard 
to other stakeholders, including employees, customers, and the environment, for the 
benefit of the company and its members. The section, therefore, favours the 
stakeholder theory. Section 247 CA empowers the director to consider employees 
when a company has gone insolvent.187 This is similar to the position held by Berger, 
J. in the Canadian case between Teck Corporation Ltd v Millar188, where the  
advocated for an extensive definition of the ‘interests of the company’ to include both 
the employees and the community.189 
So far, this section has focused on the shareholder-stakeholder primacy 
debate. Central to the debate is the understanding of the legal theories of a corporate 
personhood. Therefore, the part below will briefly focus on the legal theories of a 
corporation. 
Legal theories of corporations 
Corporate legal theory influences the understanding of the role and purpose of 
a corporation.190 Blumberg examines three traditional corporate personality theories: 
the corporation as an artificial person, with corporate rights and duties separate from 
those of its shareholders; the corporation as an aggregate of individuals, which played 
an essential role to expand constitutional protections of shareholder’s economic 
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interest in the late nineteenth century; and the ‘real entity’, associated with the 
attribution of corporate constitutional rights, like those of natural persons in most 
cases.191 
 Artificial entity theory is synonymous to the artificial person or the grand doctrine 
of the corporation. The classic or foundational definition by Chief Justice Marshall, in 
the Dartmouth College case192, is that an artificial corporation is an artificial being, 
intangible, and existing only in the contemplation of law. Its scope is expressly granted 
by its charter of creation or as an incidental to its very existence. Such existence 
depends on the action or legislative pronouncement of the state. In addition, Ewin 
adds that corporations, as an artificial entity, cannot be moral persons for they are 
constrained by their legal persona.193 In contrast, French believes that a corporation 
can be a full-fledged moral person. He argues that for an entity to be subject of a moral 
obligation, it needed to be an intentional actor, and since corporations have internal 
decision-making structures, then, they are moral persons as a collective.194 French 
argument is based on his belief that if corporations are not full members of society, 
they ‘will avoid the scrutiny and control of moral sanction,’ aimed to subject 
corporations to moral standards.195 
 Corporation as an aggregate of a natural person is also known as association 
or contract theory, favoured by shareholder supremacists. The justification of State 
regulation in the formation of a company was found to be incompatible with the 
emerging economic structuring of large corporations. The corporation is perceived as 
the constitution of natural persons in the sense of a partnership not detached from its 
members196 or the property rights of an aggregated association. The major point in 
this argument is that corporations are not a person at all (artificial or otherwise) and 
should not be subjected to any special duties. Any regulation on the organisation 
should be justified to the individuals that own the corporation, and not an 
indeterminable concept of the corporation.197 However, the analogy between 
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corporations and partnership presented a problem on its own,198 leading to the 
emergence of the natural entity theory.  
 Under the natural entity or realism theory, the corporation is neither a legal 
fiction nor a contract partnership between individuals but a natural person with pre-
legal existence.199 In classifying a corporation this way, the state’s role is restricted 
from establishing a corporation and attempting to single out a corporation for exclusive 
regulatory control.200 One result of this conception is the ability of corporations to claim 
rights associated with natural persons. However, Friedman’s opinion of the corporation 
is that they are the property of shareholders, and management are employees of the 
shareholders or trustees.201 Reich also argues that corporations should not have the 
legal standing of a person, for a corporation ought not to be charged in criminal 
proceedings but subject only to corporate civil liability, considering that a corporation 
cannot act with criminal intent or mens rea as ‘they have no human capacity for 
intent’.202 
 The Nigerian company law aligns itself with the natural entity theory, given that 
the foremost company law states that ‘…every company shall, for the furtherance of 
its authorised business or objects, have all the powers of a natural person of full 
capacity’.203 The Nigerian company law therefore leans generously on the concept of 
corporations as natural persons, with the capacity to sue and be sued and enter into 
legally binding contractual agreements, amongst other rights.  
 
2.5 The Interaction between Law and CSR 
 
This section examines the relationship between law and CSR. It depicts the 
interaction between them by demonstrating how CSR advances the law and vice 
versa. 
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The interaction between CSR and law204 is interwoven. CSR are actions by the 
organisations above legal requirements. It is generally understood to be outside the 
ambit of the law or beyond legal compliance.205 This position could be considered as 
a misnomer, considering that any action ‘beyond the law’ should be within legal 
confinement. Nonetheless, as the research will demonstrate, law and legal standards 
play a considerable role in relation to corporate responsibilities. However, critics have 
warned against using the law to influence CSR actions in corporations. Most prominent 
in the ‘separation of CSR from law’ discourse is the neo-classical school of law and 
economics, based on Adam’s Smith’s perception that a free trade unfettered by 
regulation is the most effective for a thriving society.206 In contrast, is the Keynesian’s 
school of thought which advocates for government intervention in stabilising society.207 
Much of the literature under the neo-classical school since the 1980s have inclined 
that companies should only engage in CSR activities where there is a “business case” 
for doing so.208 This approach discouraged the introduction of regulation as a response 
to the issues raised in the CSR debate. Inversely, Ward argues that CSR is not atypical 
as projected; one of the several reasons is that ‘law is a part of what surrounds us’.209 
Ward further argues that the failure to accept the legal dimensions of CSR would only 
lead to the progressive weakening of defined balance between government, business 
and civil society.210  
Despite these opposing views between voluntary and mandatory CSR, it is 
relevant to underscore the position that CSR and law cannot be completely detached. 
Governments have become more involved in CSR programs either through traditional 
mandatory regulation of business or through soft law that encourages companies to 
pursue CSR initiatives 211 or co-regulatory initiatives.212 According to Cominetti and 
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Seele, government has three relevant roles in the CSR context: facilitatingꟷ 
government facilitates CSR by advancing CSR policy initiatives; legitimisingꟷ 
governmental legitimises and public recognises CSR; and modelling ꟷ government 
encourages governmental organs to act as good corporate citizens by applying CSR 
principles.213 In short, for CSR to thrive, there has to be a conscientious effort by the 
government in creating an enabling environment, including through rules, regulations, 
and sanctions. As pointed out by Vashchenko, CSR is dysfunctional in weak societies, 
particularly, when the government, media and civil society do not promote CSR; in 
contrast, if regulations, social preferences and cultural norms favour CSR, companies 
operating within such externalities will more likely embrace CSR principles to obtain 
legitimacy.214  
Furthermore, the role of CSR and the law is at best symbiotic. That is, the role 
of law in CSR215 and the role of CSR in law. The former is law used to encourage or 
mandate CSR initiatives, while the latter is CSR (re) modelling the law, both of which 
advance CSR in one way or the other.216 The role of CSR in law could be, for instance, 
law beginning its cycle as an informal law or as a corporate responsibility initiative and 
ends up as formal law or law promulgated by the State. That is informal law as pre-
formal laws. This is the case when corporate norms at a later stage obtain the status 
of formal law.217 For instance, the introduction of the legal requirement for non-financial 
disclosures in various States, including the EU,218 started as a corporate responsibility 
initiative when 85 of the FTSE100 companies had published non-financial reports,219 
a practice that later influenced the law. Another illustration is the significance of 
international law (informal law) in the formulation of substantive CSR, such as the 
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international guidance for CSR self‐regulation in reporting and benchmarking. 
Moreover, many CSR demands from stakeholders and corporate actors appear to be 
based exactly on assessments of compliance with international law, particularly 
human rights and labour law.220  
Another vital aspect in the relationship between CSR and the law has been 
around legitimacy, most notably, legal legitimacy. Legitimacy referred to by Suchman, 
is a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions’.221 Suddaby et al. believe that the application of the concept of 
legitimacy to numerous theoretical and empirical contexts has allowed it to be 
misapplied in many ways.222 Thus, this thesis will adopt the usage of legitimacy, in the 
CSR context, as the acceptance or justification of the existence of an institution.223 
This definitional application to TTCs means that ‘their executives must convince the 
general public they exercise power in a justified manner’;224 that is, an expression of 
adherence to both legal and societal values. Corporations are generally seen as 
legitimate institutions, and the justification of their existence can be found in its 
contribution to the common good in society. Such common good includes providing 
goods and services to meet societal needs, creating wealth, providing employment, 
and other societal needs. By and large, corporations receive support from society, and 
such support or legitimacy can be questioned by society in cases of certain unethical 
or illegal performance. Legitimacy, therefore, encapsulates the notion of justification 
and accountability from these different conceptions. 
Legitimacy, in the CSR discourse, has embraced three inter-related 
conceptions: legal, sociological and moral conceptions.225 The legal conception of 
legitimacy is concerned with the justification by reference to governing legal norms.226 
Similar to this view, Jones defines legitimacy as referring to ‘a system of widely 
accepted rules and standards governing the way in which power is achieved and 
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exercised.’227 The sociological conception adopts the Weberian view of legitimacy, as 
deriving from people’s belief in its legitimacy.228 In this sense, the justificatory source 
is societal perception. In line with this perception, Mitchell asserts that legitimacy refers 
to ‘the belief among groups…that the exercise of power is justified’.229 Regarding the 
moral conception, Foldvary describes it as an act in accordance ‘with the rules of an 
ethic’ akin to a moral standard. Similarly, Mele and Armengou argree that the moral 
legitimacy of a business is based on sound ethical principles providing moral sense to 
executives and helping them to convince the firm’s stakeholders and the general public 
of the ethical acceptability of their business activities or projects.230 Such ethical 
principles should incorporate a minimum standard of justice, understood as the 
protection of fundamental human rights.231  
For the most part, these three concepts are interconnected. For instance, most 
societal perception is often based on normative standards.232 These normative 
standards are frequently embodied in laws in that given context. Often such normative 
standards must have a moral or ethical content if it is to appeal to people’s obedience 
or beliefs. In other words, the obligation of a legal precept depends upon its conformity 
to moral perception.233 This can be appreciated in the light of longstanding legal 
debates on the role of morality or, more recently, the integral nature of fundamental 
human rights to law.234 This is why Doak et al., pointed out that legitimacy that rests 
purely on the legal nature of a particular action can provide technical legality to 
performances that might otherwise be regarded as illegitimate.235 Based on this 
argument by Doak et al., it could be argued that legal legitimacy is critical to the 
existence of the tobacco industry, most notably given its hazardous credentials.236 Any 
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other product causing so many deaths when consumed as supposed to, would most 
likely lack any form of legitimacy.   
Legitimacy, when applied to CSR, becomes easy to understand why different 
interests, including marketing and public relations, all strive towards creating 
legitimacy for corporate power. The position in the tobacco industry is that the 
sociological aspect, which focuses on people’s perception, has been on a downward 
curve. NGOs, media, and international organisations have all played a part in shaping 
societal perception by expounding the awareness of tobacco health hazards. With the 
UN, as an example, health has occupied a vital role under the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG). Target 3.a of the SDG urged all countries to 
proceed and strengthen the implementation of the WHO Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (FCTC), and given that legitimacy is substantially underpinned on 
legality, the WHO FCTC has urged for a legislative framework that prompts corporate 
responsibility and normative conformity. However, TTCs have reacted to the tobacco 
control policies through litigation and through the re-engineering of consumer products 
that are less harmful than conventional tobacco products.237 TTCs have also worked 
in partnership with governments and, in the process, have influenced legislative work 
within the tobacco industry.238 The legal tussle between TTCs and stakeholder 
activism is because, on the one hand, the law can be used as an instrument which 
can generate legitimacy for TTCs, and, on the other, it is also capable of providing 
valid expressions to anti-tobacco campaigners pushing for change.239 While legality is 
not the self-sufficient criteria of legitimacy, but it is considered a primary criterion. The 
assertion is that law alone is limited to assist CSR achieve its legitimising function, but 
it is a fundamental aspect of the legitimating agenda. Law should, therefore, appear in 
its fully dynamic guise to embrace and assist the complexity of CSR.  
Another relevant point to note in the interaction between law and CSR is the 
question, is CSR against the law? This question is not without controversy, and it 
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corresponds with the nature of CSR. The question is rooted in the description that 
CSR should only be about corporate actions over and above compliance, with legally 
defined minimum standards.240 Typically, CSR policies involve a commitment by 
corporations to enhance environmental concern, human rights, fairness to suppliers 
and customers, and the disapproval towards bribery and corruption; however, the list 
is continually expanding due to the evolving nature of CSR. Stone believes that CSR 
is beyond legal rules.241 He compares CSR to responsibility plays in humans, which 
guides a person to act in a certain way despite the lack of legislative prohibitions. He 
advocates for a legal system that should move towards an increasingly direct focus on 
the processes of corporate decision making, a sub-set of CSR.242  
Accordingly, CSR as a whole should have a voluntary dimension.243 Many of 
this argument stems from the classical view summed up by Milton Friedman that the 
social responsibility of business is to make a profit,244 prompting business 
administrators that it is the shareholder’s investment they are spending. Most of these 
critics are centred on corporate philanthropy and have been equated to stealing from 
the rich to give to the poor.245 However, according to McBarnet, attacking ‘CSR by 
attacking corporate philanthropy could be seen as a mishit, because the extent to 
which philanthropy detracts from profits tend to be exaggerated’.246 For instance, 
corporate philanthropy by the UK’s FTSE100 companies amounts to less than 1% per 
annum of the pre-tax profits.247 Therefore, CSR should be viewed upon as how 
companies ‘make profits rather than about how they give them away’.248 A pre-
requisite of CSR must be the organisational willingness to look beyond their legal 
requirement, commercial concentration and business appeal to take account of social 
and environmental factors in the communities in which they operate. That is, CSR is 
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about going further than the law requires, rather than merely complying with it, and it 
is only a voluntary approach to CSR that will practically accommodate this principle.249  
However, CSR ‘going against the law’ context is not so much as management 
going beyond their legal requirement as the traditional definition suggests but as 
management going beyond its legal powers or breaching its fiduciary duty to 
shareholders.250 Under the contract theory of corporation, for instance, management 
is acting as trustees of the shareholders who are the beneficial owners 
(trustee/beneficiary relationship), or management acting as employees with the 
shareholders as owner-employer (employer/employee relationship). Each relationship 
is contractual, having duties and obligations recognisable under the law, including 
common law. Thus, management’s CSR activities acting ultra vires to what they are 
legally bound to do is CSR acting against the law.251  However, with the rise of the 
contemporary corporation, employees could be both shareholders and stakeholders. 
Shareholders because of outstanding shares in the organisation, and stakeholders 
because they are members of society or relevant stakeholder groups. The interplay 
during decisive moments of involving the shareholder-stakeholder manager would, 
perhaps, make an interesting observation. 
 
 
2.6 Voluntary and Legally Mandating CSR 
 
Parliamentarian and commentators have supported a voluntary approach to 
CSR, and if at all, government intervention should be at best minimal, subtle and 
indirect.252 During the House of Lords debate on corporate governance and 
accountability, Lord Patten pointed out that there should be no more   ‘unnecessary 
regulation on the shoulders of businesses, which are trying to create jobs and 
employment opportunity’, rather government’s role should be to promote ‘better 
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reporting and clarity’.253 Similarly, the EU stated that the ‘development of CSR should 
be led by enterprises themselves’, while ‘Public authorities should play a supporting 
role through a smart mix of voluntary policy measures’.254 Voluntarism is based mainly 
on industry-led private governance regime, which is in contrast with legislation used 
to mandate CSR and stimulate changes in corporate behaviour and governance. 
Rather than imposing new standards on companies or requiring companies to report 
on a standardised set of indicators, voluntarism seeks to encourage companies to 
strengthen private governance mechanisms such as codes of conduct, auditing, and 
their commercial power to transform supplier behaviour. It has a low level of sanction, 
as far as it does not require companies to improve standards nor impose penalties for 
noncompliance. 
Literature reveals two main legal approaches to voluntary CSR: meta-
regulation and reflexive law theory approach.255 Meta-regulation, according to Ayres 
and Braithwaite, is regulation delegated, and the State can monitor such delegation.256 
It is the reliance on non-state institutions in achieving the objectives of the government 
to the extent that self-regulation and markets function positively. In this regard, state 
intrusion is unnecessary. There are two primary forms of meta-regulation. On one end, 
the State plays a less state-centred role, acting as a facilitator or monitor of CSR 
activities exercised by non-governmental institutions. Governments are perceived to 
‘steer’ rather than to ‘row’.257 At the other end, the role of government would be that of 
a passive observer. The role of the state may be limited to constituting an enabling 
environment where non-state regulatory institutions can operate. For example, the 
state may play a role in ensuring the integrity of the information that is conducive to 
the functioning of a healthy market Governments may develop or authorise labelling 
and organic certification schemes and allow consumer preferences to dictate producer 
behaviour. Securities regulators, for example, require disclosure of relevant 
information to stock markets.258 Even though meta-regulation is favoured by 
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advocates of a Laissez-faire state, this type of regulation has its disadvantages. It 
erodes the foundation of the rule of law by appearing to position the delegated 
organisation or industry to formulate, implement and enforce the rules, resulting in a 
diminutive stance on accountability and achievement of CSR objectives. A relevant 
example is the UK newspaper industry, who were allowed to regulate themselves, and 
the lack of a governmental oversight eventually led to the phone-hacking scandal. The 
banking financial crises of 2008-2009259 and the lack of TTCs’ oversight, demonstrates 
that when state capacity in monitoring the respective industry is not robust, the 
outcome could be devastating, which can only be exacerbated when non-state 
regulatory institutions are themselves weak.260 For this reason, industry regulation 
should be reinforced by, and integrated with, state regulatory systems.261  
The reflexive law theory is a term to mean the ‘regulation of self-regulation’, as 
opposed to traditional command-and-control regulation.262 According to Cohen, it is 
reflexive because the subject (regulation) ‘reflects’ the object (self-regulation). 
Reflexive law can be used to supplement other forms of regulation.263 The theory is 
focused on procedural norms as opposed to substantive formalised rules. Cohen 
further argues that reflexive regulation does not dictate any particular outcome, unlike 
meta-regulation.264 The UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 is an example of a reflexive 
regulation. The Act demands commercial organisations to prepare a slavery and 
human rights trafficking statement for each fiscal year without providing sanctions 
when a company fails to comply, therefore amounting to endorse voluntary CSR 
reporting, without any legally binding standards.265 However, guided by the recognition 
that companies do adapt their policies and practices in response to legislation,266 there 
is a growing demand, especially amongst tobacco activist, for the role of law in CSR 
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to have less emphasis on voluntarism and more on legal regulation of the tobacco 
business. An example is the WHO FCTC, a tobacco control regulatory framework to 
be adopted as municipal laws by member nations, as an effective way in the reduction 
of tobacco prevalence. As a result, it terminates the reliance on voluntary corporate 
actions of tobacco companies to regulate corporate responsibility, rather it causes 
tobacco companies to act responsibly. Hence, corporate social responsibility is being 
brought about through law. 
During the European Commission Green paper stage, trade unions and civil 
society organisations emphasised that CSR as a voluntary initiative ‘are not sufficient 
to protect workers’ and citizens’ rights.’267 Others called for international regulation to 
control corporate practise268 because ‘compliance efforts cannot fully succeed unless 
we bring governments back into the equation’.269 Chandler called for more legal 
regulation and referred to voluntary CSR as a ‘curse’,270 for it prohibits legislating to 
control corporate excesses. Academics have argued that voluntary CSR will be used 
against the law to prevent new legal protections or used as a way of inhibiting 
regulation.271  Vogel contends that there are limits to what NGOs and the market can 
achieve and underpins the need for effective government regulation that is sustainable 
in comparison with market-driven CSR.272 LeBaron and Ruhmkorf suggest that 
voluntary CSR without a legally binding standard is ineffective. The voluntary nature 
of CSR has led to inconsistencies. CSR reporting, for instance, does not yet have a 
measure of consistency in reporting practices.273 As such, organisations cherry-pick 
supportive news story274as opposed to the standardised and easily comparable 
financial reports, where the content and reporting format are strictly regulated. 
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Regulation, therefore, would progressively lead to procedural harmonisation of CSR, 
given that, it would be fairer and presents a level playing field for businesses.275 
Against this backdrop, the research will illustrate with India’s mandatory CSR 
approach. The Indian government took a direct mandatory approach of inducing CSR. 
Corporations with specified net worth, or net profit, were mandated to spend 2% of its 
average net profit towards specified CSR activities.276 The requirement applies to any 
company incorporated in India, either domestic or a subsidiary of a foreign company. 
The qualified company would have to set up a CSR committee whose function 
includes to formulate and recommend to the board of the company a CSR policy; to 
recommend the amount of expenditure to be incurred on the CSR activities referred 
to; and to monitor the Corporate Social Responsibility Policy of the company from time 
to time.277 The CSR activities which may be included by companies in their CSR 
policies are prescribed under Schedule VII of the 2013 Companies Act, including, but 
not limited to, eradicating extreme hunger and poverty; promoting gender equality and 
empowering women; ensuring environmental sustainability; contributing to the Prime 
Minister's National Relief Fund or any other fund set up by the Central Government or 
the State Governments for socio-economic development. The Act also specifies that 
companies can give preference to the local area and communities where it 
operates.278 Whilst India’s mass rural population remains impoverished,279 the 
passage of the Companies Act could be hailed as a positive step in ensuring that 
businesses contribute to equitable and sustainable economic development. 
However, this approach lays emphasis on corporate philanthropy rather than 
strategic CSR. The redistributive process does not come without controversy. Karnani, 
for instance, asserts that the idea companies have a responsibility to act in the public 
interest, and will profit from doing so, is fundamentally flawed.280 He contends that 
CSR, in this manner, is ineffective and dangerous. He argues that firms should be 
expected to embrace CSR when there is an organic market realignment between 
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profits and social interests. The reason behind the contention is that companies, who 
have a fiduciary responsibility to their shareholders, should not be coerced to sacrifice 
profits for the sake of social welfare.281 CSR in this instance serves the purpose of 
corporate greenwashing.282 Karnani believes that CSR in the Indian context should be 
de-emphasised with greater emphasis on the real conflict and issues.283  
Commentators, in this Indian example, have further argued on the 
dysfunctionality of allowing steel or aluminium companies to run schools or 
hospitals.284 Ticking a CSR checklist or writing a cheque, as mandated under the law, 
is a poor substitute for being a good corporate citizen. How companies make profits 
(ethically and legally) is more important than what they do with them (dividends or 
taxes). Mandatory CSR through taxation forces companies to substitute government 
and outsource or delegate the state's primary function.285 Opponents of this CSR 
approach insinuate that companies should create employment and pay taxes, and it 
is unrealistic and unfair to expect companies to focus beyond the crux of their 
existence, which is to survive and grow in profitability. The mandatory 2% contributions 
could, however, be counter-intuitive to those companies affected by the financial 
crises. In addition, there is an apprehension that the mandated spending of 2% of a 
company's profits on CSR may eventually become a tax.286  
Questionably, the prescriptive CSR projects are too narrow and seem to neglect 
other relevant areas, including mental health. Moreover, it does not provide for creative 
means to foster CSR. For instance, creating a digital platform in raising awareness on 
health issues. The mandatory approach, overwhelmingly, is geared towards 
philanthropy, which is a splinter, and not the crux, of CSR. It is an anomaly that section 
135 of the Act referred to this legislative section as Corporate Social Responsibility. 
The philanthropic nature of the Act falls much into the ambit of the disapproving critique 
raised by Milton Friedman.287 The Act legislated on CSR as a ‘whole’ rather than as a 












on the complexity and inconsistency of CSR. Legislating on the ‘subset’ of CSR is akin 
to the UK Bribery Act 2010, which research suggest proves much more effective in 
establishing standards and improving corporate governance.288   
 
2.7 Transnational Tobacco Companies and CSR  
 
This section examines the relationship between CSR and the transnational 
tobacco corporations in Nigeria.  To achieve its aim, the section starts with a 
descriptive analysis of the CSR framework policies of transnational tobacco 
corporations, focusing mainly on BAT Nigeria and PMI, given that they both makeup 
over 95% of the market share in Nigeria.289 Both companies are prominent figures in 
the CSR discourse and, due to their market positions, their behaviour affects public 
perception of the tobacco industry. Following on from this, the section examines the 
position of the law and how it shapes the practice of CSR in the tobacco industry. 
Drawing from CSR policies of TTCs and the legal position of CSR in the tobacco 
industry, this section concludes that there is a role for CSR to drive the context of 
obligations and responsibilities in the tobacco industry.  
An observation of CSR statements presented by BAT (Nigeria), the largest tobacco 
company in Nigeria by market share,290 revels three core principles in their ‘Business 
Principles and Framework for CSR’291:  
1) The principle of mutual benefit – this principle is based on building relationships 
and engaging constructively with stakeholders. To achieve this aim, BAT states 
it would proactively seek the views and concerns of stakeholders, translating 
stakeholders’ expectations into actions, where reasonable and feasible.292  
2) The principle of responsible product stewardship – this principle is the basis the 
company will ‘meet consumer demand for a legal product that is a cause of 
 
288 G LeBaron and another, ‘Steering CSR Through Home State Regulation: A Comparison of the Impact of the 
UK Bribery Act and Modern Slavery Act on Global Supply Chain Governance’ (2017) 8(S3) Global Policy 15. See 
also Serious Fraud Office high profile bribery and corruption cases such as Rolls-Royce and Standard Bank, and 
yet to be concluded cases as at time of writing: BAT, Airbus group, GSK, Rio Tinto, etc. 
289 WHO, ‘Nigeria’ (WHO, 2000) <www.who.int/tobacco/media/en/Nigeria.pdf> accessed 23 May 2021. 
290 Ibid.  





serious diseases’ which ‘should be developed, manufactured and marketed in 
a responsible manner’.293 The company aspires to develop tobacco products 
that poses a reduced health risk. In reducing tobacco impact on public health, 
the company recognises that proportionate tobacco regulation is crucial to this 
objective. The company claims that it will communicate the harm to the public, 
obey all lawful regulations, prevent the underage sale of tobacco product, inter 
alia.294 
3) The principle of good corporate conduct – this principle is the basis for high 
standards of behaviour and integrity, which should not be compromised for the 
sake of results.295 To achieve this aim, the company ensures compliance with 
the law and with high standards of business practice, partnering with other 
businesses who conform to such high standards. Under their CSR framework, 
the company do not believe that being in the tobacco business is inconsistent 
with the practice of corporate social responsibility, and ‘it would be an odd 
definition of CSR that only applied to ‘popular’ businesses’.296 The company 
believes that it is their responsibility to incorporate the principles of CSR in 
every part of its operations, keeping the CSR framework under review to ensure 
that it reflects recent developments and changes in societal expectations.297  
Under the CSR framework, the company recognises that fundamental human rights 
should be respected and claims to work with suppliers and commercial partners to 
promote the recognition of such rights.298  The company also aims to accomplish 
world-class standards of environmental performance by reducing the environmental 
impact of their operations.299 In realising the claim, the company will be restructured, 
including a rigorous environmental management system and the consideration of the 
environment in designing new products. 
Philip Morris International’s approach revolves on addressing the negative 












alternatives to cigarettes while managing social and environmental impacts across its 
operations and value chain.300 The framework is based on four main pillars301: 1) 
Transforming our business – this involves accessing the impact of their products and 
providing less harmful alternatives; 2) Driving operational excellence – including 
responsible commercialisation, maintaining strong ethics and compliance culture, 
commitment to human rights, responsible sourcing of raw materials, tackling illicit 
tobacco trade is included under this section;  3) Managing social impact – this section 
embraces stakeholder engagement, the assessment and addressing the social 
impacts of their product and activities including the elimination of child labour, the 
promotion of health, safety and well-being and community engagement; 4) Reducing 
environmental footprint, including greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, biodiversity and 
deforestation, waste and littering, and water use. PMI recognises that effective 
environmental management across their operations and value chain ‘goes beyond 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations.’302 PMI sets about prioritising the UN 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in its sustainable framework.  
The CSR framework of both BAT and PMI incorporates major CSR themes, 
including CSR reporting, environmental sustainability, and stakeholder relationship. 
The framework recognises the hazardous effect of their product on society and then 
aligns itself with organisational activities that directly combat those hazards. Two 
examples include PMI’s long-term goal to end cigarette smoking and to assist tobacco 
farmers transition from tobacco cultivation to other cash crops.303  The framework 
suggests that CSR is not limited to organisational processes, but it also includes the 
tobacco product as well. In the sense that it asserts what a right tobacco product 
should be—less harmful. This has led tobacco companies commit to the production of 
less harmful tobacco products. Although the framework recognised the risk associated 
with tobacco products, but, more importantly, it fails to recognise that the tobacco 
‘epidemic’, which has resulted in the death of millions of people every year, could be 
averted forthwith by ceasing to produce the harmful product. It is this lack of 
recognition, mainly due to profits, that has predominantly defined the CSR agenda of 
 
300 PMI, Sustainability Report (PMI, 2018) p4. 
301 Ibid.  
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transnational tobacco corporations as ‘unCSR’304 and ‘greenwashing’.305 For instance, 
Chapman warns that the tobacco industry’s ‘social responsibility’ should be considered 
with caution,306 whilst Fooks et al. suggest that tobacco companies employ CSR 
strategy to gain access to policymakers with the aim of influencing tobacco control 
policies.307 The World Health Organization have also questioned the possibility of 
social responsibility in the tobacco industry, describing it as a tactic to inhibit tobacco 
control.308 As a result, the WHO recommends that Parties should prohibit any 
contributions and publicity of social responsibly causes associated with the tobacco 
industry as it constitutes a form of promotion, sponsorship, and advertisement.309 In 
other words, any “socially responsible” tobacco industry business practices, such as 
good employee-employer relations or environmental stewardship, should not be 
promoted to the public as they aim to promote a tobacco product, either directly or 
indirectly. Public dissemination of such information is prohibited, except for required 
corporate reporting or necessary business administration, such as for recruitment 
purposes and communications with suppliers.310  
 Against this backdrop, s27 of the Nigerian National Tobacco Control Act 2015 
(NTCA)311 prohibits government institutions and bodies from accepting voluntary 
contributions of any kind from the tobacco industry. The prohibition extends to a public 
office holder and political parties.312 The NTCA prohibits the tobacco industry from the 
 
304 The word is coined to mean ‘not CSR’; see also G Hastings & J Liberman, ‘Tobacco corporate social 
responsibility and fairy godmothers: The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control slays a modern myth,’ 
(2009) 18 Tobacco Control 73-74. 
305 Greenwashing is an insincere expression of concerns as a cover for products, policies and activities, notably 
to boost sales or reputation. See also F Houghton et al., ‘Greenwashing tobacco—attempts to eco-label a killer 
product’ (2019) 9 Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences 82; F Houghton et al., ‘Greenwashing tobacco 
products through ecological and social/equity labelling: a potential threat to tobacco control’ (2018) 4(11) 
Tobacco Prevention and Cessation 37. 
306 S Chapman, ‘Advocacy in action: extreme corporate makeover interruptus: denormalising tobacco industry 
corporate schmoozing’ (2004) 13 Tobacco Control 445,452. 
307 G Fooks (note 73).  
308 WHO, Technical Resource: article 5.3 (WHO 2012). Under the Guidelines for implementation of Article 5.3 of 
the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, recommendation 17 (6) for members health policy 
states: Denormalize and, to the extent possible, regulate activities described as “socially responsible” by the 
tobacco industry, including but not limited to activities described as “corporate social responsibility”. 
309 WHO FCTC (note 310) [25]-[28]. Also, the WHO FCTC recommendation is adopted in Nigeria under para19, 
First Schedule of the National Tobacco Control Act 2015. 
310 WHO FCTC, WHO FCTC Guidelines for Implementation: Article 5.3, 8-13 (WHO FCTC, 2013). 
311 This Act is the foremost tobacco control legislation and further examination of the Act in the next chapter. 





Provision of financial or other support to events, activities, individuals or groups…individual 
sportspeople or teams…welfare and other public interest organisations, government institutions 
or organisations, politicians, and political candidates or political parties, whether or not in 
exchange for attribution, acknowledgement or publicity, including corporate social 
responsibility activities of any kind.313 
 
What this means in practice, when read together with the WHO FCTC 
Guidelines, is that it creates an unusual industry-specific kind of CSR bereft of any 
public philanthropy, promotional element, and any form of government 
acknowledgment of the CSR activities associated with the tobacco industry. To 
present it another way, the law prohibits any form of ‘outward appearances’ of CSR. 
Which leads to the question—can the tobacco industry practice CSR in Nigeria without 
public philanthropy? For research suggests that the CSR agenda of Nigerian firms are 
mainly driven by philanthropy.314 Okorochkova, however, argues that CSR is not 
philanthropy or charity but a company’s commitment to operate in an economically, 
socially and environmentally sustainable manner.315 Likewise, Lin-Hi contends that 
CSR through corporate philanthropy is systematically misleading and argues against 
linking CSR with philanthropy.316 CSR should therefore be viewed upon as how 
companies make profits rather than how they give them away.317 Moreover, findings 
reveal that stakeholders in Nigeria place less emphasis on the philanthropic 
component and more on economic, legal and ethical responsibilities.318 Again, going 
by the core elements of the EC’s depiction of CSR—that is, corporate responsibilities 
and corporate impact—tobacco corporations could act in a responsible manner, 
including adhering to municipal laws and international human rights initiatives, and ‘go 
 
313 No. 19 of the First Schedule, NTCA 2015. Bold inserted by author for emphasis. 
314 K Amaeshi and C Ogbechie, ‘Nigeria’ in Wayne Visser and Nick Tolhurst (eds), The World Guide to CSR 
(GreenLeaf Publishing 2010) 276; K Amaeshi et al., 'Corporate Social Responsibility in Nigeria: Western Mimicry 
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CSR in the Nigerian Insurance Industry (2008) 4(4) Social Responsibility Journal 538. 
315 A Okorochkowa, ‘What CSR is not: extremes of CSR perception in the world of business and strategic view 
on it in the era of conscious capitalism’ (2016) 4(2) Review of Business and Economics Studies 83. 
316 N Lin-Hi, ‘The problem with a narrow-minded interpretation of CSR: why CSR has nothing to do with 
philanthropy’ (2010) 1(1) Ramon LLuLL Journal of Applied Ethics 75, 86.  
317 See note 243. 
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above and beyond’ in reducing the company’s societal without displaying any form of 
‘outward appearances’.  
Actions to act responsibly is driven by corporate management, and corporate 
management could be driven by the desire to act in an ethical manner. As a result, 
CSR could drive corporate governance without any form of public collaboration, 
advertisement, or promotional underpinnings.319 It could serve as a vehicle for 
encouraging management to consider broader ethical considerations, especially in 
countries with weak institutions,320 given that tobacco is still a legal product that needs 
to be regulated. Importantly, research suggests that emphasis should be on the drivers 
developing internal regulations where the society does not have adequate legal and 
non-legal drivers.321 CSR therefore could be adopted to fill any regulatory gaps. 
Against this backdrop, CSR role in the regulatory process could act an auxiliary 
benefit to the overall regulatory framework. TTCs evaluate their current performances, 
engage with stakeholders, implement-self assessment, produce CSR reports together 
with the evaluation and verification of the report, leading to recommendations for 
improvement. One of such improvements is TTCs’ increase in research and 
development spending in order to develop less harmful tobacco products,322 and this 
could partly be attributed to CSR commitments.323Societal engagement with 
stakeholders, including consumers and health professionals, is a prerequisite for the 
change from business as usual to sustainability. The decision to produce and promote 
less harmful alternatives was not driven by legislation but driven by CSR, as stated in 
the companies’ CSR framework policies. Moreover, it could be argued that the law is 
also part of the problem, as the law gives legitimacy to the industry to sell a harmful 
legal consumer product in the form of cigarettes. It was also not driven by declining 
sales revenue. PMI worldwide annual revenue, for example, increased year-on-year 
from $67.7bn in 2010 to $79.8bn in 2018. 
 
319 MA Harjoto and H Jo, ‘Corporate Governance and CSR Nexus’ (2011) 100(1) Journal of Business Ethics 45; 
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Weak Economies: the case of Bangladesh’ (2014) 112(4) Journal of Business Ethics 607. 
320 On the issue of weak institutions, see chapter 5 of this thesis; see also D Imhonopi and CA Onifade, 
‘Towards national integration in Nigeria: Jumping the hurdles’ (2013) 3(9) Research on Humanities and Social 
Sciences 75. 
321 See, M Rahim (note 319). 
322 A Hancock, ‘Philip Morris shifts focus to “smoke free” nicotine products’ ft.com (9 April 2019). 




For this reason, Lindorff et al. conclude that firms operating in controversial 
industry can contribute to society by solving specific social problems in ways that 
minimise the harm that would otherwise have been caused.324 An example is a 
production of alternative, less harmful tobacco products (electronic cigarettes or heat-
not-burn tobacco products). Countries such as the UK, Canada and New Zealand 
have recognised such less harmful product with the aim of reducing smoking 
prevalence, and they have promoted their use as a less harmful alternative to smoking 
tobacco.325 Therefore, CSR can potentially fill the gap where legislation or other 
conditions have left a vacuum. Translating TTCs’ CSR framework from policy to CSR-
in-action is crucial. Institutionalised purpose and commitment to CSR should be the 
inherent embodiment of a good CSR policy. Commitment to the CSR agenda is key 





A literature review on CSR has attested there is no unified theory of CSR but 
rather several normative, descriptive, and instrumental theories and concepts.326 The 
fluidity of the term demonstrates that CSR could at best be described rather than 
defined. The review identified the main themes of the concept, and the research 
adopted the EU’s depiction of CSR, giving scope and guidance to an otherwise 
dynamic term.  
In addition, the chapter revealed that the mandatory legislative approach to 
CSR does not capture the true essence of the concept. Moreover, when so called CSR 
legislation mandates firms to adopt CSR, the law also takes on the complexity and 
ambiguity of the concept; the result of which creates a questionable CSR policy. On 
 
324 Lindorff et al., ‘Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility in Controversial Industry Sectors: The Social Value 
of Harm Minimisation’ (2012) 110(4) Journal of Business Ethics 457. 
325 Public Health England, Vaping in England: an evidence update February 2019 - A report commissioned by 
Public Health England (PHE 2019); see also NHS, ‘Using e-cigarettes to stop smoking’ (NHS, 29 March 2019) 
<https://www.nhs.uk/live-well/quit-smoking/using-e-cigarettes-to-stop-smoking/> accessed 9/7/2019.  
326 S Diehl et al., Handbook of Integrated CSR Communication (Springer 2017) 4; R Bhinekawati, CSR and 
Sustainable Development (Routledge 2017); SO Idowu and S Vertigas (eds.) Stages of CSR: From Ideas to 




the opposing end of the divide is the voluntary approach to CSR, where research 
suggests that allowing organisations a choice to practise, or not to practise, CSR could 
be counterintuitive to promoting the CSR agenda. Sitting between these two opposing 
approaches is an approach where legislation does not drive CSR, but rather it drives 
a subset of CSR, and this approach appears to be a sufficient balance. Furthermore, 
the chapter was able to demonstrate the connection between law and CSR, and how 
they both advance each other.  
The chapter further demonstrated how different normative understanding and 
legal definition of a corporation have influenced what the social responsibility of a 
corporation ought to be. Consequently, the research confines a corporation to mean 
natural personhood to prevent ambiguity, given that the Nigerian company law defines 
a corporate entity as a natural personhood. Accordingly, the acquiesced natural 
personhood of a corporation bestows both rights and obligations almost 
indistinguishable from that of an individual. The subsequent chapters will therefore 
examine such rights and obligations with regards to transnational tobacco 
corporations.     
The chapter recognised the CSR statements of transnational tobacco 
corporations. In the statements, TTCs declared to engage with stakeholders, adhere 
to high standard of behaviour and integrity, reduce environmental footprint, among 
other declarations. Even though the CSR expressions recognised the harmful effect 
of tobacco, it , however, failed to immediately put an end to the production of such 
harmful product, despite the high morbidity rate associated with the product. As a 
result, tobacco control advocates have failed to accept CSR activities associated with 
the tobacco companies, referring to such activities as ‘greenwashing’ or ‘unCSR’.   
Furthermore, the chapter explored the position of the law concerning CSR 
practise in the Nigerian tobacco industry. The law prohibits the government from any 
form of CSR engagements with the tobacco companies. The law also prohibits any 
form of CSR advertisement by the tobacco companies, amongst other CSR 
prohibitions, thus, creating an industry-specific form of CSR practice. However, the 
research maintains that CSR has a role in the regulatory framework, based on the fact 
that tobacco is still a legal consumer product that needs an enhanced form of 




any form of public advertisement or public collaboration of CSR activities associated 
with the tobacco industry, which this research classified as ‘outward’ CSR, the 
research argues that CSR could drive ‘internal’ corporate decisions. Such decisions 
could manifest itself in the wider society, including acting in place of any regulatory 
gap; as a result, it enhances the overarching objectives of the tobacco regulatory 




Chapter Three. Legal and Institutional Framework: Nigerian Tobacco Industry I                     
3.1 Introduction  
 
Tobacco consumption poses real risks to health, so we agree that tobacco products should be 
regulated…327    
 
Conforming with the overall aim and objective of the research, the chapter 
identifies and evaluates the predominant legislation that regulates the tobacco industry 
in Nigeria: The National Tobacco Control Act 2015 (NTCA; Act). The Act, explicitly 
aimed at the tobacco industry, protects Nigerians from the devastating health, social, 
economic, and environmental impact of the tobacco industry. The chapter captures 
the capability of the legislation in fulfilling its objectives to the Nigerian people. To this 
end, the chapter starts with an introductory overview of the tobacco industry and 
regulation in Nigeria. It develops by dividing the NTCA into four sections, for an 
enhanced review structure. Then, it concludes by presenting recommendations to 
augment the law and inform policy.  
 
3.1.1 Tobacco Regulation in Nigeria: An Overview  
 
According to the WHO FCTC, legislation is necessary to protect society from 
the impact of the tobacco industry.328 The first attempt by the Nigerian government to 
control the industry was in 1951 under the revenue allocation document on licensing 
and controlling tobacco importation.329 This policy focused on the licensing, 
importation of tobacco, and payment of duties. Nigeria began to regulate the tobacco 
industry in the 1970s, but the industry undermined these efforts.330 The first major 
 
327 British American Tobacco Nigeria, Regulation and Lobbying, (BAT, date unknown) 
<http://www.batnigeria.com/group/sites/BAT_7YKM7R.nsf/vwPagesWebLive/DO7YLFUT?opendocument> 
accessed 29/5/2015.  
328 For instance, see WHO, WHO FCTC (WHO 2005) 14. 
329 Under section 6 of the Nigeria (Revenue Allocation) Order in Council of 1951, in SO Nwhator, ‘Nigeria’s 
costly complacency and the global tobacco epidemic’ (2012) 33(1) Journal of Public Health Policy 16–33. 
330 CO Egbe et al., ‘Avoiding “A Massive Spin-Off in West Africa and Beyond”: the tobacco industry stymies 




attempt to regulate tobacco use for health-related reasons occurred under the 
Tobacco Smoking (Control) Decree 20, 1990, by the then military government.331 The 
Decree, in most part, was unsuccessful because it included industry-proposed 
language that weakened the law and resulted in poor implementation, as indicated in 
the 2008 WHO report.332 The WHO report and Nigeria’s ratification of the WHO 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) triggered a resurgence in tobacco 
control,333 resulting in the development of the first comprehensive FCTC-compliant 
tobacco control bill—the National Tobacco Control Bill 2009.334 Although the bill was 
aimed at regulating the activities of tobacco industry, it was not enacted partly due to 
the interference from the tobacco industry.335 With the failure of the bill, another edition 
was developed by the Federal Ministry of Health and sent to the Senate for approval. 
Eventually, the bill was approved by the Senate and signed by the Nigerian 
President.336 The Bill is currently known as The National Tobacco Control Act 2015 
(NTCA). Section 3.2 examines the NTCA.  
 
3.1.2 Tobacco Industry in Nigeria: An Overview 
 
[T]he tobacco industry or business in the tobacco industry includes any person or entity 
working on behalf of, or furthering the interest of, the tobacco industry337 
 
Nigeria is one of the five main tobacco production hubs in Africa, serving both 
local and international markets.338 The predominant tobacco company in Nigeria is 
 
331 This was converted to an Act (Tobacco Control Act 1990 CAP.T16) when Nigeria transited to a democratic 
rule in 2000. 
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British American Tobacco.339 BAT has had an operational presence in Nigeria since 
1912;340 in 1933, the company attempted the first tobacco manufacturing in Nigeria 
with the establishment of a pilot plant in a cotton factory in Oshogbo, located in the 
western part of Nigeria.341 Japan Tobacco International (known locally as Habanera 
Ltd.) has a significant presence in Nigeria, serving both the local and West African 
markets.342 Philip Morris Limited (PML) was incorporated in Nigeria in 2014 as an 
affiliate of Philip Morris International; however, the first operational presence in Nigeria 
was in 1963.343 In 2015, PML signed a Third Party Manufacturing Agreement with 
International Tobacco Company (ITC), Ilorin, Nigeria, to produce some of its leading 
products.344 PML, BAT, and Leave Tobacco & Commodities Nigeria Limited are the 
three registered tobacco companies that produce about 80% of the consumed tobacco 
products in Nigeria.345 According to available data from Global Data Plc, 18.4 billion 
cigarettes sticks were sold in 2015 of which the three main tobacco companies 
domestically produced 12.2 billion,346 with BAT accounting for 75% of the overall 
domestic production.347 
Tobacco cultivation in Nigeria dates back to the nineteenth century when it was 
grown as a minor crop for domestic use, such as chewing and local trade.348 It was 
not until 1915 that the Department of Agriculture began experiments with imported 
varieties to develop a commercially viable export trade in tobacco, but  the experiments 
were unsuccessful. However, a revival of commercial tobacco farming started in 1933 
when the Nigerian Tobacco Company (NTC), a subsidiary of BAT London, opened a 
cigarette factory in Oshogbo, Nigeria.  The NTC, by distributing free seeds and other 
initiatives, encouraged local farmers to grow tobacco so as to guarantee the domestic 
supply of tobacco for the new factory.349 Consequently, 83 acres of tobacco were 
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grown in Southern Nigeria in 1934 and this increased to 40,000 acres in 1965.350 
Tobacco expanded during these early times given the favourable sowing conditions 
and agrotechnical support from NTC; subsequently, on 6 November 2000, BAT 
Nigeria and NTC merged.351 BAT continues to grow tobacco in Nigeria through a 
wholly-owned subsidiary—BAT Iseyin Agronomy Limited (BATIA), incorporated in 
2003 with the core responsibility for all domestic tobacco growing operations and rural 
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3.2 National Tobacco Control Act of 2015.  
 
3.2.1 NTCA 2015 and its relationship with WHO FCTC 2005.  
 
The National Tobacco Control Act 2015353 (NTCA) came into force on 27 May 
2015.354 The NTCA repeals the Tobacco Smoking (Control) Act 1990,355 rendering the 
NTCA as the primary tobacco legislation in Nigeria. The NTCA provides a regulatory 
framework for tobacco control, addressing the production, sale, and manufacturing of 
tobacco products, amongst other matters. It gives effect to Nigeria’s obligations under 
the WHO FCTC.356 As such, the NTCA domesticates the World Health Organization 
Framework Convention for Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC or the Convention), which 
serves as the first global public health treaty. The Convention is one of the most widely 
endorsed treaties in the history of the United Nations.357 It was adopted by the World 
Health Assembly on 21 May 2003 and entered into force on 27 February 2005.358 
Nigeria signed and ratified the Convention on 28 June 2004 and 20 October 2005, 
respectively.359 According to the WHO, the treaty is evidence-based.360 It reaffirms the 
right of all people to the highest standard of health, representing a "paradigm shift in 
developing a regulatory strategy to address addictive substances".361 In other words,  
the Convention focuses on strategies to reduce the demand and supply of tobacco.362 
Describing tobacco as an epidemic escalated by globalisation, the treaty provides a 
new legal dimension for international health cooperation;363 thus, its objective and 
protocols provides a framework to protect from the devastating health, social, 
environmental and economic consequences of tobacco consumption and exposure to 
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tobacco smoke.364 The Conference of the Parties (COP) is the governing body of the 
WHO FCTC, and its composition is made up of all Parties to the Convention. The 
FCTC is a legally binding treaty that commits Nigeria to develop and implement 
evidence-based tobacco control measures, so as to reduce the demand and supply of 
tobacco.365  
An overview of the WHO FCTC (the Convention): divided into eleven parts 
and 38 articles, the Convention outlines the core principles for effective tobacco 
control. It directs member States by publishing guidelines on how to implement the 
Convention’s proposals or actions. The WHO FCTC focuses on measures to reduce 
the supply and demand of tobacco. The supply reduction measures, for instance, 
include eradicating illicit trade366 and developing alternatives for tobacco cultivation.367 
The Convention, under article 2, encourages Parties to implement stringent measures 
beyond those stipulated under the Convention, measures that are compatible under 
international law. Article 3 introduces the objectives, while article 4 presents the 
guiding principles of the Convention. The Convention encourages price and tax 
measures as an effective means to reduce tobacco prevalence,368 as well as the use 
of non-price measures, such as effective legislation, regulation, and policies.369 Article 
8 addresses the adoption and implementation of effective measures to protect against 
the exposure of tobacco smoke in public spaces and indoor workplaces. Article 9 
obliges Parties to regulate the contents, emissions, and methods of tobacco products. 
Article 10 calls upon Parties to compel manufacturers and importers to disclose to 
government authorities, and make public, information on the constituents and 
emissions of tobacco products. Article 11 requires each Party, within three years of 
entry into force of the Convention, to adopt and implement effective measures to 
prohibit misleading tobacco packaging and labelling; amongst other measures. All 
members of the Convention have adopted guidelines on how to implement Article 11. 
The Convention commits Parties to undertake a comprehensive ban of all tobacco 
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advertising, promotion, and sponsorship, and to also eliminate all forms of illicit trade 
in tobacco products.370 
Article 16 outlines ways to include the prohibition of tobacco products to under-
aged persons under domestic law, as well as other measures limiting the access of 
tobacco products. These other measures include limiting the sale of tobacco products, 
either individually or in small packets; limiting the distribution of free tobacco products; 
ensuring that tobacco vending machines are not accessible to minors; and proposing 
a total ban of tobacco vending machines as an option for consideration. Article 17 
contains the provision to support economically viable alternative activities. Parties are 
obliged to cooperate with each other and with competent intergovernmental 
organisations, to promote economically viable alternatives for tobacco workers, 
growers, and individual sellers. On the issue of environmental protection, the 
Convention addresses concerns regarding the severe risks posed by tobacco 
cultivation to human health and the environment.371  
Again, the Convention is incorporated under the NTCA as a municipal law. 
Under this section, the NTCA will be divided into four parts (3.2.1.1 - 4). Each part will 
be evaluated based on its adequacy in meeting the objectives of the Convention. 
Against this evaluation, recommendations will be suggested to enable the Act, which 
in turn, enables the overarching principle of the tobacco regulatory framework. 
 
3.2.1.1 Part IV: Regulation of Smoking 
 
 
The duty to protect individuals from tobacco smoke corresponds to an obligation by 
governments to enact legislation to protect individuals against threats to their fundamental 
rights and freedoms. This obligation extends to all persons, and not merely to certain 
populations.372 
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The NTCA prohibits smoking in listed ‘public places’ and residential homes co-
occupied by a person under the age of 18,373 with The Minister of Health empowered 
to expand the list of ‘public places’.374 Under the NTCA, ‘public places’ “means all 
public places listed…and excludes the roads, streets and highways and all outdoors 
places within the 5 meter rule”.375 However, the WHO FCTC guidelines states that 
public spaces ‘should cover all places accessible to the general public or places for 
collective use…’.376 Therefore, under the definition of listed ‘public spaces’, the NTCA 
should include all accessible ‘public places’; anything less would run contrary to the 
Convention.  
Furthermore, certain public places could be exempted from the List of places 
that prohibits smoking. That is, the NTCA could allow some indoor public areas, such 
as clubs and bars, to become smoking areas, if the manager or owner of the club/bar 
provides a facility for a ‘designated smoking area’.377 The designated smoking area 
could be a space within the indoor facility equipped with the ‘state of the art ventilation 
equipment’.378 Conversely, the WHO FCTC avers that such ‘state of the art ventilation 
equipment’ or the use of any designated smoking area have repeatedly shown to be 
scientifically ineffective to protect against exposure to tobacco smoke.379 Guiding 
Principle 2 states that all indoor public places should be smoke-free380 and any 
measures, other than a 100% smoke-free environment, do not protect against 
exposure to tobacco smoke. Moreover, a 2019 WHO report suggests Nigeria lacks a 
comprehensive ‘smoke-free’ legislation.381 For this reason, it is recommended that the 
defective section be aligned with the objective of the WHO FCTC. Perhaps, the lack 
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of resources, tobacco industry interference, weak enforcement and political will382 are 
reasons impeding a comprehensive framework. 
 
3.2.1.2 Part V: Prohibition of Tobacco Advertising, Promotion and Sponsorship 
 
The Act prohibits the advertisement of tobacco products in any form.383 Any 
contravention of this section involves a fine, imprisonment or both.384 Evidence 
suggests that the restriction on tobacco advertisement has had a significant impact on 
the reduction of tobacco prevalence in places like Canada, Finland, New Zealand, and 
Norway.385  
The influence of the media represents one of the key developments in modern 
society. Today the media and advertisement platforms have become so diverse, 
ranging from the internet to text messaging, that it creates unique complexities. 
Advertising is an effective way for the tobacco industry to grow its consumer base, 
considering the vast amount spent on it. In the United States alone, the amount spent 
on cigarette advertising and promotion by the largest cigarette companies rose from 
$8.37bn in 2011 to $9.17bn in 2012.386 One of the key justifications for the 
comprehensive ban on tobacco advertisement and promotion is the misleading nature 
of tobacco promotional campaigns.387 Hoyer and Innis described deceptive 
advertisement as marketing communications that likely result in consumers having 
information or beliefs that are incorrect or cannot be substantiated.388 The tobacco 
companies have falsely claimed, mostly through third parties, that smoking played little 
or no role in the causation of cancer and other associated diseases. In the case 
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between United States vs Philip Morris USA,389 District Judge Gladys Kessler held that 
the major tobacco companies are using deceptive claims to market and promote their 
products. Similarly, Judge Brian Riordan of the Quebec Superior court, Canada, 
rebuked the TTCs for misleading facts.390 His ruling pointed out that, 
 
by choosing not to inform either the public health authorities or the public directly of what they 
knew, the [Tobacco] Companies chose profits over the health of their customers… it is clear 
that it represents a fault of the most egregious nature and one that must be considered in the 
context of punitive damages.391 
 
Although section 12(1) of the NTCA prohibits the advertisement, sponsorship, and 
promotion of tobacco products in any form, section 12 (2) of the Act gives an exception 
to section 12 (1), creating a loophole. Section 12(2) states that section 12(1) does not 
apply to ‘communication’ between manufacturers, retailers of tobacco products and 
any ‘consenting person age 18 and above’, but the Act does not clarify or define the 
meaning of a ‘consenting adult’, nor does it state what constitutes one. Again, the Act 
neither defines nor states what constitutes ‘communication’ between the consenting 
adult and the tobacco company. Moreover, the FCTC Guidelines states that any such 
exception should be clearly defined392 and access to such information should be 
restricted.393 The provision of s12(2), in practice, presents an alternative to the supply, 
demand, and advertisement of tobacco products, antithetical to the aims of the FCTC 
and the overall objectives of the NTCA. For this reason, it is proposed that the relevant 
authorities should improve on this escape clause, therefore giving effect to the aims 
of the Act and to the clarity of legislative expressions. The Act will also benefit from a 
comprehensive guidance, like the Convention’s guidelines and the guidance to the UK 
Bribery Act, 2010.  
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 The Convention recommends Party states to prohibit public education 
campaigns initiated by the tobacco industry, such as the ‘youth smoking prevention 
campaigns’ (YSP), on the basis that they involve ‘contributions’394 or represent 
corporate promotion.395 Although this prohibition may be enforced under paragraph 
19, Second Schedule of the NTCA 2015, the paragraph, however, lacks clarity. 
Moreover, after the enactment of the NTCA 2015, BAT Nigeria continues to promote 
its YSP campaign on its website.396 As a result, the NTCA would benefit from a 
guidance section to promote clarity and reduce ambiguity.  
The WHO FCTC recommends limited interaction between government officials 
and the tobacco industry;397 any interaction should be conducted transparently and 
should be made public.398 In Uganda, for instance, any tobacco control policy 
government official caught interacting with the tobacco industry is liable to 
imprisonment under the tobacco control legislation.399 The NTCA also prevents any 
form of voluntary contribution made by the tobacco industry to any government, public 
official or political party.400 On the contrary, evidence suggests that TTCs have made 
contributions to government institutions, including donating vehicles to the Nigeria 
Customs Service and training the Nigerian Police Force in Lagos on tobacco control 
enforcement.401 The interaction between Nigerian officials and TTCs have been a 
principal factor for tobacco interference in Nigeria.402 For instance, the Nigerian 
Ministry of Health filed a report to the WHO FCTC that the lack of funds and ‘tobacco 
industry interference in government’ have been a barrier in the execution of the 
Convention.403 Another example of TTCs’ interference with the tobacco regulatory 
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framework is the memorandum of understanding (MoU) between British American 
Tobacco Nigeria (BATN) and the Nigerian government. Under the MoU, BATN 
committed to collaborate with the Nigerian government in regularising the tobacco 
sector.404 Such collaboration is in breach of section 12 of the NTCA. To limit such 
breaches, section 26 NTCA stipulates a public education and awareness campaign 
on the risk of collaborating with the tobacco industry and on the risk of tobacco 
companies’ interference with tobacco control.   
In respect to these findings, adequate resources to enable the tobacco 
regulatory structure is recommended and the interaction between the government and 
the tobacco industry should cease.  
 
3.2.1.3 Parts VI-IX: Sales and Product Regulation; Licensing. 
Section 15 prohibits the sale and access to tobacco products to persons below 18 
years.  The contravention of this provision will result in a fine, imprisonment, or both.405 
Although government policies can increase or decrease the age at which one can buy 
cigarettes, research suggest that it is unlikely that a complete ban on under 18 years 
would be fully effective.406 Findings from Hersch, for instance, suggests that most state 
regulations aimed at fighting teenage smoking have had little or no effect.407 Hersch 
findings indicates that most teens do not consider it difficult for minors to purchase 
tobacco products within their community, regardless of the age restrictions on 
purchasing tobacco. The recommendations he proffers outside of the traditional 
regulatory framework that may influence teen smoking are education and parental 
intervention.408 The findings indicate that the legislative apparatus alone is inadequate 
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to solve the tobacco crisis. Therefore, it is recommended that other non-regulator 
measures could be explored in the legislation. The performance of an intensive public 
awareness campaign is crucial for the development of an adequate tobacco regulatory 
framework. The relevance of this approach is beneficial because, as research 
suggests, there is a lack of public awareness of significant tobacco regulatory 
matters.409 The tools and infrastructure to raise public awareness are essential means 
of bringing about change in the behavioural norms around tobacco consumption and 
exposure to tobacco smoke.410 The WHO FCTC Guidelines recommends each 
member to specify the people, bodies or entities responsible for tobacco-control 
education, communication and training. On the contrary, the NTCA did not specify the 
government body responsible. Instead, s26 states that a ‘responsible authority of 
government’ shall be appointed or ‘made aware’ by the Minister of Health. A WHO 
report in 2019 indicated that there was no national mass media (anti-tobacco) public 
campaign conducted in Nigeria, with a duration of at least three weeks, between July 
2016 and June 2018.411 In light of the report, Nigeria should strengthen the NTCA by 
adopting the recommendations of Article 12 of the Guidelines. The provisions of the 
guidelines include providing training and adequate human, material, and financial 
resources to establish and sustain the programme at local, national, sub-national and 
international levels; raising tobacco taxes as a funding mechanism; monitoring and 
evaluating the outcomes of public education and communication interventions in 
different target groups whilst considering critical differences, such as gender, 
educational background, age, and literacy.412 
 On the issue of tobacco supply reduction, the NTCA adopts article 15 of the 
WHO FCTC on the elimination of illicit trade in tobacco products.413 According to the 
Convention, illicit trade poses a serious threat to public health, as it increases access 
to, often cheaper, tobacco products, fuelling the tobacco epidemic and undermining 
tobacco control policies.414 It also causes substantial losses in government revenues 
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and, at the same time, contributes to the funding of international criminal activities.415 
These severe matters prompted Party members to adopt the ‘Protocol to Eliminate 
Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products’ (Protocol), which serves as a new international treaty 
with the objective of eliminating all forms of illicit trade in relation to tobacco and 
tobacco products.416 The Protocol supplements Article 15 of the WHO FCTC. ‘Illicit 
trade’ under the Protocol is defined as any practise or conduct related to producing, 
shipping, receiving, having, distributing, selling or buying tobacco products that are 
prohibited by law.417 To prevent the illegal trade, the Protocol aims to make the supply 
chain of tobacco products secure through a series of measures by governments, 
including the establishment of a global tracking and tracing regime and a global 
information-sharing point located in the Secretariat of the WHO FCTC.418 Even though 
Nigeria is a Party to the Protocol,419 it failed to domesticate the Protocol, considering 
that under s12 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, an international treaty has to be 
domesticated before it can be enforceable. Due to the importance of the Protocol, it is 
recommended that the legislative arm of government domesticates the Protocol. Other 
ways to limit the supply of tobacco under the Protocol is to ensure control of the supply 
chain, include licensing and the regulation of Internet-sales.420 
In addition, the Act prescribes all tobacco packaging to have health warnings 
covering not less than half of the total surface area.421 For such warnings to be 
adequate, Viscusi argues they must convey new and credibly information.422 In other 
words, do the proposed warnings convey any new information? and is the warning 
information credible?423 The warnings in the NTCA appears to contain little information 
that smokers have not already heard; consequently, it does not pass Viscusi’s test. 
The second point on information credibility has led to claims and counterclaims by pro-
tobacco actors and tobacco control advocates, not least by the tobacco industry, who 
have declared such move—warnings and symbols—as an infringement on property 
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rights and the freedom of expression.424 More on the infringements claimed by the 
TTCs is under section 3.3.  
 
3.2.1.4 Parts X – XII: Enforcement; Education & Public Awareness; Price and Tax 
Measures 
The Act reveals three enforcement officials: the Nigerian police,425 an authorised 
officer,426 and any person who owns, controls, or occupies smoke-free premises.427 
Enforcement of rules in any society, especially Nigeria, is key. The Nigerian police 
force has been notably uneven and often more concerned with other matters than 
crime control,428 leading to a surge in private security actors and vigilant citizens filling 
the security gap.429 Nigerians, according to Owen et al., do not trust the police and 
have become accustomed to the injustice, lack of finality and ineffectiveness of the 
justice system.430 Basic social conditions like high rates of poverty and illiteracy have 
constrained the ability of many to relate effectively with the criminal justice system. 
Many researchers into policing across Africa have concluded that the ‘criminal justice 
system can be an ineffective and blunt instrument that triggers more trouble than it 
resolves’.431  
Under the Act, the granting of private citizens, such as the manager of a smoke-
free premises, to enforce the Act may be controversial. Moreover, the Act is silent on 
the immunities and limitations of the manager’s enforcement powers. If private 
individuals are to assume the roles of the police, then the scope of authority of the 
individual should be clearly defined. When the state permits the manager or a private 
person to take reasonable steps to stop any person from smoking in a prohibited area, 
the access to force is, to a considerable extent, foreseeable, especially when the 
manager confronts perpetrators who intend to cause bodily harm. As authority is 
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derived from the state, the manager could probably substitute for the state police, 
considering that the NTCA stipulates the manager should take steps to maintain 
compliance whenever the police are unavailable to enforce the non-smoking ban. To 
moderate the probable danger of this delegation, certain countries have restricted 
these concessions, such that they are only available in response to culpable threats 
to the core elements of a crime. For instance, section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 
(UK) allows an individual to use reasonable force to effect or assist an arrest, or to 
prevent crime,432 but section 24A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 limits 
the exercise of this power of arrest to indictable offences. Furthermore, empowering 
the manager of a smoke-free premise to facilitate compliance under the provision of 
the NTCA is, arguably, the state eroding and evading its duties. For instance, Dsouza 
argues that while every person deserves to be protected under the law, a state should 
not avoid its responsibility to its citizens by diluting its monopoly of force to the extent 
that the state becomes a secondary agent.433 In addition, enforcing the smoke-free 
rules could result in injury, death,434 or more public disorder. These various interests 
are best served by the clarification of the conditions under which a manager should be 
authorised on the degree of force that can be exercised and the standard of care to 
which the manager will be held.  
Another ambiguous section under the NTCA is enforcing the provisions of the 
Act over the internet or social media platforms.435 The Act prohibits the advertisement 
and the sale or distribution of tobacco products over the internet436 However, a desktop 
research revealed a network of promotional tobacco products.437 The internet 
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transcends national borders, and this causes complexity. As a result, the internet has 
become one of the main battlegrounds to establish the rule of law,438  raising the issue 
of enforcement, jurisdiction, and accountability. For instance, who should be held 
accountable for the tobacco video or picture content? Should it be the internet service 
providers,439 social media platforms, or the uploader, who could be anonymous? 
Generally, the placing of accessible materials online does not mean that the content 
provider or producer is domiciled in Nigeria. Under common law, a court had no 
authority outside its territorial limits,440 so when the defendant is abroad and the 
identity of the perpetrator remains unknown, service of the writ is almost impossible. 
In theory, the Nigerian Criminal Code (CC),441 makes provision for such offences. 
Section 12 CC states that when an act against any Nigerian federal law is committed 
outside Nigeria, the transgression is deemed as an offence perpetrated in Nigeria.442 
Since the NTCA prohibits the promotion of tobacco product, then the producer of such 
content could be prosecuted.  In addition, actions can be issued in personam under 
Section 12(2) Criminal code:  
 
if that act or omission occurs elsewhere than in Nigeria, and the person who does that act or 
makes that omission afterwards comes into Nigeria, he is by such coming into Nigeria guilty of 
an offence of the same kind, and is liable to the same punishment, as if that act or omission 
had occurred in Nigeria and he had been in Nigeria when it occurred. 
 
The CC could, however, absolved the accused from the charge, provided ‘the accused 
person did not intend that the act or omission should affect Nigeria’.443 Foreign content 
providers on the internet, on the one hand, could be absolved based on this provision. 
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On the other hand, it could be argued that the reason for the broadcast, in the first 
instance, is to have a universal effect; information placed on the internet is usually for 
all internet users anywhere in the world, and Nigeria is no exception. This geographical 
lack of boundary creates difficulties in applying the territorial rules of jurisdiction.444 
Rahman argues that internet communications do not take place in any territory, but 
rather in cyberspace or in a virtual interactive environment.445 Even though cyberspace 
may appear borderless, it is a misconception to assert that internet activities do not 
take place in the physical world. The constituent elements of cyberspace, that is, the 
human and corporate actors, and the computing and communications equipment 
through which a transaction stipulates from, all have a real-world existence and are in 
one or more physical world legal jurisdictions.446 Transnational collaboration, in this 
instance, is crucial. One can only wait to see how the courts and the enforcement 
agents in Nigeria would implement the prohibition of promoting tobacco products via 
the internet. 
Under s43 — tax and price measures — the government and its agencies can 
implement tax policies and strategies or fiscal measures to promote the objectives of 
the NTCA. Among several tobacco control measures, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) considers tobacco taxation as the most effective policy tool for reducing 
tobacco prevalence and improving public health.447 It offers the additional advantage 
of raising substantial government revenues that can be used to fund priority 
investments that benefit the entire population.448 For tobacco taxes to be effective, it 
must be well designed and high enough to discourage consumption. Research 
suggests that Nigeria needs to re-design its tobacco tax system, which is still much 
lower than the recommendation of the WHO, a recommendation that is benchmarked 
at 75% of the retail price.449 
The NTCA also derogates from the Convention by being silent on the electronic 
nicotine delivery systems (ENDS) and the electronic non-nicotine delivery systems 
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(ENNDS), such as e-cigarettes. There are no restrictions on the sale, packaging, 
promotion, and advertising of e-cigarettes because the products do not fall under the 
definition of tobacco products. According to s45 NTCA, tobacco product is defined as 
products entirely or partly made up of tobacco leaf, and since ENDS and ENNDS have 
no tobacco leaf, the products are not regulated under the NTCA. This lack of regulation 
is contrary to the WHO FCTC, which states that members must consider prohibiting 
or restricting them.450 In accordance with the Convention, the NTCA should broaden 
the definition of tobacco products to include ENDS, ENNDS, and any other similar 
product.  
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3.3 NTCA 2015: Challenges from the TTCs 
 
 Transnational tobacco corporations have litigated against tobacco regulatory 
policies in multiple jurisdictions.451 In many of those litigations, the health impact has 
outweighed the claims presented by the tobacco companies.452 The focus of this 
section is to employ those experiences to inform and enhance the tobacco regulatory 
framework in Nigeria.    
 Transnational tobacco corporations have challenged tobacco control 
regulations on the basis they encroached on their fundamental rights.453 They claim, 
for instance, that tobacco packaging restrictions violates the rights of expression.454 
Nigeria has similar regulatory restrictions under the NTCA—every tobacco product 
package should have health warning signs covering 50% of the total surface area.455 
TTCs have further argued that such interference not only violates freedom of 
expression,456 but it also violates the right to own property457, both of which are 
guaranteed under sections 43 and 44 of the Nigerian constitution, respectively. 
Regardless of how these claims have been argued in other jurisdictions, the research 
seeks to uncover the potential responses under the tobacco regulatory framework in 
Nigeria. To this end, it will discuss the scope of the tobacco companies’ claims under 
the legislative and constitutional context and seek guidance from foreign jurisdictions, 
given that there is a lack of tobacco control case laws in Nigeria. Moving forward, the 
next paragraph will focus on the government’s prerogative to restrict corporate rights 
and, more importantly, on the court’s custom to protect against contentious 
restrictions.      
 Under the Nigerian constitution, government is empowered to restrict 
fundamental rights for the interest of public health. The restrictions, however, should 
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be ‘reasonably justifiable in a democratic society’.458 This prerequisite have been 
condemned as ‘efforts of the Nigerian elites or bourgeoisie … to dictate the amount of 
freedom the people can have’.459 For this reason, amongst others, section 46 of the 
constitution provides every Nigerian with an avenue for redress, empowering the High 
Courts with the responsibility of balancing the authority of government with the rights 
of citizens.460 In this regard, the Courts protect the fundamental rights of every 
Nigerian.461 Increasingly, the courts have had to balance different contending 
interests, and when in a position with no local precedent, the courts seek guidance 
from foreign authorities. The Nigerian judicial system, therefore, ascribes potency to 
foreign judicial decisions with similar provisions and circumstances.462 For instance, in 
Cheranci v Cheranci,463 the decision of the Nigerian court was guided by the 
experiences of both India and the United States. Similarly in the UK, all five Law Lords 
in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd, referred to foreign authorities in their 
judgments, with Lord Bingham acknowledging that his conclusion was “fortified by the 
wider jurisprudence”.464 For this reason, as well as the lack of tobacco control case 
laws in Nigeria, the research sought guidance from foreign precedents. 
 As the Nigerian constitution allows the government to restrict rights, provided 
the restrictions are ‘reasonably justifiable’,465 the next paragraph will focus on the 
standard used to determine if a restriction is ‘reasonably justifiable’. Then, the standard 
will be engaged to determine if the restriction under the Nigerian Tobacco Control Act 
can withstand the applicable level of scrutiny.    
 
458 s45(1) Constitution FRN 1999: ‘Nothing in sections 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 of this Constitution shall invalidate 
any law that is reasonably justiciable in a democratic society (a) in the interest of defence, public safety… or 
public health’ (b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom of other persons. 
459 M Akpan, ‘The 1979 Nigerian Constitution and Human Rights’ (1980) 2(2) Universal Human Rights 23, 36.  
460 Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal v Okonkwo [2001] WRN 1; (2002) AHRLR 159. 
461 Inspector-General of Police v ANPP and ors (2007) African Human Rights Law Reports 179 [34]. 
462 Okonkwo (Note 460) [15]; see also Nigerian Ports Authority v Ali Akar & Sons (1965) 1 All NLR 526; Olafisoye 
v Fed Rep Nigeria (2004) 4 NWLR (pt 804) 580; see also R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 
[2006] UKHL 12, [2006] 2 AC 307, para 23. 
463 Cheranci v Cheranci [1960] NRNLR 24 (High court, Northern Region of Nigeria). See also the following cases 
with similar approach: A Akar (note 462); Olafisoye (note 462). 
464  Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32, [34] cited in Lord Toulson, 
‘International Influence on the Common Law’ (Common Law and Commercial Bar Association, London, 11 
November 2014) para13 <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-141111.pdf> accessed 3 September 
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 The constitution safeguards individual and corporate rights, unless it can be 
proved that pressing public interest demands otherwise.466 In Williams v Majekodunmi, 
the Nigerian Supreme Court states that the rights of the individual can be invaded only 
if it is ‘essential for the sake of some recognised public interest’.467 However, the 
phrase ‘reasonably justifiable’ is somewhat ambiguous and difficult to interpret468 For 
the court to recognise its responsibility to determine whether or not the law is 
‘reasonably justifiable in a democratic society’, it is imperative for it to discover the 
meaning of the phrase. It is a phrase which can, without further definition, lead to legal 
complexities. Bate J., in the Nigerian case between Cheranci v Cheranci, embarked 
on finding standards to judge when a legislation is deemed reasonably justifiable,469 
and the court guided itself using the following standard:  
 
(1) There is a presumption that the Legislature has acted constitutionally and that the laws 
which they have passed are necessary and reasonably justiciable.  
(2) … (a) it must be necessary in the interest of public morals or public order [or public health]; 
(b) must not be excessive or out of proportion to the objective it sought to achieve.470 
 
After establishing the standard to determine if a restriction is ‘reasonable justifiable’, 
the next paragraph will focus on TTCs’ accusations that certain tobacco control 
regulation violates their rights. Although the accusations presented in the research are 
from foreign proceedings, Nigeria will benefit for two main reasons: first, certain 
provisions of the NTCA share similarities with the foreign litigated claims, and Nigeria 
still runs the risk of a tobacco regulatory challenge. Second, the knowledge will inform 
academics, judiciary, and policy makers, subsequently reinforcing the tobacco 
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 Transnational tobacco corporations have argued, inter alia, that the tobacco 
packaging restrictions violates the right of expression and the right to property.471 
Despite the fact sections 43 and 44 of the Nigerian constitution guaranteed the right 
of expression and the right to property, respectively, section 20 of the National 
Tobacco control Act imposed restrictions on tobacco packaging. The violation 
regarding the right of expression will be considered under the U.S case of R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Company and ors v Food & Drug Administration (FDA) 
(hereinafter, RJR).472 Using key elements from the case law, the research will seek to 
analyse the tobacco restrictions under the Nigerian legal framework.  
  In RJR473, five tobacco companies474 filed a complaint475 against the FDA, 
alleging that specific provisions of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
Control Act (Tobacco Act) violated their First Amendment right to freedom of 
expression. The only issue before the court was that the graphic warning label 
promulgated by the FDA—which incorporates textual warnings, a corresponding 
graphic image, and a smoking cessation telephone helpline—violates the First 
Amendment’s freedom of expression.476 The court applied the Central Hudson477 test, 
which allows restrictions on commercial speech if the government can prove (i) its 
asserted interest is substantial, (ii) the restriction directly and materially advances that 
interest, and (iii) the restriction is narrowly tailored. Whilst the Appellate Court 
acknowledged that the FDA’s interest in reducing smoking rates could qualify as a 
substantial interest, the Court ruled that the FDA failed to prove that the graphic 
warnings would reduce smoking rates. The Court stated that the FDA did not provide 
‘a shred of evidence – much less the “substantial evidence” required … showing that 
the graphic warnings will “direct advance” its interest in reducing the number of 
Americans who smoke’.478 Even though the FDA used data from Canada and Australia 
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to assess the effectiveness of graphic warnings, the court believed that the FDA 
offered no evidence to show ‘that such warnings have directly caused a material 
decrease in the smoking rates in any of the countries that now require them’.479 The 
court ruled the graphic warnings were unconstitutional restrictions on economic 
freedom of expression because the FDA failed to prove that the restriction would 
advance the government’s interest.480 However, in BAT South Africa (Pty) Ltd. v. 
Minister of Health,481 the South African court held a contrasting view. The court 
declared that instances may occur where it is impossible to prove the outcome of a 
particular measure, or its effectiveness. It does not necessarily follow that the policy is 
therefore unreasonable or unjustifiable. Rather, if the concerns are of sufficient 
importance and the risks associated with them are sufficiently high, then, that may be 
enough to justify the restrictive measure.482     
 The key standards highlighted in RJR and Cheranci,483 aforementioned, would 
be harnessed to evaluate if the tobacco packaging restrictions infringes on the 
fundamental rights of TTCs. To recapitulate Cheranci, three key elements are 
necessary for the tobacco restriction to be reasonably justifiable: the legislature acted 
constitutionally; the restriction is necessary to advance public interest; the restriction 
is proportionate to the objective and not excessive. To recapitulate RJR, the court 
applied the Hudson Central test: government should have a substantial interest; the 
restriction should advance the cause of the public’s interest; restriction should be 
narrowly tailored, proportional, and not excessive. Given that the key elements of both 
cases overlap, the research will treat the standards jointly.  
 On the first point, did the Legislature acted constitutionally in enacting the 
NTCA? Under Nigeria’s treaty obligation, the NTCA incorporates the principles of the 
WHO FCTC. Section 12(2) of the constitution FRN empowers the legislature to make 
laws on ‘matters …to implement a treaty’. Therefore, the legislature acted in 
accordance with the constitution. The next issue is whether the government has a 
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substantial interest in safeguarding public health. Section 17(3)(c) of the 1999 
constitution stipulates that ‘the state shall direct its policy towards ensuring that the 
health…of all persons…are safeguarded and not endangered or abuse’, while item 17 
on the concurrent legislative list of the same constitution stipulates that the federal 
legislative bodies may make laws for the federation with regards to health matters. 
Section 45 of the aforementioned constitution empowers the government to 
promulgate laws that are reasonably justifiable in the interest of public health and 
safety, amongst other interests. Considering these constitutional provisions, the 
Nigerian government has a substantial interest to safeguard public health.  
 The next question is on necessity. In other words, is the tobacco restriction 
necessary in the interest of the public. Whilst serving as the President and CEO of 
Imperial Tobacco Canada, Marie Polet affirms that ‘smoking can cause a number of 
serious and, in some cases, fatal diseases’,484 and went further to assert that no 
tobacco ‘product in any form could qualify under the definition of “safe”’;485 as a result, 
the judge proclaimed, inter alia, that tobacco product is ‘dangerous and harmful to the 
health of consumers’.486  Besides, the World Health Organization recognises tobacco 
as an ‘epidemic’ that needs to be eradicated.487 Consequently, there is the urgency 
and necessity to pass laws and regulations restricting the sale, manufacture, and 
advertisement of tobacco products. The provision and objectives of the NTCA would, 
therefore, be beneficial and necessary to protect public health from the tobacco 
‘epidemic’.   
 Another key standard raised is that the restriction should be proportionate and 
advance the cause of public health, demonstrating a material reduction in tobacco 
prevalence. Fundamentally, the NTCA is a law to bring about social change, but the 
social impact of tobacco control, including on advertising and promotion488, sale489, 
packaging and labelling,490 and environmental tobacco smoke,491 is difficult to 
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assess492, an assessment that is compounded in Nigeria given the lack of data.493 
Government collating and granting public access to such information is necessary to 
formulate and adapt tobacco regulatory measures and policies, considering that 
tobacco is not only a health hazard, but it is also a developmental threat.494 However, 
findings suggest that a comprehensive tobacco regulatory framework could reduce 
tobacco consumption, alongside education, public health reform and other 
measures.495 For instance, data496collated after Australia introduced plain packaging 
rules497 suggest a correlation between plain packaging restriction and the reduction in 
smoking prevalence.498  
 On the subject of whether the tobacco regulatory restriction is proportionate to 
the objective, the UK supreme court presented two principal test questions in R (on 
the application of Lumsdon & ors) v Legal Services Board:499 first, is the measure in 
question suitable or appropriate to achieve the objective pursued? and secondly, is 
the measure necessary to achieve that objective, or could the objective be attained by 
a less onerous method?500 Furthermore, in Bank Mellat v Her Majesty's Treasury (No 
2),501 a relevant UK Supreme Court case, notably as it is centred on the justification of 
domestic law interferences with Fundamental rights principles,502Lord Sumption raised 
four test questions to determine proportionality:   
 
 
492 A Gilbert and J Cornuz, which are the most effective and cost-effective interventions for tobacco control? 
(WHO Regional Office for Europe’s for Health Evidence Network 2013). 
493 D Adeloye et al., ‘Current prevalence pattern of tobacco smoking in Nigeria: a systematic review and meta-
analysis’ (2019) 19(1719) BMC Public Health 1-14. 
494 RE Malone & JS Yang, ‘Tobacco a threat to development?’ (2017) 26 Tobacco Control 241-242. 
495 A Gilbert and J Cornuz, which are the most effective and cost-effective interventions for tobacco control? 
(WHO Regional Office for Europe’s for Health Evidence Network 2013); D Adeloye, supra at (n493); DT Levy et 
al., ‘The impact of implementing tobacco control policies: the 2017 tobacco control scorecard’, (2018) 24(5) 
Journal of Public Health Management and Practice 448-457.  
496 See, for instance, Report of Dr. Tasneem Chipty, ‘Study of the Impact of the Tobacco Plain Packaging Measure 
on Smoking Prevalence in Australia’ (Australian Govt Dept of Health, 24 Jan 2016). See R (application of BAT et 
al.) v Secretary of State for Health [2016] EWHC (Admin) at [501]-[516]. 
497 Section 2 Plain Packaging Act No. 148, 2011. The Act came into effect in 2012. 
498 R (application of BAT and others) v Secretary of State for Health, ibid.  
499 R (on the application of Lumsdon & ors) v Legal Services Board [2015] UKSC 41 [33]. 
500 Ibid. There is some debate as to whether there is a third question, sometimes referred to as proportionality 
stricto sensu: namely, whether the burden imposed by the measure is disproportionate to the benefits secured.   
501 Bank Mellat v Her Majesty's Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39. 




(i) whether its objective is sufficiently important to justify the limitation of a fundamental right; 
(ii) whether it is rationally connected to the objective; (iii) whether a less intrusive measure could 
have been used; and (iv) whether, having regard to these matters and to the severity of the 
consequences, a fair balance has been struck between the rights of the individual and the 
interests of the community. These four requirements are logically separate, but in practice, they 
inevitably overlap because the same facts are likely to be relevant to more than one of them.503 
 
Although the test questions raised to determine if a measure is proportionate overlap 
with standards already addressed in RJR and Cheranci, the research will still focus on 
the test questions, but without being repetitive.  
 Proportionality in this instance is concerned with balancing the interests of 
TTCs against public health interest. It is the duty of the courts to balance the interests 
by giving weight to presenting opinions. In balancing public health interests against 
TTCs’, the Nigerian courts can rely on, or give weight to, opinions on health issues of 
the WHO and its Convention. The Convention counteracts the activities of 
transnational tobacco corporations.504 Foreign judiciary have consistently relied on the 
views and opinions of the WHO.505 In USA v Philip Morris,506 the Court attached great 
weight to the fact that the WHO FCTC was ‘adopted by consensus’, and it is based on 
the best scientific evidence and experience, bearing a "decisive influence" in the 
direction of a case.507 The WHO FCTC have been cited to demonstrate that a 
restrictive measure was proportionate, reasonable, and justifiable, and the courts have 
extensively relied on such evidence.508 In Philip Morris v Uruguay,509 the international 
arbitral tribunal noted that the WHO FCTC could serve as a ‘point of reference for 
reasonableness’ of Uruguay’s restrictive measures. Ruling in favour of Uruguay, the 
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tribunal was informed by the WHO FCTC in its finding that Uruguay’s restrictive 
measures were reasonable. In addition, the WHO FCTC acts as a municipal law under 
the NTCA, fulfilling Nigeria’s treaty obligation with the Convention. The Nigerian 
constitution, which is the grundnorm, provides for the adoption of a treaty under s12. 
As a result, it could be argued that any measure arising from the NTCA should be 
justifiable and proportionate.510 The Convention, as well as other research, recognises 
that tobacco is a harmful product, resulting in the death of millions of users each 
year.511 Based on the high morbidity rate, the question raised in the proportionality 
test—whether the measure is necessary and suitable to achieve its objective—could 
be argued that the restrictions, which equates to saving lives and protecting children 
from tobacco addiction, is necessary. The courts have also held that the seriousness 
of tobacco hazards should outweigh other interests.512 Furthermore, the fact that other 
lesser measures could be used or could be proven to be more productive is not one 
that the court should consider, given that the criterion to be applied is if the legislation 
is manifestly inappropriate. Moreover, in the context of tobacco control, there is no 
single conclusive way to advance tobacco control, except via a comprehensive 
tobacco control framework comprising legal and non-legal measures, yet there are still 
no guarantees of a widespread reduction.513 This makes it even impossible, with 
regard to tobacco restrictions, for the courts to give an exception based on the fact 
that there is a lesser intrusive measure.514   
  Against this backdrop, the pronouncement of the NTCA is in accordance with 
both national and international consensus: protecting public health supersedes the 
interests claimed by the TTCs. Nigeria should, therefore, ensure a comprehensive 
tobacco control framework and, more importantly, ensure a vigorous enforcement of 
the tobacco control rules. This area of health regulation is not a policy blank canvass 
but rather, it is a significant effort to protecting the health and wellbeing of citizens.  
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3.4 Conclusion  
 
The chapter reveals some gaps in the primary tobacco control legislation, therefore, 
reinforcing the claim that the NTCA is an integral part of the tobacco regulatory 
framework but should not stand in isolation both in practice and perception.515 The 
NTCA should be complemented with other regulatory and non-regulatory actions. It 
proves that there is a capacity for other voluntary measures, such as CSR, to espouse 
social change. The execution of the law, public awareness and education have shown 
to play a critical role in a tobacco control policy. This position is key, considering the 
gaps highlighted to realign the NTCA with the WHO FCTC.  
 The findings identified in this section that could inform practice and policies are: 
1) The loophole identified under section 12 of the NTCA should be closed, given 
that it creates an avenue to circumvent tobacco control policy in Nigeria. 
2) Procedural guidelines specifically for tobacco control and the NTCA would 
promote greater understanding in practice. An example is the UK guidance on 
procedures relevant to the UK Bribery Act issued by the UK Justice Ministry.    
3) Public awareness and education of the Act should be considered.  
4) Increase of funds and other relevant resources to tobacco control policies and 
institutions. 
5) There should be a zero-tolerance on the interaction with TTCs to prevent 
interference. 
6) The WHO FCTC informs parties to adopt ‘measures beyond those required by 
the Convention’. The ‘full’ adoption of the Convention could be regarded as the 
first step to attain the beyond status. After that, the implementation of measures 
beyond that of the Convention could be regarded as the second or penultimate 
step. The point is that the identification of these gaps suggest Nigeria has not 
yet attain the first step, and a long way from the accomplishing the second.  
7) Smoking is still ongoing in certain public places. There should be improvements 
in enforcing the 100% smoke-free environmental policy. The NTCA also has 
limited environmental policies that protect the environment from the impact of 
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tobacco industry activities. The other laws identified in this chapter could serve 
as an auxiliary benefit to the NTCA, an Act that should be realigned with the 
objectives of Article 18 of the WHO FCTC.  
8) Consequently, the NTCA falls short of keeping with the ‘spirit and the letter’ of 
the WHO FCTC, which it purports to represent.  
9) The manager or owner of smoke-free premises should have their smoke-free 
enforcement role clarified. The NTCA 2015 will significantly benefit from a 
supplementary guidance similar to the Bribery Act 2010 guidance provided by 
the U.K. Ministry of Justice or the Guidelines to the WHO FCTC. 
10) There should be regular monitoring and data collection process to measure the 
success of the NTCA and tobacco control efforts. There is a need to 
significantly improve the data and research gap on tobacco control in Nigeria 
to design more effective tobacco control policies. At present, non-state actors 
and non-governmental organisations and donors have played the leading role 
in meeting the data and research needs of this thesis/research. However, the 
government stands to benefit significantly with the availability of quality data 
and evidence-based policy design. It is therefore incumbent on the government 
to allocate human and financial resources towards this end. 
11) Non-regulatory methods should be explored. Encouraging parental intervention 
through public awareness in reducing smoking prevalence in minors and 
teenages as an example. 
12) Nigeria should domesticate the ‘Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco 
Products’ 
13) The Act has to provide for the restriction of electronic nicotine delivery systems 
(ENDS) and electronic non-nicotine delivery systems (ENNDS) in line with the 












The WHO FCTC encourages existing legislation to form part of the tobacco 
regulatory framework.516 This chapter, therefore, explores laws that could be applied 
to regulate the activities of transnational tobacco corporations. It demonstrates that 
the selected laws, collectively or severely, could be refocused or adapted towards the 
activities of TTCs and, therefore, function as an intricate part of the tobacco regulatory 
framework. Since host states have the primary obligation to control transnational 
tobacco corporations, the selected laws would ensure the protection of the people, as 
well as the environment, from the impact of the tobacco industry. These set of laws, 
unlike the NTCA 2015, are not explicitly targeted at the tobacco industry, but they are 
intended as an auxiliary benefit to the NTCA, providing remedies for people who have 
been impacted by the activities of the tobacco industry, which in turn enhances the 
overall tobacco regulatory framework. In addition, the chapter examines Nigeria’s 
tobacco control inaugural committee and institutions, established to fulfil Nigeria’s 
obligation under the WHO FCTC. The chapter addresses the adequacy of these laws 
and institutions in the context of tobacco control. It concludes by drawing out 
recommendations to improve the law and inform policy. 
 
 
4.2 Nigerian Company Law and the Regulation of TTCs. 
 
Nigeria regulates the creation and operation of registered companies through 
its domestic company law.517 In the nineteenth-century, Nigeria experienced 
exponential trade growth after the abolition of slave trade and the formal establishment 
of British colonisation.518 Under colonial statutes enacted between 1876 and 1922, the 
law applicable to companies in Nigeria at this time was the common law, the doctrines 
of equity and the statutes of general application in England on the first day of January 
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1900, subject to any later relevant statute.519 The implication of which common law 
concepts were received into the Nigerian company law and have remained part of the 
law.520 With the continued growth of trade, the colonialist deemed it necessary to 
promulgate laws to facilitate business activities locally. This led to the first company 
law in Nigeria, the Companies Ordinance of 1912, a local enactment of the Companies 
(Consolidation) Act, 1908 of England.521 The first measure aimed at regulating 
transnational corporations was the provisions under the Nigerian Companies Act, 
1968. It required local incorporation of any foreign corporation. The objective was to 
position transnational corporations under the ambit of the law and unify compliance, 
including the disclosure of accounts and the regulation of director and shareholders. 
This local incorporation of transnational corporation is still observed under the current 
Nigerian company law: The Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1990 (CAMA).522 
The incorporation of transnational corporations, under s54(1) of CAMA, creates 
a parent-subsidiary relationship, where the parent company is registered in a foreign 
country, and the subsidiary is registered in Nigeria. This creation, according to 
Ogowewo, restricts foreign investment.523 It also produces a situation where parent 
companies deny liability from the actions of their subsidiaries, because the 
subsidiaries are Nigerian companies under the principle of limited liability.524 The 
default rule in Nigeria, like in other common law jurisdiction, is that a holding company 
and its subsidiaries are each distinct and separate legal person.525 It is also the 
position of the Nigerian law that a subsidiary is not an agent of the parent company 
but a different entity.526 Theoretically, it may be possible to proceed against a parent 
company in the Nigerian courts. The primary concern would be the enforcement of 
judgement in the home state of the parent company. According to Orojo, if a parent 
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company has a subsidiary in a foreign country, the parent company would not be 
subjected to the authority of the host country; therefore, if the host country gives a 
ruling against the parent company, the courts of the home state will refuse to enforce 
it.527  
However, the reverse could be possible. That is, legal action could be initiated 
in the home state of a parent company for violations conducted by its subsidiaries in 
host states.528 In Milieudefensie v Royal Dutch Shell Plc et al.,529 for instance, the 
plaintiff sued Shell Nigeria and its parent company, Royal Dutch Shell Plc, in the home 
state of the parent company—The Hague, Netherlands—for human and 
environmental rights violations perpetrated by the subsidiary in Nigeria.  Aside from 
granting jurisdiction for the case to be held, the Dutch court ruled that the parent 
company owed a duty of care to victims of its subsidiary company. In a similar line of 
reasoning, the UK Court of Appeal in Chandler v Cape plc530 held that, under certain 
circumstances, a parent company owed a direct duty of care to its subsidiaries to 
ensure a safe system of work. The significant of these rulings concerning the 
regulation of the tobacco industry in Nigeria is that, under common law principles, such 
as the duty of care, applicants could potentially initiate a claim against a transnational 
tobacco corporation and its Nigerian subsidiary in the home state of the transnational 
tobacco corporation.  
  
4.3 Common Law.  
 
32(1) Subject to the provisions of this section and except in so far as other provision is made 
by any Federal law, the common law of England and the doctrines of equity, together with the 
statutes of general application that were in force in England on the 1st day of January, 1900, 
shall, in so far as they relate to any matter within the legislative competence of the Federal 
legislature, be in force in Nigeria. 
 
527 JO Orojo, Company Law in Nigeria (3rd edn, Mbeyi & Associates 1992) 85.  
528 Okpabi and others v Royal Dutch Shell Plc and another [2021] UKSC 3; Milieudefensie v Royal Dutch Shell Plc, 
Court of Appeal of the Hague, Case No. 200.126.149. 
529 Ibid.   




32(2) Such Imperial laws shall be in force so far only as the limits of the local jurisdiction and 
local circumstances shall permit and subject to any Federal law.531 
Common law and its principles form a fundamental part of the Nigerian legal 
system,532even though they are subject to the Nigerian constitution.533 The 
prominence of common law rests in the fact that an action can be issued where there 
is a lacuna in the provisions of statutes.534 It provides the opportunity for an aggrieved 
to seek redress. In many countries, legal cases based on theories of negligence, duty 
of care, deception, and other theories of manufacture liability are common law matters, 
critical when consumers litigate against tobacco corporations.535  
Several legal elements that the claimant have to prove to succeed in litigation, 
and the several defences employed by the defendant, have made it a challenge to 
seek redress against tobacco manufacturers.536 Moreover, tobacco-related diseases 
often appear many years or even decades after a tobacco user begins to use tobacco 
products; thus, constraining the nexus between causation and its consequences: 
Novus actus interveniens.537 In the case of negligence, for instance, the claimant has 
the burden of proving that the defendant was careless in the exercise of his duty of 
care and, in addition to showing that damage occurred, he must also show that the 
damage occurred as a result of the negligence of the defendant.538 Lord Atkin 
emphasised the appropriate note of caution by stating that, 
 
 
531 Interpretation Act, c 192, LRN 1990 (emphasis added). 
532 AO Obilade, Nigerian Legal System (Sweet & Maxwell 1979); Charles Mwalimu, The Nigerian Legal System 
(Lang Publishing 2005) 399. 
533Inspector-General of Police v All Nigeria Peoples Party & ors (2007) AHRLR 179, NgCA 2007.  
534 O Oluduro, Oil Exploitation and Human Rights Violation in Nigeria’s Oil producing Communities (Intersentia 
Publishing 2014) 166. 
535 DD Blanke and Vera da Costa e Silva (eds), Tobacco control legislation: an introductory guide (World Health 
Organization Publication 2004). 
536 DD Blanke (note 535). 
537 Ibid. See, for instance, R v Jordan (1956) 40 Cr App R 152 (CA); R v Smith [1959] 2 QB (CMAC) Cf Thambo 
Meli and ors v R [1954] 1 All ER 373 (PC). See J Sanders and J Machal-Fulks,’The Admissibility of Differential 
Diagnosis Testimony to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: The Interplay of Adjective and Substantive 
Law‘(2001) 64(4) Law and Contemporary Problems 110. 
538 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100; Baker v T E Hopkins & Son Ltd [1959] 3 ALL ER 225 (CA); Caparo v 




To seek a complete logical definition of the general principle is probably to go beyond the 
function of the judge, for the more general the definition the more likely it is to omit essentials 
or to introduce non-essentials.539 
 
As at the time of research, no successful individual or government tobacco 
litigation claim has occurred in Nigeria. However, common law and common tort law 
are constantly being developed.540 A recent development in the common law principle 
of forum non conveniens could, perhaps, lead to the rise of holding TTCs and other 
multinational companies accountable. The common law doctrine refers to the proper 
place or jurisdiction to initiate litigation. Traditionally, a claim is made in tort ‘where the 
harmful event occurred’541 or where damage is suffered,542but with the recent cases 
of Milieudefensie543 and Okpabi,544 it appears that the courts are willing to expand the 
scope. In those two cases, both the harmful event and the damage occurred in Nigeria, 
but the courts in the host state of the parent companies allowed the case to be heard, 
even though the subsidiary and the holding or parent company are recognised as 
distinct legal entities.545 The option to have a different forum could therefore help hold 
TTCs accountable for tort or human rights violations, because access to justice in 
Nigeria is hindered by a number of obstacles unique to corporate human rights 
abuses, ranging from restrictive procedural rules to delays in legal proceedings and 
enforcement of judgements.546 However, the aim in this regard is to improve access 
to justice in Nigeria. 
 
4.4 Criminal Code 
 
 
539 Ibid. Donoghue p580. 
540 Tony Weir, An Introduction to Tort Law (Clarendon Law Series 2006) pp3-4. 
541 Four Seasons Holdings Incorporated v Brownlie [2017] UKSC 80 [39]. 
542 Ibid [41]. 
543 Milieudefensie (note 528). 
544 Okpabi (note 528). 
545 See section 338 CAMA and section 316 CAMA. 





The Nigerian Criminal Code (CC)547 is not specifically targeted at the tobacco 
industry; it could, however, be applied in cases of air and water pollution activities of 
the tobacco industry. Section 245 of the CC, for instance, states:   
 
Any person who corrupts or fouls the water of any spring, stream, well, tank, reservoir, or place, 
so as to render it less fit for the purpose for which it is ordinarily used, is guilty of a 
misdemeanour, and is liable to imprisonment for six months.  
 
This legislation could be used as a protective measure against water contamination. 
Report suggests that the large and frequent applications of fertilisers, herbicides and 
pesticides, which is required to protect the tobacco plant from insects and diseases, 
pollutes the local groundwater and waterways, and decreases the long-term fertility of 
the soil.548 Equally, Goodland et al. reveal that besides being ‘hazardous to users, 
these chemicals can contaminate village water supplies’.549 Some of these residues 
have been found in underground water and deep wells in Nigeria.550  
Another relevant provision is section 247 of the CC, which states that any person 
who: 
 
(a) vitiates the atmosphere in any place so as to make noxious to the health of persons in general 
dwelling or carrying on business in the neighbourhood, or passing along the public highway; or 
(b) does any act which is, and which he knows or has reason to believe to be, likely to spread the 
infection of any disease dangerous to life, whether human or animal, is guilty of a 
misdemeanour, and is liable to imprisonment for six months. 
 
The above section is apposite with the intensive application of pesticide during the 
various stages of tobacco cultivation, as previously mentioned. The application of 
these substances to water and air may cause the genetic selection of pesticide-
 
547 Cap. C38, LFN, 2004. Hereinafter referred to as CC. 
548 J Madeley, ‘The Environmental Impact of Tobacco Production in Developing Countries’ in Alan Blum (ed), 
Cigarette Underworld (Medical Society of the State of New York 1985) 70. 
549 Goodland et al., Environmental Management in Tropical Agriculture (Westview Press 1994).  
550 ED Orunonye and E Okrikata, ‘Sustainable Use of Plant Protection Products in Nigeria and Challenges’ 




resistant insects, making the control of diseases such as malaria particularly 
challenging.551 There is also the risk of wildlife exposure to tobacco pesticides through 
accidentally eating toxic pesticide residues found on plants and insects, or through 
contact with their skin and eyes, as well as through inhaling pesticide vapours.552 This 
exposure has devastating health effects for both birds and mammals.553 Pesticide 
poisoning in the developing world is a grave concern.554 A high proportion of pesticide 
intoxications appear to be due to lack of knowledge, unsafe attitudes, and dangerous 
practices.555  
In Nigeria, it is prohibited to manufacture, formulate, import, export, advertise, 
sell or distribute pesticide unless under the Pesticide Registration Regulations (PRR) 
2005.556 The National Agency for Food and Drug Administration Control (NAFDAC) is 
the agency responsible for controlling and registration of pesticides in Nigeria,557 
resulting in the EU prohibiting certain Nigeria products due to the high concentration 
of pesticides.558  
The use of these legislative provisions may be challenging. Commentators 
have argued that the phrases ‘corrupts or fouls’ and ‘render it less fit for purpose which 
it is ordinarily used’ are too general for precise judicial interpretation.559 As such, it 
poses a significant challenge for the prosecution to produce scientific evidence to 
prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, as stipulated under the Nigerian criminal 
justice system.560 Another challenge appears to be the laxity in executing the 
framework. Farmlands located in rural areas may lack intelligent monitoring by the 
authorities, and this may perhaps be the reason proscribed elevated level of residue 
 
551 A Olsen, ‘Pesticides in Tobacco Increase Health Risks’ (Pesticide Action Network, 12 May 2006) 
<http://www.panna.org/legacy/panups/panup_20060512.dv.html> accessed 9 March 2016. 
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555 G Forget, ‘Pesticides and the third world’ (1991) 31(1) Journal of Toxicology & Environmental Health 11. 
556 Ss1&2 PRR 2005.  
557 Section 8 Drugs and Related Products (Registration, etc.) Act 1996 as amended; See Commencement 
section and s1 PRR 2005.  
558 Food Safety Authority of Ireland, ‘Withdrawal of dried beans originating from Nigeria due to potential 
presence of pesticides’ (Food Safety Auth of Ireland, 13 July 2020); AA Adewunmi et al., ‘Pesticides and Food 
Safety in Africa’ (2018) 8(2) European Journal of Biological Research 70. 
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Reflections of legal Significance for the energy Sector’ (1996) Nigeria Current Law Review 12 in O Oluduro, Oil 
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is found in the food supply chain. In the same context, a residual analysis conducted 
by Ululating et al.561 shows a high percentage of residue, including banned pesticides, 
discovered in food samples. 
Furthermore, the provisions of the law underrate the severity of the offence. 
Under s245 CC, the fouling or corruption of water is referred to as a misdemeanour 
liable to six months incarceration. Bearing in mind that such an act of ‘poisoning’ could 
cause death or grievous harm.  
Considering the above, the following recommendations are proposed: 1) there 
should be a comprehensive monitoring system, particularly in the hinterlands, with an 
extensive training program on the proper handling and application of pesticide by the 
relevant agencies; 2) a substantial provision of punishment from misdemeanor to 
severity, mainly when it results in the death of the consumer; 3) the diversification to 
crops that require lesser or no use of pesticide, herbicide or fertilizer; 4) and the 
promotion of organic substitute of pesticides and fertilizers.    
 
4.5 Environmental Sustainability in Nigeria and Tobacco Regulation. 
 
In carrying out their obligations under this Convention [WHO FCTC], the Parties agree to 
have due regard to the protection of the environment and the health of persons in relation 
to the environment in respect of tobacco cultivation and manufacture within their 
respective territories.562 
 
Nigeria has an obligation under the Convention to protect the environment from 
the impact of TTCs. However, data suggests that environmental degradation as a 
result of deforestation to cultivate tobacco has significantly increased: in 1934, 86 
acres of land was used for the cultivation of tobacco; by 1985, the figure has risen to 
120,000 acres with 60,000 farmers growing tobacco.563 Going by this upwards 
trajectory, more than 240,000 acres of land would be used to cultivate tobacco by 
 
561 A Olulakin et al., ‘Assessment of Selected Food Products for Pesticide Residue in Major Markets of Oyo 
state, Nigeria’ (2001) 54 Int’l letters of CPA 47. 
562 WHO FCTC, Part V, Article 18: ‘Protection of the Environment’. 
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2036. Furthermore, the World Health Organisation’s report states that around 12.6 
million people died as a result of living or working in an unhealthy environment, which 
corresponds to approximately 1 in 4 of total global deaths.564 Environmental risk 
factors, such as air pollution (including exposure to second-hand tobacco smoke), 
water and soil pollution, chemical exposures, climate change, and ultraviolet radiation, 
contribute to more than 100 diseases and injuries.565 Environmental resource control 
and management is, therefore, paramount. 
Against this backdrop, a subsequent question comes to mind— to what extent 
is environmental sustainability achievable in the Nigerian tobacco industry, or to what 
extent can tobacco control achieve environmental sustainability in the tobacco 
industry? Drawing a significant route towards a sustainable future, Hollander contends 
that the most critical environmental problem is poverty. He believes that economic 
development and affluence pose a significant threat to the world's environment and 
resources. Describing inferences to the great strides made by affluent democracies 
towards improving and protecting the environment, Hollander makes the case that one 
of the essential prerequisites for environmental sustainability is a global transition from 
poverty to affluence.566  
Research suggests a relationship between environmental stress and 
development in sub-Saharan Africa. The region tragically suffers the vicious cycle of 
poverty that leads to environmental degradation, which then leads to even greater 
poverty.567 This resonates profoundly in Nigeria for over 50% of Nigerians live in 
poverty,568 and poverty is higher in the rural areas, where tobacco is mostly cultivated, 
than in urban areas.569 According to the WHO, many tobacco farmers are poor and in 
debt,570 leading to a vicious circle of poverty and illness.571  
 
564 WHO FCTC  ‘WHO publishes a news release about environmental risks factors’ (WHO FCTC, 15 March 2016) 
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 Several institutions and organisations have been designated to conduct 
activities that could facilitate the protection of the environment. The Federal Ministry 
of Environment coordinates the activities of these institutions. The Ministry was 
established to address environmental issues free from duplication of efforts and 
competition among other government agencies. The Federal Ministry of Environment 
has the responsibility to control land degradation, desertification, pollution, 
reforestation, and conservation of biological diversity. The Ministry has the overall 
responsibility for the protection and conservation of the environment and its 
sustenance. At the state level, equivalent bodies have been established for the 
protection of biological diversity and general environmental management. A marked 
increase in the number of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are also 
concerned with protecting the environment. Sections 4.6.1 – 4.6.4 examines how 
adequate are the laws and governmental agencies in protecting the environment from 
the impact of the activities and products of TTCs.  
 
4.5.1 National Environmental Standards and Regulatory Enforcement Agency 
(NESREA) Act 
 
NESREA Act was assented to by the President of Nigeria on 30 July 2007.572 
A precursor to the Act was the Federal Protection Agency (FEPA) Act promulgated in 
1988,573 which established the Federal Protection Agency (FEPA), an agency charged 
with the responsibility of protecting and developing the environment.  In 1999, FEPA 
and other relevant departments in other Ministries were merged to form the Federal 
Ministry of Environment. However, the new entity lacks an appropriate enabling law to 
enforce compliance.574 This situation discontinued the effective enforcement of 
environmental laws, standards and regulation in Nigeria. To address this lapse, the 
Federal Government in line with section 20 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, established the National Environmental Standards and 
Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA), a parastatal of the Federal Ministry of 
 
572 FRN official gazette, Government Notice No. 61, Act No. 25. 
573 Cap. F10 LFN 2004; Decree 58 of 1988 and 59 (amended) of 1992. 





Environment. A notable provision of the NESREA Act is section 7(c). It mandates the 
Agency to enforce environmental compliance with the provisions of international 
agreements, protocols, conventions and treaties, and such other agreement as may 
from time to time come into force. This provision should be read in line with Section 
12(1) of the 1999 constitution FRN, which mandates the domestication of international 
instruments to ‘have the force of law’.575 Nigeria has ratified several international 
agreements on the environment, including matters on climate change, biodiversity, 
desertification, hazardous waste, and pollution.  
The environment, according to the Act, includes water, air, land, all plants and 
human beings or animals living therein, and the inter-relationships which exist among 
them.576 For the protection and advancement of the environment, the Agency 
recognised that the regulations were inadequate to protect the environment. The 
Federal Government through NESREA, therefore, implemented thirty-three 
Environmental Regulations, including the National Environmental (Food, Beverages 
and Tobacco Sector) Regulations,577 which was established to prevent and minimise 
pollution to the Nigerian environment from all operations and ancillary activities of food, 
beverages and the tobacco sector.578 NESREA is responsible for the overall protection 
and development of the environment, biodiversity conservation and sustainable 
development of Nigeria’s natural resources and environmental technology.579 The 
objectives of the Agency include coordination and liaison with relevant national and 
international stakeholders on matters of enforcing environmental standards, 
regulations, rules, laws, policies and guidelines580, except for matters in the oil and 
 
575 s12(1) Constitution FRN provides: ‘No treaty between the federation and any other country shall have the 
force of law except to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly 
where the treaty deals with matters not included in the Exclusive legislative list, it must in addition be ratified 
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576 s37. 
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(Food, Beverages and Tobacco Sector) Regulations. 
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gas sector.581 One of the Agency’s enforcement powers is the establishment of mobile 
courts to expeditiously decide cases of violation.582 
Researchers have reiterated the lack of the far-reaching effect of the Act. Ladan 
proclaims that there is the added need for information and public environmental 
education, as the best form of prevention of environmental harm.583 Other notable 
challenges highlighted by the former Director-General of the Agency include 
inadequate human and institutional capacity, inadequate baseline information data, 
budgetary constraint, lack of public awareness and education, and ineffective 
exchange and feedback mechanisms between relevant stakeholders and the 
Agency.584  
 
4.5.2 Biodiversity Laws 
 
We recognise that we have both an impact and a dependence on biodiversity, through our 
business operations and use of ecosystem services, such as forest products, soil and water—
BAT.585 
Nigeria signed and ratified international treaties and agreements on biodiversity 
conservation, including the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 1992,586 the 
Ramsar Convention587, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) 1973,588 the African Convention on the Conservation 
of Nature and Natural Resources 1968.589 All of which impose various duties and 
responsibilities in Nigeria to pursue conservation policies. Article 6(a) of the CBD for 
instance, provides that each contracting party develop ‘national strategies, plans or 
programs for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity…’ In 
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recognition of the need to protect biological resources, Nigeria promulgated specific 
legislations such as The National Park Decree 1991,590 the Sea Fisheries Decree 
1992591 and the Endangered Species (Control of International Trade and Traffic) Act 
1985,592 and others.  
The Endangered Species Act 1985 (CITT) contains a list of endangered 
species that needs protecting, but the Act excludes plants (the Act provides only for 
animals) and habitat destruction by human activities, such as deforestation, contrary 
to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity.593 
The National Park Service Decree594 stipulates, inter alia, that a person shall 
be guilty, unless authorised to do so under the Decree or Regulations, if the person(s): 
1) introduces a chemical or otherwise causes any form of pollution; 2) carries out an 
undertaking connected with forestry, agriculture; 3) alters the configuration of the soil 
or the character of the vegetation; 4) perpetrates any act to harm or disturb the fauna 
or flora, in the National Park.595 The Decree provides for imprisonment and/or fine any 
violation perpetrated by any individual or corporation.  
 The National Policy on Environment, launched in 1989 and revised in 1999, 
provides strategies for the biological diversity and conservation of natural resources, 
including the promotion of in situ and ex situ biodiversity conservation, and the 
implementation of a National Strategy and Action plan for biodiversity conservation, 
among other strategies. The purpose of the National Policy on the Environment is to 




590 Decree No. 36 0f 1991 (repealed by the National Park Service Decree No.46 1999, now Cap. No.65 LFN 
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4.5.3 National Environmental (Food, Beverages and Tobacco Sector) Regulations, 
2009.596 
 
NESREA implemented thirty-three Environmental Regulations. One of the regulation 
is directed towards the tobacco sector: National Environmental (Food Beverages 
&Tobacco sector) Regulations, 2009. It aims to provide, amongst others, the effective 
enforcement of environmental standards, regulations, rules, and laws. The thirty-three 
Regulations are based around environmental challenges evaluated as having pre-
eminence in ensuring both industrial and generally sustainable use of natural 
resources and includes, also, the adoption of sustainable and environmentally friendly 
practices.597 
The Regulations have been divided into nine parts and thirteen schedules. Part 
one relates to environmental governance,598 including chemical usage,599 emission 
control and treatment technologies.600 Part two identifies sampling procedures 
concerning the collection and analysis of samples;601 and sampling for licence 
classification, microbiological analysis and air analysis.602 Parts three to nine deals 
with—licensing and permit; industrial effluent or air emission monitoring and reporting 
requirements; duty of the Agency to ensure compliance with conditions, 
enforcement603, offences604 and penalty;605 incentives; interpretation and citation. 
Finally, the schedules provide for the effluent standards for food, beverages and 
 
596 Federal Republic of Nigeria, Abuja, Regulations No. 33 of 2009, Official Gazette, Vol. 96, No. 65, 14 October 
2009. 
597 MT Ladan, ‘Review of NESREA Act 2007 and Regulations 2009-2011: a new dawn in environmental 
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sewage collection and treatment system and liquid or solid and other septic from septic or holding tank 
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600 Regulations 1-25. 
601 The term “spot sampling” has been defined under Regulation 54 as “sample of liquid or sediments obtained 
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base sediment and water of the fluid in the tank”. 
602 Regulations 26-33. 
603 This includes enforcement notices and reminder as well a suspension of permit under Regulations 41-43 
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tobacco, including sludge disposal permissible limit; air emission guidelines; and soil 
quality standards; amongst other best practice and regulatory provisions.606 
 
4.5.4 Environmental Impact Assessment Decree 1992 (EIA)607 
 
The EIA started as an apparatus for environmental appraisals in the early 1980s under 
the 1981-1986 National Development plan. The plan recommended all public and 
private projects be accompanied by an environmental impact assessment.608 Before 
its promulgation, the EIA was incoherent in major developmental projects.609 The 
Decree established a legislative framework for EIA in Nigeria.610 The objective of the 
Decree is: 
 
‘to establish before a decision taken by any person, authority corporate body or unincorporated 
body including the Government of the Federation, State or Local Government intending to 
undertake or authorise the undertaking of any activity that may likely or to a significant extent 
affect the environment or have environmental effects on those activities shall first be taken into 
account’.611  
 
Section one and two of the Decree institutes a duty to establish environmental 
concerns in any proposed interests by person(s), or governmental body that may have 
a significant impact on the environment. It requires that before the commencement of 
any project, its environmental impacts must be evaluated in other to mitigate its effects 
on the environment. The EIA is a process that involves various stages a project 
undergoes, from proposal to approval, before the release of an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) and certificate.612 Where no adverse environmental effects exist, the 
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EIA is issued, and the project commences with appropriate mitigation and monitoring 
measures. Through newspaper advertisement, the Agency invites stakeholders to 
participate in discussions, before the Agency makes a final proclamation.613 Section 4 
prescribes the minimum content of the EIA, including the description of the proposed 
activities to the potential impact on any other state(s) outside Nigeria.614 The Agency’s 
findings must be impartial and transparent.615 However, section 15(1) establishes 
some exemptions from EIA, such as when the President believes that the 
environmental effects of the project are likely to be minimal, or the project is to be 
carried out during a national emergency, or the project is in the interest of public health 
or safety. 
Furthermore, the Decree has a Mandatory Study List. The list itemised the 
industry where EIA must be initiated before projects are commenced. Tobacco 
processing and agriculture are included on the Mandatory list.616 The implication on 
the tobacco industry is that an EIA requirement for most activities or projects involving 
tobacco processing is compulsory. In sum, the EIA and the Agency (Federal Ministry 
of Environment) generate a form of consistency in relation to the tobacco process.  
 Critically, the Decree is not without its shortcomings, most especially, the 
conundrum of poor legislative drafting and incorrect cross-referencing. Section 14(1), 
for instance, states that ‘where a Federal, State or Local Government Agency 
Authority617 established by the Federal, State or Local Government Council …’, when 
there is no such body as a ‘Local Government Agency Authority’. The section could 
have been drafted as ‘where an Agency established by the Federal, State or Local 
Government…’ One can only infer because the actual meaning of the section is 
unclear. The Decree also has no section 12, only an editorial note stating that ‘there 
is no section 12 within this Decree’. As indicated earlier, the Decree is fraught with 
erroneous internal cross-referencing. For instance, section 17 states that ‘the case of 
projects referred to in section (sic) 43 - 45…’ but s44 - s45 does not have the case of 
project. Another example is the cross-referencing in section 56(1) & (2) to section 
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‘excluded projects’. Commenting on the poor legislative drafting, Ajai proclaims that 
the Decree ‘may be worse than no legislation at all’ because it encourages 
unnecessary litigation and compels the courts to embark on a judicial process on 
ineffective and redundant provisions.618 The blunder, consequently, weakens the 
protection of the environment.  
 Another unresolved deficiency of the Decree is section 15 (1):  
 
An environmental assessment of project shall not be required where - 
  
(a) in the opinion of the Agency the project is in the list of projects which the President, … is of the 
opinion that the environmental effects of the project is (sic) likely to be minimal;  
 
Such provisions are susceptible to political influence and exploitation. In addition, 
research suggest that EIA enforcement compliance in the public or government sector 
is almost nonexistence. Ogunba admonish the lack of EIA in public projects,619 since 
government have persistently refused to initiate EIAs for their projects even though 
environmental impacts are imminent.620 Similarly, research carried out by Adomokai 
and Sheate suggest that community participation with the governmental project is 
mostly initiated under pressure from NGOs and the regulating bodies.621 
Furthermore, section 62 highlights the disproportionate punitive measure of the 
Decree. The failure of transnational tobacco corporation to comply with the Decree will 
only result in a fine of not less than N50,000 and not more than N1,000,000.622 This 
amount is inadequate to serve as a deterrent in comparison with the potential financial 
returns from investing in such projects.623 The inclusion of a Variable Monetary Penalty 
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621 Rosemary Adomokai & anor ‘Community participation and environmental decision-making in the Niger 
Delta’ (2004) 24(5) Environ Impact Assessment Rev 495, 512. 
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(VMP) and the imprisonment of corporate offenders for some categories of offences 
is therefore recommended. The VMP should consider certain conditions, including the 
cost of restoration, the financial benefit gained by the offender in committing the 
offence, and a deterrent component. 
 Another deficit of the Decree is the area of public participation and awareness. 
Section 25 provides guidelines for notification to the public, and s7624 to s9 instructs 
the Agency to disseminate information about EIA in respect of proposed activities.  
However, Femi Olokesusi argues that the provision for public involvement under the 
Decree is limited. He maintains that the public scrutiny of the screening report of the 
project only takes place after the submission of the final EIA report.625 Adomokai & 
Sheate also believe that the impact of EIA on the decision-making process is low;626 
Besides, they argue that many communities distrust corporations and government to 
adequately protect the environment,627 and corporations are apprehensive about 
public participation, because it could potentially lead to delays and conflict with the 
community.628 Most of the underpinning issues of participation could be avoided when 
the participation phase is included in the business case of the project and initiated 
before the commencement of the project. There should be a reinvigoration of political 
will and the augmentation of all stakeholders, including NGOs, towards environmental 
sustainability.  
Other EIA lapses identified in Nigeria include the general lack of awareness;629 
multiplicity of designated authorities for EIA approval;630 Agency’s financial and other 
 
Southeastern Nigeria’ (2016) 4(4) International Journal of Basics and Applied Science 36. See also OO Adelowo 
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resource constraints;631 institutional and procedural ‘controversies’;632 the conducting 
of EIA after project commencement;633 lack of provision for ‘environmental audit’ for 
projects commenced prior to the promulgation of the EIA Decree;634 constricted 
definition of the word environment under the provision of the Decree;635 and in some 
sectors, the total disregard of EIA and perceived negligence on the part of the 
regulators.636 Addressing these shortcomings is crucial for the EIA Decree to fulfil its 
mandate of regulating and controlling environmental degradation arising from tobacco 




4.6 National Tobacco Control Committee and the Tobacco Control Fund 
 
The National Tobacco Control Committee (Committee) was established by 
the National Tobacco Control Act 2015 (herein referred to as the Act).637 Section 5(a)-
(i) of the Act stipulates the functions of the Committee, including to advise and make 
recommendations to the Minister of Health on the development and implementation of 
tobacco control policies, strategies, plans, and projects in accordance with the WHO 
Framework Convention for Tobacco Control; to administer and manage the Tobacco 
Control Fund; to exercise control over the dispensation of licences to manufacture, 
import or distribute tobacco products; to propose regulations for the approval of the 
Minister of Health; to coordinate, support or fund public tobacco cessation or 
sensitisation programmes on crucial provision of the Act; to develop strategies for the 
counselling and rehabilitation of smokers; and to collaborate with the Federal Ministry 
 
631 Ibid. at p655. 
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of Agriculture and other Agencies in advocating alternative crops to tobacco farmers. 
The Committee is headed by the Chairperson or Chief Executive appointed by the 
Federal Minister of Health. The Committee also consists of representatives of other 
agencies specified under the Act, including the Standards Organisation of Nigeria 
(SON) and the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN). The Committee and its 
members should always maintain its independence from the tobacco industry as 
provided under the Act;638 however, the tobacco industry is a member of the 
Committee through its membership with MAN,639 contravening Article 5.3 of the WHO 
FCTC.  
 The Tobacco Control Fund (referred to as the Fund) was established under 
the Act.640 The fund is administered and managed by the Committee. It consists of the 
Federal Government budgetary allocation;641gifts, donations, and testamentary 
dispositions, consistent with the objectives of the Act;642 and government subventions 
to meet the objectives of the Act.643 The purpose of the Fund is to support projects 
that contribute to the national tobacco control strategy.  
Aside from the Tobacco Control Fund, Nigeria can access funds and other 
resources through international tobacco control charities. As more countries adopt 
stronger measures to reduce tobacco prevalence, the tobacco industry is challenging 
these measures, such as through international trade and investment agreements. In 
response to this growing threat from the tobacco industry, global charities are 
providing resources to assist nations in areas such as human and financial resources. 
For instance, Bloomberg Philanthropies and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
have launched the creation of the Anti-Tobacco Trade Litigation Fund.644 The fund 
supports low- and middle-income countries that are in arbitration or in litigation with 
the transnational tobacco corporations.645 Governments that have their tobacco 
control laws challenged in international trade tribunals are eligible to access the fund 
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for expenses directly related to the conduct of the litigation, such as legal costs, expert 
fees and other litigation-related costs.646 Technical assistance is also available to 
governments or their representatives threatened by the tobacco companies or to 
government that are moving ahead with strong legislation that might prompt trade-
based litigation. This assistance includes consultation with lawyers and other experts, 
as well as access to guides and manuals that summarise vital trade issues.647 The 
assistance from such global charities could advance the course of the Committee’s 
tobacco control objectives.  
It is recommended that the Committee establish a framework to evaluate 
supported projects and provide public access to all the necessary framework 
documents, information, and tools. It should also provide details of approved projects, 
the organisations behind them, the level of funding, and the publication of the Fund's 
annual report. In addition, the Committee should be adequately funded to enable it to 
advance its objectives. Another way of funding the tobacco regulatory agencies and 
projects is to increase taxation on tobacco products; a percentage of the tax income 
could be dedicated to the Committee and the Fund. Research suggests that the surge 
in the price of tobacco due to tax rise could reduce tobacco prevalence: for every 10% 
increase in the retail price of tobacco, consumption is reduced by about 8% in low- 
and middle-income countries, considering variables associated with income, age, and 
other demographic factors.648    
 
4.7 Ministry of Health and the Tobacco Control Unit 
 
The Federal Ministry of Health is tasked with reducing the risk associated with 
tobacco production and tobacco use through policy interventions, legislations, and 
regulations.649 The Minister of Health is the head of the Health Ministry. Apart from 
appointing the Head of the Committee, the Minister also appoints a representative 
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of the Committee.650 The Minister is authorised to remove a member of the Committee 
for reasons stipulated under section 3 of the NTCA. Importantly, the Committee 
advises the Minister on tobacco policies and strategies, and any regulations made by 
the Committee has to be approved by the Minister.651 The Minister is authorised to 
generate regulations under section 39 of the Act; however, under sub-section 2, any 
regulation by the Minister shall be subject to the approval of both houses of the 
National Assembly, creating a cumbersome process for the Minister to initiate 
regulations. For monitoring and compliance purposes, the Ministry can demand an 
annual report from Tobacco Corporations in a prescribed format, content and 
frequency published in the Official Gazette.652 The Ministry is also charged with the 
portfolio to establish an appropriate mechanism for monitoring, evaluating, inspecting, 
and enforcing the provisions of the Act.653 Finally, the Minister can expand the list of 
public places where smoking is prohibited.654   
 The Tobacco Control Unit (the Unit) is under the remit of the Ministry of 
Health. It is charged with the responsibility of executing the plans and projects of the 
Committee and the Ministry.655 The Unit, comprising of a Chairperson and other staff, 
is appointed by the Minister.656 It has various functions stipulated under the NTCA, 
including to implement the decisions of the Committee; to coordinate the activities of 
the Ministries, Departments and Agencies responsible for the implementation of the 
Act; to collate and furnish all required annual or other periodical reports; to coordinate 
all enforcement activities under the Act; and to execute other duties and 
responsibilities assigned by the Minister or the Committee.657 
 Again, the recommendations proffered in section 4.7—National Tobacco 
Control Committee and Fund—are applicable under this section.  
 
 











Standards Organisation of Nigeria (SON) and Nigerian Industrial Standard (NIS).  
The Standard Organisation of Nigeria (SON) is a Federal Agency instituted to 
organise tests and ensure the compliance of designated and approved standards; to 
undertake investigations as necessary into the quality of facilities, materials and 
products in Nigeria, and to establish a quality assurance system including certification 
of factories, products and laboratories; to ensure reference standards for calibration 
and verification of measures and measuring instruments; to compile an inventory of 
products requiring standardisation; to compile Nigerian standards specifications; 
undertake investigations as necessary into the quality of facilities, materials and 
products in Nigeria; among other functions.658 A person who manufactures or imports 
tobacco or tobacco products is prescribed by the Act to submit reports on tobacco or 
tobacco product contents and emissions as may be stipulated by SON.659 Such 
standards are detailed under the NIS report approved by SON.  
The Nigerian Industrial Standard (NIS) is the prefix given to all standards elaborated 
as Nigerian standards. The NIS specifies a standard for tobacco and tobacco products 
under the direction of the technical committee on tobacco and tobacco products.660 
NIS covers packaging and labelling, quality requirements such as level of ingredients, 
reference sampling, and test methods for tobacco products imported, distributed, 
manufactured for local sale or marketed in Nigeria.661 Any person engaged in the 
production of a tobacco product using ingredients at levels above the recommended 
standard shall be liable to sanctions – fine or imprisonment – under the Act.662 
Members of the technical committee include representatives of the tobacco 
industry.663 However, a significant observation is that the tobacco industry participated 
in framing the “2014 Standard for Tobacco and Tobacco Products” policy. The 
Standard Organisation of Nigeria justified the involvement of the tobacco industry 
because the policy is expected to guide the manufacturing activities of the tobacco 
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companies.664 This arrangement runs contrary to s27 and s28 of the NTCA and article 
5.3 of WHO FCTC. Guiding Principle 1 of the FCTC states,  
 
there is a fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the tobacco industry’s interests and 
public health policy interests and, considering tobacco industry produces a product scientifically 
proven to be addictive, to cause disease, death and a variety of social ills, it is pertinent under 
the Guiding Principle, therefore, authorities should protect the formulation and implementation 
of public health policies for tobacco control from the tobacco industry to the ‘greatest extent 
possible. 
 
It is recommended that for the success of tobacco control, there should be a 
strong political will for tobacco control agencies, including support for the Ministry of 
Health and the Committee, because the Act delegates significant regulatory functions 
to them. Under the legislative framework of the Act, health authorities (and not 
legislatures) are primarily responsible for the designing, regulating, and 
implementation of tobacco control policies. Regulations initiated by the Minister of 
Health and health authorities should, therefore, not be subjected to the approval of the 




This chapter illustrates that the legislative instruments highlighted in this chapter could 
enable tobacco control efforts. This is in accordance with Article 18 of the WHO FCTC, 
which requires members to protect the environment and the health of persons from 
the impact of tobacco cultivation and manufacture. After drawing insights from different 
jurisdictions, the chapter underscores the relevance of domestic law in controlling the 
activities of transnational tobacco corporations. However, the examination of these 
laws and regulatory bodies revealed that the law and the different government 
agencies are inadequately equipped in protecting the environment and regulating the 
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tobacco industry, partly due to poor legislative drafting, incommensurate punitive 
measures, the lack of enforcement, among other inadequacies.  
The chapter went further to identify the areas of the Nigerian law that needed 
reform to deal adequately with tobacco control. The findings and recommendations 
identified under this chapter to enable tobacco control and inform policy are: 
a) Delays in issuing regulations - The Ministry of Health receives recommendations 
from the Tobacco Control Committee, forming the basis for regulations to address 
tobacco control policies. To date, no regulations have been issued for the 
implementation of the Tobacco Control Act. This is further compounded by the fact 
that any regulation must receive approval from both Houses of the National 
Assembly of Nigeria.665 It presents ongoing challenges for the Ministry and delays 
full incorporation of the WHO FCTC into the Nigerian law and regulatory processes, 
allowing TTCs to proceed without a clear regulatory framework and to influence 
tobacco control policies. Bottlenecks delaying the pronouncement of regulations 
need to be addressed. There is also a wider issue on the length of time needed for 
regulatory approval within both Houses of Assembly. 
b) NESREA Act and the adoption of article 18 WHO FCTC — The WHO FCTC 
requests members to protect the environment and the health of persons in relation 
to tobacco control and manufacture. The NESREA Act addresses the issue of 
environmental governance in Nigeria with specific regulations for the Tobacco 
industry; however, there is a perceived lack of a far-reaching effect. Challenges on 
budgetary constraint, lack of public awareness and education, weak enforcement 
and communication with relevant stakeholders, all aim to generate a weak 
legislation. Other tobacco control regulatory bodies and regulations are also 
affected by the same gaps associated with the NESREA. 
c) Voluntary initiatives on the part of the tobacco industry have a role to play in 
minimising pollution through tobacco farming, where pesticides are actively used. 
In this case, pollution of groundwater supplies and biodiversity around tobacco 
growing areas have the potential to end up in the food chain, having a detrimental 
effect on public health. This may require the agency, NESREA, to seek alternative 
 




methods towards achieving its goals of environmental protection, rather than using 
enforcement through its regulatory authority. One recommended method is for 
TTCs to drive change over their supply chain, such as educating tobacco farmers 
on the use of pesticides, providing training on the rules and procedures, and 
creating a sense of awareness and responsibility for the environment. 
d) The existing laws and regulations mentioned in this chapter could serve as an 
auxiliary benefit to the primary tobacco legislation, in accordance with Article 19(1) 
WHO FCTC: ‘For tobacco control, the Parties shall consider taking legislative 
action or promoting their existing laws, where necessary, to deal with criminal and 
civil liability, including compensation where appropriate’.  
e) Even though corporations can be held accountable in civil actions for violations 
through tort claims, this area is, however, underutilised. During the time of 
research, there appears to be no conclusive reported case law on TTCs in Nigeria. 







Chapter Five. Anti-Corruption and Tobacco Regulation.  
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
Corruption is one of the significant challenges in regulating TTCs in Nigeria.666 
Research suggests that corruption has an impact on the implementation or 
enforcement of tobacco control policies.667 This chapter explores the relationship 
between corruption and the adequacy of tobacco regulatory policies in Nigeria. To this 
end, it examines the impact of corruption on the tobacco industry, and Nigeria’s effort 
in combatting corruption. It also examines the activities of TTCs that undermine their 
effort in keeping to their voluntary contract of corporate social responsibility. Finally, 
the chapter will discuss efforts of the international community in restraining corruption 
and the challenges faced thereof.   
 
5.2 Corruption and the Search for Scope. 
 
There is no accepted definition of what constitutes a corrupt act. The 
understanding and interpretation of corruption vary with time, location, and 
discipline.668 To an extent, this may be attributed to what is included under the term 
and the public perceptions on corruption that differs considerably from one country 
and culture to another. In Nigeria, for instance, the leading anti-corruption Act, the 
Corrupt Practices Act 2000, did not define corruption, instead it states what corruption 
should include: ‘bribery, fraud and other related offences’.669 According to 
Transparency International (TI), acts such as bribery, embezzlement, money 
laundering, extortion, amongst others, constitute the term corruption.670 Furthermore, 
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the intricacy of this ‘modern phenomenon’,671 underpinned by the complexity and 
accuracy of measuring corruption obtained from self-survey,672 only lends itself to an 
ambiguous definition. Corruption comprises of a wide range of behaviours whose 
economic and political effects vary greatly, with no accepted vocabulary for 
distinguishing between its different forms. The attempts of individual authors and 
institutions to provide workable definitions of corruption within the context of their 
understanding of what constitutes a corrupt behaviour have also been an arduous 
task.673 Despite the array of controversies, corruption has been defined and classified 
in different forms and sub-forms, as different authors and agencies have attempted to 
operationalise the term for practical analyses and actions.674 For instance, TI defines 
corruption as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’.675 Arguably, this definition 
is not without its flaw because power that is not entrusted seems to fall outside the 
confines of corruption in the definition.676 Another definition by the World Bank 
President, Jim Yong Kim, is that corruption is simply ‘stealing from the poor’.677 A critic 
of this definition will only fall under the realm of semantics since the underlying 
meaning is the economic multiplier effect. Hope’s panoptic definition of corruption, 
however, appears to capture the major elements of the concept: 
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‘it involves the behaviour on the part of officeholders or employees in the public and private 
sector, in which they improperly and unlawfully advance their private interests of any kind and/or 
those of others contrary to the interest of the office or position they occupy or otherwise enrich 
themselves and/or others or induce others to do so, by misusing the position in which they are 
placed’. 678  
 
Corruption, generally, is the improper and usually unlawful conduct intended to secure 
a benefit for oneself or another.679  
The issue with corruption, to a considerable extent, is not with the meaning or 
conceptualisation but with the scope; that is, the boundary of what should be 
encompassed under the term − corrupt practice. For instance, ‘facilitation payments’ 
according to TI, is a form of bribery and should be prohibited.680 Likewise, the 
International Chambers of Commerce (ICC)681 describes facilitation payments as 
‘unofficial’ and ‘improper’. In contrast, the US Foreign Corrupt Practises Act 1977, as 
amended, did not prohibit facilitation payment, rather it created an exemption by 
recognising facilitation payments to foreign officials as payment to expedite or secure 
the performance of routine government action by a foreign official.682 No such 
exemption exists under the UK Bribery Act, 2010 (UKBA) because facilitation payment 
perpetuates an existing ‘culture’ of bribery and have the potential to be abused.683 
Scope and interpretation of corruption may also differ in relation with the form of 
government. That is, corruption in a democratic society may differ in scope and 
interpretation than in a monarchical regime.684 This issue was evidenced between the 
United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Corner House Research v 
Director of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO).685 In the case, the SFO and police officers 
carried out an investigation into allegations of bribery by BAE Systems plc (BAE), 
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concerning military aircraft contracts with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. According to 
the UK Attorney General's evidence, BAE has always contended that any payments 
were nothing short of ‘lawful commission’ approved by the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia,686and the continued investigation into the bribery allegations would result to 
an ‘offence caused to the Saudi Royal Family’.687 This case goes to show how 
corruption is perceived differently by independent nations.  
In addition, the exclusion of corrupt practises from certain professions or for the 
benefit of public interest produces a condition for inconsistency in scope. Section 13 
UKBA, for instance, creates a defence for bribery offences where the person charged 
proves that the conduct was necessary for the proper excise of an intelligence service, 
or by the armed forces when engaged on active service. Section 13(6)(c) UKBA 
defines active service as the military occupation of a foreign country or territory.  In R 
v Director of the Serious Fraud Office688, the necessity to balance the need to maintain 
the rule of law against the broader public interest was at the forefront of the case. It 
was considered that the continued investigation of the alleged bribery would, 
consequentially, risk grave harm to the UK’s national and international security.689 In 
the case, the Prime Minister referred to the security threat as a ‘higher 
consideration’,690 attributing greater importance to the security threat over corruption 
due to public interest.  
Furthermore, an emotive case may not be a justified corruption case. As an 
illustration, if P and her children were on holiday abroad, and P pays money to ensure 
that her sick child receives treatment which, were the payment not made, the child 
would not receive treatment, Should P then be prosecuted for paying a bribe? As per 
Collins J. in Daraydan Holdings Ltd v Solland International Ltd, bribery ‘corrupts not 
only the recipient but also the giver of the bribe’.691 If left undefined, P would be guilty 
of an offence; however, the decision by the crown prosecution service or similar 
service in other jurisdictions not to prosecute such act could be regarded as an 
equitable attempt to redress the law.  A real-life example of ‘P’ could be in Mexico 
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where a family spends on average 14% of its income on bribes for basic services to 
which they are already entitled to, such as water, medicine, and education.692 These 
are some of the grey areas illustrating the complexity of corruption.   
 
5.3 Anti-Corruption, Unethical Practises, and TTCs.  
 
[T]he actions of tobacco companies in their participation and interference in the political and 
economic systems of developing nations, and widespread cases of corruption and 
manipulation, significantly impede the development of equitable health and economic 
infrastructure.693 
 
The multiple nationalities of TTCs create ambiguities in the area of accountability and 
transparency by actions of some host states to relax business rules in order to 
encourage foreign direct investment.694 To combat this issue, British American 
Tobacco (BAT), for instance, have adopted a unilateral ‘standards of business conduct 
(SoBC)’ for all subsidiaries or companies under the BAT group, except where the 
SoBC conflicts with local laws, then the local laws take precedence.695 Under the 
SoBC, whistleblowing is encouraged against unlawful acts at work, including bribery, 
improper unauthorised payment, facilitation payment, ‘turning a blind eye’ or failing to 
report any improper payment or other inducements.696 Despite these measures, there 
have been damaging revelations on the conduct of TTCs.  
In United States of America v. Philip Morris et al.697, damaging unethical 
activities of TTCs were revealed. The US Department of Justice (DoJ) brought the 
 
692Forward given by Ex PM David Cameron, The policy paper against corruption: a collection of essays (note 
671).   
693 C Dresler et al., ‘Assessment of short reports using a human rights-based approach to tobacco control to the 
Committee on Economics, Cultural and Social Rights’ (2018) 27(4) Tobacco Control 385,388; SO Nwhator, 
‘Nigeria’s costly complacency and the global tobacco epidemic’ (2012) 33(1) Journal of Public Health Policy 16. 
694 JR Branston and AB Gilmore, ‘The failure of the UK to tax adequately tobacco company profits’ (2020) 42(1) 
Journal of Public Health 69; AB Gilmore and M McKee, ‘Exploring the impact of foreign direct investment on 
tobacco consumption in the former Soviet Union’ (2005) 14 Tobacco Control 13. 
695 BAT, ‘Standards of Business Conducts’ available at 
<http://www.batnigeria.com/group/sites/bat_7ykm7r.nsf/vwPagesWebLive/DO7YLFTQ/$FILE/medMD9PFFP
W.pdf?openelement> accessed 13 May 2017. 
696 Ibid.  




claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Act (RICO). The DoJ 
sued on the grounds that the tobacco companies had engaged in a decades-long 
conspiracy to (1) mislead the public about the risks of smoking; (2) mislead the public 
about the danger of second-hand smoke; (3) misrepresent the addictiveness of 
nicotine; (4) manipulate the nicotine delivery of cigarettes; (5) deceptively market 
cigarettes characterised as “light” or “low tar,” while knowing that those cigarettes were 
at least as hazardous as full flavoured cigarettes; (6) targeting the youth market, and 
(7) not producing safer cigarettes. The facts of the case suggest that the defendants 
knew from the 1960s that smoking causes serious adverse health effects. In spite of 
their internal knowledge, the defendants continued from 1964 onwards to falsely deny 
and distort information and research outcomes of health effects due to the fear of 
litigation.698 Despite increasing consensus in the scientific community that smoking 
caused lung cancer and other diseases, the defendants embarked on a ‘campaign of 
proactive and reactive responses to scientific evidence that was designed to mislead 
the public about the health consequences of smoking’.699 Again, the Court found that 
the ‘[d]efendants have designed their cigarettes to precisely control nicotine delivery 
levels and provide doses of nicotine sufficient to create and sustain addiction’ 
necessary to ensure commercial success,700 but the defendants continued to make 
false and misleading public statements regarding the control of nicotine content and 
delivery.701 With regard to passive smoking, the court found that the tobacco 
companies implemented a broad strategy to undermine the evidence that passive 
smoke is a health hazard,702 even though research funded by tobacco companies 
provided evidence to the contrary. The tobacco companies made numerous public 
statements denying the connection between second-hand smoke and disease in non-
smokers, and the court found that the conduct is still ongoing.703 In addition, the court 
discovered that the tobacco companies were involved in the suppression, 
concealment, destruction of material evidence, and the improper use of lawyer-client 
privileges in restricting disclosures.704 In sum, Judge Gladys Kessler declared that the 
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tobacco companies ‘marketed and sold their lethal product with zeal, with deception, 
with a single-minded focus on their financial success, and without regard for the 
human tragedy or social costs’705. 
There have been other strings of allegations and unethical behaviour levied 
against the TTCs.706 The BAT whistleblower allegation, for example, involves an ex-
employee of BAT Kenya, Paul Hopkins, who revealed he had facilitated venal acts for 
BAT, including bribery, because it was explained to him that “in Africa, that's the cost 
of doing business”. He further disclosed that all the ethical statements proclaimed by 
BAT were mere ‘PR’.707 Hopkins exposé includes several allegations: an alleged bribe 
to a local MP in Uganda to amend a report against a rival company; an alleged bribe 
to representatives of Burundi, Rwanda, and the Comoros Islands to the WHO FCTC 
to undermine its efforts; and an alleged bribe to an MP in Uganda to undermine the 
country’s anti-tobacco control laws, among other allegations;708 however, BAT denies 
any involvement in these allegations.  
In United States of America v. Universal Leaf Tabacos709, court documents 
disclosed the Brazilian defendant, a subsidiary of Universal Corporation, a global 
tobacco leaf supplier to TTCs and headquartered in the US, pleaded guilty of bribing 
foreign officials and falsifying accounting records, among other criminal acts. Universal 
and Universal Brazil entered into a non-prosecution plea agreement with the US 
Department of Justice, including a $4.4 million criminal fine, and the retainment of an 
independent compliance monitor for a minimum of three years to oversee the 
implementation of an anti-bribery and an anti-corruption compliance program.710 
Similarly, two subsidiaries of Alliance One International, a global tobacco leaf 
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merchant, pleaded guilty in the US to the bribery of foreign officials, among other 
unethical practices.711    
 Transnational Tobacco Corporations have been accused of complicity in 
tobacco smuggling.712 The practice of flooding low-tax foreign markets with more 
tobacco than they are capable of consuming has sparked concerns that much of the 
product can find its way back into the highly taxed countries, thus, circumventing 
taxation and increasing sales profit for TTCs. For example, during the early 1990s, the 
United States imposed a much lower tax on cigarettes and cigarette tobacco than 
Canada. To avoid paying high tax in Canada, the cigarettes manufactured in Canada 
were labelled for export to the United States. On reaching the United States, the 
products were then smuggled back and sold in Canada.713 The difference was so 
profound that in some areas, a Canadian cigarette was sold for a price three times 
higher than the price across the border.714 Imperial Tobacco Canada (a subsidiary of 
BAT) and Rothmans Inc. pleaded guilty to aiding smuggling during the early 1990s 
and were both fined a combined sum of over one billion Canadian dollars.715  
In the UK, HM Revenue and Customs fined BAT for its complicity in tobacco 
smuggling, reported in the 2017 case between British-American Tobacco (Holdings) 
Ltd v The Commissioners for HM’s Revenue & Customs.716  The Tribunal found BAT 
in breach of its duties to stop facilitate tobacco smuggling under section 7A (1) of the 
Tobacco Product Duty Act 1979.717 According to the Tribunal’s document, BAT is a 
member of a group of companies that manufactures tobacco products, including a 
brand of hand-rolling tobacco (HRT) called Cutters Choice (CC). CC is manufactured 
by a Dutch BAT group company in the Netherlands and then exported directly to 
Belgium upon its purchase by a Belgian BAT group company. In fact, the Dutch BAT 
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entity sells the tobacco to a UK BAT company which then sells it to the Belgian BAT 
group company, but the goods move directly from the Netherlands to Belgium. The 
Belgian BAT company sells the product to independent Belgian wholesalers; this is 
the first supply outside the BAT group. The Belgian wholesalers then sold the tobacco 
to Belgian retailers who in turn sold it to consumers.718  
HRT, as well as CC, is liable to excise duty. All EU Member States are obliged 
to charge a minimum rate of excise duty on HRT, but some Member States have 
higher excise rates than others. The rate of excise duty in the UK is significantly higher 
than in Belgium. That difference created an opportunity for legitimate wholesale and 
retail businesses in Belgium who purchase HRT (such as CC and competitor products 
manufactured by or for other Tobacco Manufacturers) for sale in Belgium. The lower 
rate of excise duty on HRT in Belgium, in turn, created a demand from consumers in 
the other Member States where rates of excise duty are higher, such as the UK, 
France and the Netherlands.719 By supplying excess HRT into the Belgium market in 
an amount above legitimate demand, the Tribunal agreed it is ‘more likely that BAT’s 
products would be resupplied to persons who were likely to smuggle’.720 Further, the 
Tribunal rejected BAT’s submission that ‘little and often’ smuggling was outside the 
scope of its statutory duty contained in section 7A (1)’,721 despite their Standard of 
Business Conduct (SoBC)722 and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between 
BAT and HMRC stating otherwise.723   
 The complicity of TTCs with cigarette smuggling takes place globally, including 
Europe, China, South Africa, Latin America and Vietnam, sometimes in alliance with 
criminal gangs.724 Internal correspondence from the ‘truth tobacco industry 
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documents’ suggests an established vocabulary and a calculated system to manage 
the illegal cigarette trade by some TTCs. The revelation indicates legal import was 
referred to as “DP” (Duty Paid) while illegal import was known as “DNP” (duty not paid), 
“transit”, or “GT” (general trade) shipments.725 Euphemisms for smuggled cigarettes 
also include “the parallel market”, “second channel” and “border trade”.726 In a 
statement made by Kenneth Clarke when he was the deputy chairman of BAT, he 
blamed both the competition and the government for making it necessary that his 
company, BAT, partnered with smugglers: 
 
Where any government is unwilling to act or their efforts are unsuccessful, we act, completely 
within the law, on the basis that our brands will be available alongside those of our competitors 
in the smuggled as well as the legitimate market…727 
 
Africa is vulnerable to the smuggling activities of TTCs,728 with Nigeria serving 
as a strategic ‘key market’;729 Nigeria is one of the main transit and transit destinations 
for illicit tobacco products.730 The revelation of the UK Select Committee on Health in 
2002 unmasked the involvement of TTCs in the smuggling trade across Africa, 
particularly in Nigeria.731 The documentary evidence presented to the health 
committee was taken entirely from BAT files made available to the public as part of 
the tobacco settlement agreement. The files exposed the planning, organisation, and 
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management of BAT smuggling in Africa, including Nigeria, Cameroons, and other 
countries in Francophone Africa.732 "Unit 1" and "Unit 2" were the code given to the 
departments responsible for organising this activity. These “Units” were based at the 
then BATCo UK headquarters in Staines, Middlesex. According to the files, cigarettes 
smuggled to these African countries were manufactured in Southampton and then 
shipped to Antwerp or Marseille. A Liechtenstein based BAT agent called Soropex 
then forwarded the containers on to a network of smugglers using a variety of routes, 
including Benin Republic.733 Documents further revealed that even if legal imports 
were feasible, ‘GT shipments will remain the mainstay of our activity’.734 Another 
damaging revelation was the meeting between BATUKE and Sorepex executives that 
took place on the 1st of July 1987 at BATUKE735 headquarters in the UK.  An internal 
BAT document revealed the content of the discussion on Africa sales and suggested 
smuggling into Nigeria:  
 
The discussion was held concerning direct imports to Nigeria through Mr Adji who . . . would 
disguise the cigarette importation by calling the shipment something else, e.g. matches736 
 
The plan to conceal tobacco products and falsify documents on the origin of stock 
were made known to BAT. The revelation demonstrates how TTCs recruited 
intermediaries, as distributors, to enable the smuggling trade. The distributors 
purchased cigarettes from BATUKE then supplied them to ‘transiteers’ – a term used 
for smugglers that physically transport contraband across borders.737 A vital function 
of the distributors or middlemen was to insulate BAT from direct contact with the 
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‘transiteers’, reducing the risk of detection and prosecution. One of the documents, for 
instance, described how Sorepex, ‘provided cover’ for BAT.738 
Against this backdrop, smuggling in Nigeria and elsewhere could perhaps be 
part of TTCs’ strategy to increase market share and, ultimately, profits.739 It is apt to 
conclude with the pronouncement of Green J., which sums up the activities of tobacco 
corporation: 
 
The conclusions which have arisen from the US courts about the sharp discord between what 
the tobacco companies think inside their own four walls and what they then say to the outside 
world (especially through experts), are so damning and the evidence of the discord so 
compelling and far-reaching that it is not at all surprising that the WHO concluded that there 
was an evidence base upon which to found their recommendations to contracting states to 
apply vigilance and demand accountability and transparency in their dealings with the tobacco 
companies.740 
 
5.4 Nigeria’s Efforts in Combatting Corruption and Its Impact on Tobacco Regulation. 
 
This section identifies some of the root causes of corruption in Nigeria and 
discusses cases of corrupt practices in Nigeria. 
Ex-British Prime Minister, David Cameron, referred to Nigeria as “fantastically 
corrupt”, describing Nigeria as, “possibly the…most corrupt countries in the world”.741 
The ex-PM, however, failed to acknowledge Nigeria’s progressive anti-corruption 
accomplishments and the fact that corruption is transnational and interconnected.742 
Western countries are embroiled in the complexity of corruption, mainly in twofold. 
First, Western organisations perpetrate the act of bribery and other nefarious activities 
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in countries such as Nigeria for the exchange of lucrative benefits or contracts.743 
Second, corrupt funds or proceeds of crime flow into western economy through banks 
to purchase bonds744, prime properties, and other commodities.745 President 
Obasanjo condemned foreign western government and banks for not providing 
adequate measures to stop such actions, as morally reprehensible and asserts that 
‘the thief and the receiver of stolen items are guilty of the same offence’.746  
In 1996, Nigeria was the most corrupt country according to Transparency 
International CPI747. Twenty years later, the trajectory score reveals improvement in 
the fight against corruption.748 The social impact of corruption on a nation can be 
profound, including the distortion of the market economy, and the creation of a non-
enabling environment for CSR to thrive.749   
In 1999,750 the executive government of Nigeria approached the World Bank to 
undertake significant governance and corruption diagnostic survey of Nigeria.751 The 
research was in conjunction with several Nigerian institutions including, the Centre for 
Development Studies (CDS) of the University of Jos and the University of Port 
Harcourt.752 The corruption survey was to highlight the magnitude and effects of 
corruption and corrupt practices in Nigeria from three critical segments of the society: 
households, enterprises, and public officials. The findings were to serve as a 
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benchmark for subsequent reviews to occur every two to three years. The national 
survey was designed to reflect the multi-ethnicity of Nigeria. Overall, five thousand 
randomly selected respondents participated in the survey.  Two thousand five hundred 
households were sampled, one thousand five hundred respondents across the three 
tiers of government participated in the public official’s sample, and one thousand 
respondents were interviewed in the Business enterprises survey.  
The three surveys were undertaken in 2001, and they were intended to provide 
an understanding of the perception of the major problems militating against 
development in Nigeria. The surveys identified endemic corruption to have shaped the 
level of social-economic development in Nigeria.753 For example, in one of the surveys, 
households were asked to identify the degree of seriousness of each of the research 
indicators. The respondents identified unemployment as the most challenging concern 
facing Nigeria, followed closely by corruption and the prohibitive cost of living.754 In a 
similar vein, households were interviewed to capture their perceptions of corruption in 
Nigeria. The figure reveals that 80% considered corruption as a severe challenge. 
Public officials were also asked in the survey to measure the extent of corruption in 
Nigeria, and the survey indicated an elevated level of corruption perception among 
public officials.755 The Business enterprise survey disclosed crime and corruption as 
a significant obstacle in conducting business in Nigeria. 
  Corruption is a major challenge in Nigeria, and there is no shortage of academic 
research on this issue.756 According to Osoba, corruption is ‘a way of life in Nigeria’.757 
Salisu, from an economic standpoint, concludes that ‘[t]he statistical exercise in 
Nigeria suggests that the magnitude of corruption is quite considerable.’758 Likewise, 
Hope avers that Nigeria has developed a national and international reputation as a 
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real menace of corruption.759 Tignor contends that ‘no country in the continent has 
devoted more attention and energy to continuing allegations of corruption than 
Nigeria.’760 Ocheni and Nwankwo attributed these failings to culture, and a poor reward 
and value system,761 while others have taken a historical approach as to the cause 
and understanding of corruption in Nigeria.762 However, there is an underpinning 
consensus amongst academics and commentators that political will is a profound 
factor in eradicating corruption in Nigeria.763 Political will, according to Bamidele et 
al.764, is partly why anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria have mostly been unsuccessful. 
 The elevation of Nigeria to a state where corruption is ‘a way of life’ can be 
much appreciated from a historical perspective. Corruption in Nigeria can be traced to 
the pre-colonial era of slave raiding and trading, where captured individuals were 
exchanged for gifts by the rulers of some districts.765 This act continued long after the 
trade was outlawed under the British protectorate until an aggressive effort by the 
colonial administrators eventual brought the practice to an end.766 One of Britain's last 
legacy to Nigeria was to open the discussion concerning governmental impropriety 
and to make it a prominent issue. This concern about corrupt acts in Nigeria had deep 
roots in the nineteenth century, and colonialism was extolled for providing the good 
government in place of oppression and chaos. To justify their conquest of West Africa, 
the British claimed to be agents of law and order. They believed that powerful chiefs 
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and Emirs, like those in Northern Nigeria, were inherently aggressive, salvage and 
corrupt.767 In a speech given in Sokoto in March I903, Lord Frederick Lugard asserted 
that the Fulani rulers would not be removed from their offices under British indirect 
rule: ‘but bribes are forbidden, and mutilation and confinement of men in inhuman 
prisons are not lawful’.768  
Temple also wrote that the lack of honesty is the first significant flaw of many 
of his African friends.769 In Northern Nigeria, especially between 1900 and 1920, the 
British removed those Northern office-holders whom they regarded as the most 
corrupt.770 The Southern part of Nigeria, those territories south of the Northern 
Protectorate, was not spared of the accusation of corruption by the British colonial 
ruler.771 The British administrators were so alarmed by the level of corruption and 
abuse of power by local politicians that they asserted that Nigeria was not yet ready 
for independence during the agitation for self-rule by local politicians.772 Ogunyemi’s 
analysis of Nigerian laws against corruption and the actual reporting of corrupt 
practices reported by the Director of Audit from 1950–1960 (decolonisation period), 
concludes that many of the proven cases of fraud were, however, not sanctioned as 
required by law. This attitude laid the foundation for a culture of impunity in the 
management of public resources in the immediate post-independence period.773 
 Individual ethnic groups to promote their interests over those of any national 
agenda has led to poor governance. Idemudia believes that the consequences of the 
1914 forced amalgamation of the southern and northern protectorates driven by the 
British colonialist’s political and economic interests, as opposed to the concerns or 
aspirations of the indigenous people, which led to the Federal government investing 
in ‘projects that are driven by ethnic politics at the expense of rational economic 
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decision’.774 Likewise, Akinwunmi states that in pre-colonial Nigeria, each of the ethnic 
groups that colonialism forcefully brought together under one administration had their 
own unique political and administrative structures that best suited their society. 
However, this unique structure was obliterated after the amalgamation of 1914.775 
Akinwunmi avers that the British failed to foster the foundation for integration 
(evidenced by the introduction of the indirect rule system and several constitutional 
bargains) during decolonisation. 776 The opportunity presented by independence to 
redress the roots of these problems was, however, neglected by the new indigenous 
political elites who took over from the colonialists. Rather, they saw the opportunity to 
further their interests through ethnicity and religion, and this presented the elites, 
according to Akinwunmi, with the opportunity to plunder the national economy to the 
point of collapse, as successive Nigerian government failed due to a cycle of coups 
and counter-coups with the coup plotters citing corruption as part of the reason for the 
coup d’état.777  
Against this backdrop, the ‘unholy’ amalgamation was a social contract forced 
on Nigerians without the will of the people. The failure of the colonial administration to 
create a legitimate social contract among the various groups divided the country along 
the lines of ethnicity, including language and regional dialect. Governance, therefore, 
was challenging and this evoked a famous phrase by one of the founding fathers of 
the Nigerian nation that ‘Nigeria is merely a geographical expression’, lumped together 
as an arbitrary collection of disparate groups.778 Similarly, Agagu,779 Rafiu et al.780 
argued that this ‘fraudulent social contract’ and the forceful consolidation of diverse 
peoples from different socio-cultural backgrounds without their formal consents to co-
exist as a nation, created horizontal and polarised primordial loyalties that continue to 
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pose considerable obstacles to the challenge of national integration. Moreover, the 
relationship between the Nigerian political leaders and the masses, according to Rafiu 
et al., have only continued the ‘domination781 and exploitation’ system inherited from 
the colonialist782.  
Even though the unification of Nigeria is viewed as a ‘fraudulent social contract’, 
nonetheless, the colonial rulers equipped Nigeria with relevant tools to confront 
corruption, including Western-style education (early Nigerian leaders trained at British 
universities, and they returned to Nigeria to join the independence movement in the 
late 50s and early 60s, the best and brightest were employed in the civil service),783 
professional public service and working utilities,784 standardisation of systems and 
structure, and the awareness of corruption and accountability in the polity and 
administration, especially during the decolonisation era, were all credible platforms the 
indigenous political elites should have embraced. However, it was clearly missed by 
the political elites, and the situation snowballed into a society whereby the lack of 
accountability is perceived as the norm. 
 After the discovery and the sole reliance of oil in Nigeria, corrupt practices took 
a worse turn, and oil became a resource curse.785 A ‘resource curse’ situation is where 
resource-rich countries tend to have less economic growth and worse developmental 
outcomes than countries with fewer natural resources. With the discovery of oil, the 
nation plunged into a situation known as ‘Dutch Disease;’ that is, the dominance in an 
economy of a particular commodity export, usually oil, to the exclusion of the 
development of other sectors resulting in severe economic imbalance and 
vulnerability.786 In the same vein, Oluduro stated that corruption is prevalent in the oil 
sector especially in the award of oil licences and contracts, but the most prevalent is 
bribery and embezzlement of oil rent, 787 and this situation permeates into the larger 
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society. It was estimated that in the late 1970s, $25million per day was transferred 
abroad on behalf of Nigeria’s corrupt officials.788 In 2008, KBR, a US oil service 
company and its former chairman and CEO, Albert J. Stanley, pleaded guilty to paying 
millions of dollars in bribes to senior Nigerian government officials to secure contracts 
worth $6 billion. KBR agreed to pay a $402 million in criminal fine,789 while the former 
chairman was sentenced to thirty months imprisonment by a U.S district judge.790  
Another major depravity in the oil sector is the $6.8 billion oil subsidy scam.791 
The House of Representatives’ report revealed that the subsidy regime operated 
during the period under review, were fraught with endemic corruption and entrenched 
inefficiency.792 The report uncovers a long list of alleged wrongdoings involving oil 
retailers, Nigeria's Oil Management Company, government officials as beneficiaries, 
and the state-owned Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation.793 Under the oil subsidy 
scheme, oil retailers were paid for premium motor spirit (oil/fuel) that was never 
supplied.  Investigators considering the subsidy found importers were being paid for 
59 million litres per day, while the country only consumes 35 million litres per day. 
Mismanagement by government officials and fraudulent claims by fuel marketers cost 
the country $6.8 billion over three years – about a quarter of Nigeria's annual budget 
Prosecution of the offending firms is currently on-going in the Nigerian courts.794 In 
FRN v Wabgatoma & ors795, which was the first conviction of the oil subsidy scandal, 
the Lagos State High Court sentenced the chairman and the managing director of 
Ontario Oil & Gas Nigeria Limited to ten years imprisonment for their role in the oil 
subsidy fraud. Again, the Nigerian House of Representative Ad-hoc Committee is 
currently investigating an alleged seventeen billion US dollars stolen from undeclared 
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crude oil and liquefied natural gas exports to global destinations.796 The revenue loss 
to the government was estimated as fifty-seven million barrels of crude oil illegally 
exported and sold in the U.S. between January 2011 and December 2014 without 
remittance to the government. Accordingly, corruption in the oil industry distorts public 
policy, creates misapplication of resources, and hinders development; over, and above 
all, it undermines good governance and ultimately hurts the poor most.797 Meanwhile 
the Speaker of the House, Yakubu Dogara, summaries it all when he declared that the 
‘incidence of money missing in the industry had become a recurrent decimal to the 
point that the news item in the media is incomplete without mention of the ills of the 
industry’.798 Campbell and Page referred to Nigeria as a kleptocracy, ‘a nation 
characterised by a type of corruption in which government or public officials seek 
personal gains at the expense of those being governed’.799 Corruption, therefore, is 
‘deeply embedded in virtually all aspects of national life’,800 including the economy, 
political, judiciary, health and institutions all around the country.801  
Corruption, recognised in most sectors of the Nigerian economy,802 has a 
profound impact on tobacco regulatory effort. For the most part, weak institutions of 
which corruption is a manifestation803 can result in inadequate promulgation and 
enforcement of tobacco control policies,804 including the impediment to policy 
changes.805 In a corrupt environment, resources for human capital and other needed 
investments, such as infrastructure and health, are often diverted through various 
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means.806 Smuggling, another venal act associated with the tobacco industry, 
illustrated in section 5.3, undermines tobacco control effort.807  
Moreover, the Nigeria Customs Service recognised the lack of 
intergovernmental cooperation as a barrier to the implementation of tobacco control 
laws.808 One major way in restraining smuggling is to have an effective customs and 
border system; however, evidence suggests that Nigeria may be lacking in this 
regard.809 Once there is a weakness in the tobacco regulatory framework, evidence 
suggests that the tobacco industry will interfere and influence the tobacco control 
agenda.810 The tobacco industry in Nigeria, for instance, was involved in the 
development of the standards for Tobacco Control of 2014, contrary to the WHO 
guidelines against the engagement of the industry in policy formulation.811 Measures 
preventing TTCs from interfering in tobacco control policies have been regarded as 
anti-corruption measures. According to the WHO Committee of Experts on Tobacco 
Industry Documents, TTCs have operated to subvert the efforts of the WHO in a 
manner that is elaborate, well-financed, sophisticated, and usually invisible.812 Article 
5.3 of the FCTC (Protection against Tobacco Industry Interference) are anti-corruption 
measures to prevent interference in tobacco control actions and policies.813 The treaty 
obligates Parties to protect their health policies from the tobacco industry. 
 However, from 1960 to date, Nigeria employed several measures and 
approaches to eradicating corruption, including institutional approach, legal approach, 
and political education. The legal or constitutional approach includes: the promulgation 
of Decrees during the military era, Acts of Parliament during the civil rule periods, and 
 
806 Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and Philip Osafo-Kwaako, ‘Nigeria’s economic reforms: Progress and challenges’ 
(March 2007) Brookings Global Economy and Development Working Paper No. 6. 
807 FJ Chaloupka (ed), Tobacco Control in Developing Countries (OUP 2000). 
808 J Ishaku et al.,  A Scoping Study of Nigeria’s Tobacco Market and Policy Space (CSEA 2019). 
809 O Agbu, ‘Corruption and Human Trafficking: The Nigerian Case’ (2003) 4(1) West Africa Review 1; N Munchi, 
‘Smuggled rice makes mockery of Nigerian quest to boost farming’ ft.com (6 June 2019).  
810 WHO, Tobacco Industry interference: a global brief (WHO Press 2012); K Danishevski K et al.,’Public 
attitudes towards smoking and tobacco control policy in Russia’ (2008) 17 Tobacco Control 276: this article 
reveals that the TTCs allegedly negotiated the overturn of a Soviet decree banning tobacco advertising.   
811 O Oladepo et al., ‘Analysis of Tobacco Policies in Nigeria: historical development and application of multi-
sectoral action’ (2018) 18(suppl 1) British Medical Council Public Health 77. 
812 World Health Organization, ‘Tobacco Company Strategies to Undermine Tobacco Control Activities at the 
World Health Organization,’ Report of the Committee of Experts on Tobacco Industry Documents, July 2000. 
813 Southeast Asia Tobacco Control Alliance (SEATCA) et al. (eds), Anti-corruption and Tobacco Control 
(Bangkok, Thailand Nov 2017); H Weishaar et al., ‘Global Health Governance and the Commercial Sector: A 
Documentary Analysis of Tobacco Company Strategies to Influence the WHO Framework Convention on 




the establishment of legislative institutions empowered to arrest and prosecute corrupt 
officials814 such as the Corrupt Practices Decree of 1975, The Public Officer 
(Investigation of Assets Decree No 5 of 1976), Forfeiture of Assets, etc. (Certain 
Persons) Decree No 53 of 1999. Other measures during the military era include the 
use of Tribunal such as the Failed Bank Tribunal set up by the Abacha military 
government. Constitutional measures include the Code of Conduct Bureau and the 
Code of Conduct Tribunals provided for in the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions.815 Political 
education has also been employed, such as the Ethical Revolution between 1979-83, 
War against Indiscipline introduced by General Muhammad Buhari from1983-85, War 
against Indiscipline and Corruption implemented by General Sani Abacha from 1993-
1998 and the National Orientation Agency under the civilian administration of 
Olusegun Obasanjo.  
There are other measures implemented to deter corruption from 1999, when 
Nigeria returned to electoral democracy, to date: the establishment of the Independent 
Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), and the Economic and Financial Crime 
Commission (EFCC) (these two bodies are empowered by law to investigate, arrest 
and prosecute suspected corrupt public office holders and political appointees); the 
introduction of Due Process in all the federal Ministries and parastatals. All these 
measures, including the various socio-economic and political reforms, have been 
designed to curb the menace of corruption in the country. However, this thesis will limit 
itself to the anti-corruption measures that relate to corporations, especially 
multinational corporations.   
 
5.4.1 The Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000.  
 
In Nigeria, a corporation can be held criminally liable for corrupt practices under 
the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 (CPA).816 It identifies a 
wide range of corrupt practices such as bribery, fraud, and other related offences. The 
Act is broad in scope and applies to both public officials and private persons, including 
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private dealings between private businesses.817  Under s1 of the CPA, ‘person’ 
includes a natural person, a juristic person or any body of persons corporate or 
incorporate. Section 2 of the Act, which is the interpretation section, offers only a vague 
definition of corruption, defining it as ‘including bribery, fraud and other related 
offences’. 818 The CPA attempts to draw a line between private and public business. 
Sections 9, 17, 18, 21 and 22 are provisions of the CPA that may affect corporations. 
Section 9 CPA criminalised offences of giving gratification to public officers, while 
sections 17 and 18 proscribe the gratification of a public officer by and through agents. 
Sections 21 and 22 declare bribery unlawful in reference to auction and contracts, 
respectively.  
The CPA, however, has its deficiency. It does not make provisions for those 
who have access to public funds but are not regarded as ‘public officials’ as defined 
under s2 of the CPA. According to Ocheje, the spouses and children of public office 
holders have used public funds in implementing various projects, so such quasi-public 
officer’s position must be acknowledged in the CPA819. Furthermore, Ocheje highlights 
that the CPA does not go far enough concerning public officers who, although they 
probably do not corruptly benefit from their conduct, facilitate corruption through 
negligence. Acts such as culpable neglect of duties relating to controls of public 
expenditure, budget overruns, and extra-budgetary spending fall under this purview.820 
The UK Bribery Act 2010 and the US Foreign Corrupt Practises Act (FCPA)821 have 
extraterritorial laws for the bribery of foreign public officials, but the CPA, nor any other  
Nigerian law, have no similar provision. This may be because of the historical 
background to the enactment of extraterritorial laws on foreign bribery that resulted 
from the Watergate scandals and several other disclosures of large illicit payments by 
US firms.822 Thus, extra-territorial foreign bribery laws are perceived as laws relevant 
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to MNCs headquartered in developed countries and conducting corporate practices in 
other developed and developing countries.  
Another criticism facing the CPA is whether section 40 of the CPA runs contrary 
to the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, common law and international conventions. Section 
40 of the CPA states that every person required to give any information by an 
investigative officer shall be legally bound to give information, failing to do so, the 
person shall be guilty of an offence on conviction liable to six months imprisonment or 
a fine of ten thousand naira. There are sections of the Nigerian constitution in 
contravention with s40 of the CPA:  section 36(5), presumption of innocent until proven 
guilty; section 36(11), no person tried for a criminal offence shall be compelled to give 
evidence at trial; and section 39 safeguards the freedom of expression, including 
freedom to impart ideas and information without interference. The freedom of 
expression or free speech does not only safeguard speech in its positive aspect but 
safeguards negative free speech right, that is, the right not to speak. The U.S. 
Supreme Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette gave recognition 
to the right not to speak: ‘the freedom of thought … includes both the right to speak 
freely and the right not to speak at all…’823 The right of silence is a common law 
principle.824 In broad terms, it is the refusal to answer questions before, during, or after 
a trial without sanctions. The right protects all suspects, whether guilty or innocent.825 
It serves as a practical and symbolic expression of the presumption of innocent and 
fair trial guaranteed under sections 36(5) and 36(1) of the constitution FRN, 
respectively. Lord Mustill, in the English case of R v. Director of SFO; ex parte Smith826 
identifies six threads of the concept of the right to silence. One of the six, in direct 
opposition with section 40 of the CPA states that the right to silence is, ‘a general 
immunity possessed by all persons and bodies from being compelled on pain of 
punishment to answer questions posed by other persons or bodies’.827 In addition, the 
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right to silence is a provision that can be found in international treaties in which Nigeria 
is a member, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)828 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Right.829 In sum, s36 of 
the CPA runs contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Nigerian constitution  
 
5.4.2 The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission 
(ICPC) and The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC).  
 
The Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) was established by the 
CPA.830 Its duties are laid out under section 6(a) – (f) CPA: investigating corruption 
reports and where appropriate prosecuting offenders; examining the practices, 
systems and procedures of public bodies so as not to facilitate fraud or corruption; 
assisting on ways by which fraud or corruption may be eliminated or minimised; 
advising heads of public bodies of any changes in practices, systems or procedures 
compatible with the effective discharge of the duties of the public bodies as the 
Commission thinks fit to reduce the likelihood or incidence of bribery, corruption, and 
related offences; educating the public on and against bribery, corruption and related 
offences, among other functions as prescribed under the Act. Under its mandate to 
educate the public on bribery and corruption, the ICPC established the Anti-Corruption 
Academy of Nigeria (ACAN), an educative training centre. The establishment of ACAN 
is partly in fulfilment of Nigeria’s commitment to the global initiative for the successful 
implementation of the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption (AUCPACC), as well as the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC).831 The ICPC acts mainly upon petition or report of corrupt allegations 
received. Under its petition guidelines, a petition can be sent from anywhere in the 
world against any corporate or non-corporate person in Nigeria who is suspected of 
having committed or about to commit an offence under the Corrupt Practices and 
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Other Related Offences Act 2000.832 In the discharge of their duties, officers of the 
ICPC, under section 5 CPA, are conferred with the powers and immunities of a police 
officer. Other investigative powers granted include (a) to seize movable or immovable 
property, where there is reasonable grounds the property is relevant to the offence 
(section 37); (b) upon attaining a court order, to search a property and its occupants 
and seize any evidence thereof; to remove by force any obstruction to any premises 
for purposes of investigation; and to detain any persons found in the premises or 
conveyances until the search is completed (section 36). In addition to these powers, 
the Chairman of the Commission is granted extensive powers to obtain information 
from persons reasonably suspected to have committed an offence under the Act 
(section 44). The information required may relate to the precise identification of 
properties that are the subject matter of the offence suspected to have been 
committed, whether such properties are within or outside Nigeria. The commissioner 
may compel information to be produced, including bank accounts, documents, and 
records relating to the business, travel or sources of income, earnings, gifts or other 
assets of suspected offenders.833  
The ICPC was initially burdened with litigations challenging its constitutionality 
which almost paralysed its activities; however, the Supreme Court upheld the validity 
of the CPA and the ICPC.834 Again, in 2003, the National Assembly sought to expunge 
the ICPC by repealing and replacing the CPA, but the Nigerian Supreme Court halted 
the process.835 The ICPC has continued to investigate and prosecute cases under the 
provision of the CPA. 
 The EFCC was created in 2002 under the former President of Nigeria, 
Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) to complement the efforts of ICPC. The EFCC is 
empowered under section 6 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(Establishment, Etc) Act 2004 to investigate and prosecute all offences connected with 
economic and financial crimes, including those perpetrated by individuals, public 
bodies and private corporate organisations. Section 46 of EFCC Act defines ‘economic 
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and financial crimes’ to include any form of fraud, narcotic drug trafficking, money 
laundering, embezzlement, bribery, illegal arms dealing, smuggling, human trafficking 
and child labour, illegal oil bunkering, illegal mining, tax evasion, looting, foreign 
exchange malpractices, and any form of corrupt malpractices. The EFCC under the 
pioneer chairmanship of Nuhu Ribadu, quickly emerged formidable against corruption 
in Nigeria. Public anticipations of the new institution were received with scepticism, 
given the Nigerian government’s past track record of laxity in the implementation of 
previous anti-corruption programmes.836  
However, in October 2005, the EFCC’s credibility and public acceptance 
escalated when it recorded an unprecedented breakthrough in the nation’s history of 
anti-corruption campaigns by securing the conviction of Nigeria’s Inspector General of 
Police, Tafa Balogun (2002-2005), after it emerged that public funds were diverted to 
his accounts,837 and the successful prosecution and conviction of the authors of the 
‘Brazilian bank’ case fraud, where the accused defrauded a Brazilian bank, Banco 
Noroesta of Sao Paulo, of $242m.838 Aside from the over $5 billion in stolen assets the 
institution helped to recover from corrupt officials and the securing of over 400 
convictions, EFCC’s investigations also led to the prosecution and subsequent 
removal of a Senate President, state governors, ministers, national assemblymen, 
bank executives, corporations and many other key personalities.839 The EFCC 
prosecuted and conviction of some of the perpetrators of the $6.8billion oil subsidy 
scam narrated in section 5.4. During the time of writing, the EFFC indicted electoral 
officials (the Independent National Electoral Commission officials) over the ₦3.4billion 
bribery scandal during the 2015 general elections840 and the $1.2billion Malabu 
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scandal,841 to mention but a few. Furthermore, the EFCC gained both technical and 
financial assistance from Western governments, including the USA, UK, and the EU. 
For instance, between 2006 and 2010, the EU provided $23.5m worth of assistance 
to the EFCC842. Foreign law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI and the London 
Metropolitan police, have provided aid through key training of EFCC investigators.843  
 The challenges faced by EFCC and ICPC have caused some researchers to 
refer to Nigeria as a social environment that rewards corruption.844 For the two 
Commissions to be effective, there must be an enabling environment to complement 
it, and the strategies adopted must be by the rule of law and civil society. In Federal 
Republic of Nigeria v. Joshua Dariye845, J. Dariye, the EFCC prosecuted Dariye, a 
former state governor, on corruption charges ranging from embezzlement of public 
funds to criminal breach of trust, yet he won a Senatorial seat in the 2011 elections. 
Whilst still a serving governor in 2004, Dariye was arrested in the UK for money 
laundry offences, but he jumped bail in September of the same year and returned to 
Nigeria.846 Eight other former governors arraigned on corruption charges by the EFCC 
won party nominations to contest in the 2011 elections either as a governor or as a 
senator.847 In addition, those accused of corruption who are still under probe were 
honoured by the Nigerian president, Goodluck Jonathan (2010-2015), ‘the conferment 
of national honour that includes several corrupt political elements, fraudsters, and ex-
convicts’.848 One of the most controversial bestowment of national honours is on the 
late General Sani Abacha, former military president. After the successful forfeiture of 
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General Abacha’s assets in the case between USA v. Mohammed Sani et al.849, US 
Assistant Attorney General Caldwell made the following pejorative statement about 
Abacha:  
 
“Rather than serve his county, General Abacha used his public office in Nigeria to loot millions 
of dollars, engaging in brazen acts of kleptocracy…With this judgment, we have forfeited $480 
million in corruption proceeds that can be used for the benefit of the Nigerian people. Through 
the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative, the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division denies 
kleptocrats like Abacha the fruits of their crimes and protects the U.S. financial system from 
money laundering. In coordination with our partners in Jersey, France and the United Kingdom, 
we are helping to end this chapter of corruption and flagrant abuse of office.”850 
 
Abacha ruled Nigeria for five years after a 1993 military coup, and he is believed to 
have embezzled $4.3bn while in office, placing him among the ranks of one of Africa’s 
most avaricious kleptocrats.851 Professor Wole Soyinka condemned the act because 
‘by honouring Abacha, President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration had ridiculed 
Nigeria in the presence of world leaders by glorifying murderers and thieves’.852  
Political interference in anti-corruption cases, as well as other ICPC/EFCC 
activities, is another challenge encountered by the anti-corruption bodies, which is 
partly why no Chairman of the EFCC is allowed to complete his or her term of office.853 
Other challenges include judicial corruption and inefficiency,854 inadequate personnel, 
inadequate funding, poor working conditions and reward system.855 The rate of poverty 
in Nigeria is strikingly prevalent that many Nigerians have embraced corruption as an 
alternative means of survival.856 A low wage, coupled with high inflationary rates of 
 
849 USA v. Mohammed Sani et al Case 1:13-cv-01832-JDB Document 1 Filed 11/18/13 (US Department of 
Justice) <https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/765201435135920471922.pdf> accessed 24 April 2017. 
850 US Dept of Justice (note 744). 
851 David Smith, ‘Switzerland to return Sani Abacha 'loot' money to Nigeria’ The Guardian (18 March 2015). 
852 Ibid.  
853 Oluduro (note 534) 364. 
854 HRW (note 842). 
855 AT Albert et al., ‘EFCC and the politics of combating corruption in Nigeria (2003-2012)’, (2016) 23(4) Journal 
of Financial Crime 725. 
856 OO Umoh & AS Ubom, ‘Corruption in Nigeria: Perceived Challenges of the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) in the Fourth Republic’ (2012) 3(3) International Journal of Advanced Legal Studies and 




goods and services, has led to more irreconcilable hardship in spite of the abundance 
of natural resources, and so many have died due to starvation, diseases and 
incalculable natural disaster, according to Mamadu.857  
The ICPC has been condemned for emerging as a weak organisation,858 while 
the EFCC is criticised for being indifference to the rule of law and for serving as a tool 
used by the incumbent government to subdue political opponents.859 EFCC and ICPC 
have overlapping functions in the investigation and prosecution of corruption despite 
having different mandates, leading to suggestions that both bodies should 
amalgamate as a single entity.860 Moreso, the EFCC, ICPC, the police force and the 
Attorney General of the Federation, all have assigned powers to investigate and 
prosecute corruption cases without a clear scope.861 Moreover, Albert and Okoli argue 
that the EFCC is not a capable institution, nor does it serve as a deterrent in 
combatting corruption,862where Oyovbaire863and Iyare864 attributed the ineffectiveness 
and failures of EFFC to external factors, such as political influence. 
 
5.4.3 The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) 
 
The UNCAC was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 31 October 2003 
and came into force on 14 December 2005. It is signed by 140 countries. As part of 
the effort aimed at eradicating corruption, the Nigerian government ratified the UNCAC 
on 14 December 2014. The UNCAC is the only legally binding universal anti-corruption 
instrument.865 The UNCAC requires countries to criminalise a wide range of acts, 
 
857 T Mamadu, Corruption in the Leadership Structure of the Nigerian Polity, (Jochrisam Publishers 2009) in OO 
Umoh ibid at p106. 
858 VAO Adetula, (note 859) 48. 
859 VAO Adetula (ed), Money and Politics in Nigeria (Petra Digital Press 2008) 50; JS Ojo, ‘Looting the Looters: 
The Paradox of Anti-Corruption Crusades in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic (1999-2014)’ (2016) 12(9) Canadian 
Social Science 1-20. 
860 Ibid. 
861 AT Albert et al., ‘EFCC and the politics of combating corruption in Nigeria (2003-2012)’, (2016) 23(4) Journal 
of Financial Crime 725. 
862  Ibid.   
863 S Oyovbaire, ‘Introduction’, in S Oyovbaire (ed), Governance and Politics in Nigeria: the IBB and OBJ Years, 
(Spectrum Books 2008). 
864 T Iyare, ‘Corruption and the crisis of national values’. In S Oyovbaire, ibid. 
865 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations Convention Against Corruption, (United Nations: 




including bribery, embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversions of public funds, 
and various other acts of corruption in the private sector.866 It is divided into eight 
chapters, including Preventive measures (Chapter II), Criminalization and law 
enforcement (Chapter III), International cooperation (Chapter IV), and Asset recovery 
(Chapter V).  This thesis will limit itself to Chapters II and III because the two chapters 
are directed at corporations.  
Preventive measures include anti-corruption policies and practices.867 For 
instance, article 5(3) UNCAC requires the State Party to establish and promote 
effective practices aimed at the prevention of corruption, and periodically evaluate 
relevant legal instruments and administrative measures to determine their adequacy 
in preventing and fighting corruption. It is questionable whether the Nigerian state 
evaluates its legal instruments and administrative measures to determine if they are 
adequate in the anti-corruption fight. As an example, while section 8 of the CPA Act 
prescribes seven years imprisonment for any person who corruptly asks for, receives 
or obtains any property or benefit of any kind, s112 of the Criminal Code Act868 
ascribes three years imprisonment for the same offence. Most often, the latter option 
is used to decide corruption cases, as evidenced in some corruption judgments.869 
The reason why the latter remains so is that the Nigerian Criminal Code has not been 
reviewed in accordance to the provision under article 5(3) UNCAC.  
 Chapter III of the UNCAC criminalises certain offences such as bribery of 
national public officials, foreign public officials or officials of an international public 
organisation.870 State Parties are required to establish liability of legal persons 
 
866 United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), arts 15-25. 
867 See chapter II, article 5 of the UNCAC.  Other preventive measures are the use of anti-corruption bodies to 
prevent corruption (article 6); proper adoption and maintenance of public sector (article 7); code of conducts 
for public officials (article 8); public procurement and management of public finances (article 9); public 
reporting (article 10); measures relating to judiciary and prosecution services (article 11); prevention of private 
sector corruption (article 12); participation of society (article 13); and prevention of money-laundering (article 
14). 
868 Criminal Code Act, Chapter 77, Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1990.  
869 AT Albert et al., ‘EFCC and the politics of combating corruption in Nigeria (2003-2012)’, (2016) 23(4) Journal 
of Financial Crime 742. 
870 See chapter III, articles 15 and 16 of the UNCAC.  Other offences which States should be criminalized include 
embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public official (article 17); intentional 
laundering of proceeds of crime (article 23); intentional obstruction of justice (article 25).  Offences which 
State Parties should consider criminalizing include trading in influence (article 18); abuse of functions by public 
official (article 19); illicit enrichment (article 20); bribery in the private sector (article 21); and embezzlement of 




(corporations) for the participation in any offence established within the convention. 
Such liability may be criminal, civil or administrative. Legal persons held liable are 
subjected to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions, 
including monetary sanctions.871 Under the Convention, State parties have territorial 
and nationality jurisdiction over the offences.872 The convention includes the exercise 
of any criminal jurisdiction established by a State Party in accordance with its domestic 
law.873 
The UNCAC has excellent potential to be a useful tool in ensuring corporate 
responsibility or liability for corrupt corporate practices. Even though Nigeria ratified 
the UN Convention, it is yet to be domesticated as required by section 12 of the 
Nigerian Constitution.874 Oluduro avers that such a step to domesticate the Convention 
would prove Nigeria’s commitment to combating corruption; nonetheless, some 
sections of the UNCAC have been incorporated into different legislative Acts in 
Nigeria. An example is provisions under article 14 UNCAC875, can be found under the 
provision of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011. Again, section 1(b) of Article 
14 calls for a dedicated law enforcement agent in combating money laundering, and 
this was translated into section 6 of the EFCC (Establishment) Act 2004, charging the 
EFCC with the responsibility of all financial crimes including money laundering. Most 
sectors under the UNCAC such as, but not limited to, bribery876, embezzlement877, 
illicit enrichment878, freezing, seizure and confiscation,879 all have coverage under the 
EFCC Act or the CPA. However, article 16 - Bribery of foreign public officials and 
officials of international public organisations – has not yet been postulated in Nigerian 
legislation, as at the time of writing.  
 
 
871 See chapter III, article 26 of the UNCAC. 
872 See chapter III, article 42 of the UNCAC. 
873 See chapter III, art. 42 (6) of the UNCAC. 
874 Oluduro (note 534) 368. 
875 Article 14, sections 1-5, is on measures to prevent money laundering. 
876 Article 15 UNCAC. See Chapter 12 Criminal Code (CC) Act; sections 8-10, 18, 21-22 CPA. 
877 Article 17 UNCAC. See Chapter 12 CC. 
878 Article 20 UNCAC. See Chapter 12 CC; section 19 CPA. 
879 Article 31 UNCAC. Forfeiture See section 20, 21, 23-33 EFCC (Establishment) Act, 2004, and also, sections 




5.4.4 The African Union (AU) Anti-Corruption Convention. 
 
Nigeria is a party to the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption (AU Convention).880The AU Convention was adopted on 1 July 2003 by the 
AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Maputo, Mozambique.881 The AU 
Convention has five objectives as stipulated under article two. The Convention aims 
to promote and strengthen the development of mechanisms to prevent, detect, punish 
and eradicate corruption and related offences in the public and private sector in African 
states.882 It also aims to facilitate cooperation among the State Parties to ensure the 
effectiveness of measures and actions to eradicate corruption.883 It proscribes both 
public and private sector acts of corruption. In regard to the Private sector, article 11 
of the Convention enjoins party states to adopt legislative and other measures to 
combat corruption and related offences committed by agents of the private sector; 
establish mechanisms to encourage participation by the private sector in the fight 
against unfair competition, respect of the tender procedures and property rights; and 
to adopt such other measures as may be necessary to prevent companies from paying 
bribes to win tenders. Article 1 defines ‘private sector’ as the sector of a national 
economy under private ownership in which market forces control the allocation of 
productive resources rather than public authorities. Private sector entities based on 
this definition would include partnerships, small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), and multi or transnational corporations.884  
 Article 9 of the Convention requires each State Party to adopt such legislative 
and other measures to give effect to the right of access to any information that is 
required to assist in the fight against corruption and related offences. The promulgation 
of the Freedom of Information Act885 follows the provisions of article 9. The AU 
 
880 Nigeria signed and ratified the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption on the 16/12/2003 
and 26/09/2006. 
881 African Union, ‘African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Crime’ (AU, 11 July 2003) 
<https://www.au.int/web/en/treaties/african-union-convention-preventing-and-combating-corruption> 
accessed 26 April 2017. 
882 Article 2, section 1. 
883 Article 2, section 2. 
884 Olufemi O. Amao, ‘The African Regional Human Rights System and Multinational Corporations: 
Strengthening Host State Responsibility for the Control of MNC’, (2008) 12(5) The Int’l Journal of Human Rights 
761, 779.  




Convention recognises the role of civil society and the media in monitoring the 
principles of the Convention at the domestic level and the need to create an 
empowering environment that will enable them to hold Governments to the highest 
level of transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs.886 
 However, the AU Convention is criticised for its excessive use of claw-back 
clauses as contained in several of its provisions, granting supremacy to domestic laws 
of state parties. For example, article 7(5) states that any immunity granted to public 
officials shall not be an obstacle to the investigation of allegations against the 
prosecution of such officials, subject to the provisions of domestic legislation. All these 
clawbacks, according to Olaniyan, undermines the objectives of the Convention and 
emasculates uniformity in its application amongst member State parties.887 The 
Convention has also been criticised for lacking provisions on the liability of 
corporations. Amao, for instance, recognises the Convention’s effort to check 
corruption in the private sector, yet the convention’s attention is on State 
responsibilities without making provisions for the direct liability of multinational 
corporations.888 Furthermore, the Convention is silent on the issue of bribery of foreign 
public officials despite reference to various public and private acts of corruption.889 
Addressing the above challenges, therefore, will help reinforce the Convention’s 
capacity to tackle corruption and, thus, complement the efforts taken at the domestic 
state level. 
 
5.5 Contribution of the International Community in Combating Corruption in Nigeria 
 
This section examines the efforts of the international community in the global 
prevention of corruption and its impact on Nigeria, including the use of foreign 
 
886 Article 12, AU Anti-Corruption Convention. 
887 K Olaniyan, ‘The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption: A Critical Appraisal’ 
(2004) 4 African Human Rights Law journal 74, 86. 
888 Olufemi O. Amao, ‘The African Regional Human Rights System and Multinational Corporations: 
Strengthening Host State Responsibility for the Control of MNC’, (2008) 12(5) The Int’l Journal of Human Rights 
761, 781. 
889  NJ Udombana, ‘Fighting Corruption Seriously? Africa’s Anti-Corruption Convention’ (2003) 7 Singapore 




legislative tools such as the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and 
the United Kingdom Bribery Act 2010 in aiding the anti-corruption effort in Nigeria. 
The harmonisation of the international community is critical in the global combat 
against corruption. Home countries holding perpetrators accountable for corrupt 
practices carried out in host states is a promising development. In the United States, 
for instance, a corporation and its employees are liable for bribery carried out in a 
foreign country where the employee must be acting within the scope of his or her duties 
and for the benefit of the corporation.890 Generally, a corporation is not liable for 
exceptional acts that are genuinely outside the employee's assigned duties or contrary 
to the corporation's interests, such as where the corporation is the victim rather than 
the beneficiary of the employee's unlawful conduct.891  
The U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) successfully prosecuted erring firms under the U.S. Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),892 illustrated in the case of Universal and Universal 
Brazil, where DoJ fined the corporation paid a fine to the U.S. DoJ for the violation of 
the FCPA.893 The application of the FCPA in prosecuting corrupt activities carried out 
in Nigeria is also noteworthy; for instance, the SEC charged Parker Drilling Company, 
a worldwide drilling services and project management firm, with the violation of the 
FCPA for authorising bribes to Nigerian officials involved in resolving the company’s 
customs dispute. The company agreed to pay $4m to settle the SEC charges.894 
Again, the Securities and Exchange Commission executed a settled enforcement 
action against Bristow Group Inc., a New York Stock Exchange-listed helicopter 
transportation services and an oil and gas operation firm, for the violation of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, including the bribery of foreign government officials. 
Under the Commission’s Order, a Nigerian affiliate of Bristow Group made improper 
payments to Nigerian state government officials in return for the reduction of the 
affiliate's employment taxes owed to the Nigerian state government. The Order further 
finds that the same affiliate and another Nigerian affiliate of Bristow Group 
 
890 Crim No 6516, USDC for the district of Rhode Island 148 F.Supp 365; 1957 U.S Dist. LEXIS 4029. 
891 Ibid.  
892 This is a deterrent to companies listed on the US exchanges and registered with the US SEC. 
893 US DoJ (note 710). 




underreported their expatriate payroll expenses in Nigeria.895 In SEC v ENI, S.p.A & 
anor,896 the Italian company ENI, S.p.A. and its former Dutch subsidiary Snamprogetti 
Netherlands B.V. violated the FCPA in a bribery scheme that included deliveries of 
cash-filled briefcases and vehicles to Nigerian government officials to win construction 
contracts. According to the SEC's complaint, senior executives authorised the hiring 
of two agents, a U.K. solicitor, and a Japanese trading company, through which more 
than $180 million in bribes were routed to Nigerian government officials to obtain 
several contracts to build liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities on Bonny Island, 
Nigeria. Snamprogetti and ENI agreed to jointly pay $125 million to settle the SEC's 
charges. Snamprogetti was fined an additional $240 million to settle a separate 
criminal proceeding brought by the U.S. Department of Justice.897 All these cases were 
brought under the US FCPA, without which, the perpetrators would not have been 
brought to justice in Nigeria.  
 Against this backdrop, the US FCPA is an essential legislative tool in controlling 
corporate criminal responsibility. It has both anti-bribery and accounting provisions, in 
accordance with the OECD Convention.898 The anti-bribery Act prohibits corporate or 
non-corporate actors,899 agent of a domestic concern,900 and any stockholder acting 
on behalf of a US company from bribing foreign officials to obtain or retain business.901 
An exception under the Act is a payment made to a foreign official, political party or 
party official, the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a 
routine governmental action by a foreign official, political party or party official.902 The 
 
895 U.S. Security and Exchange Commission, ‘SEC Institutes Settled Enforcement Action Against Bristow Group 
for Improper Payments to Nigerian Government Officials and Other Violations’ (SEC, 26 Sept 2007) 
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periodic reports with the SEC. 
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jurisdiction of the FCPA for corporate liability is both territorial and extra-territorial in 
its effect; that is, foreign and national companies which cause—directly or indirectly 
through agents—an act in furtherance of the corrupt payment to take place within the 
territory of the US or internationally, are subject to the jurisdiction of the FCPA. There 
are two liability defences903under the FCPA: (1) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of 
anything of value that was made, was lawful under the written laws and regulations of 
the foreign official’s country; or (2) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of 
value that was made was a reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and 
lodging expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official, party, party official, or 
candidate and was directly related to— (A) the promotion, demonstration, or 
explanation of products or services; or (B) the execution or performance of a contract 
with a foreign government or agency.904 The FCPA also prohibits payments towards 
obtaining or retaining business.905 
 The UK Government has shown increased propensity in combating money-
laundering and bribery offences perpetrated by ‘relevant commercial organisation’906 
with an ‘associated person’ in Nigeria, and globally.907 This commitment was 
demonstrated in 2004 with the arrest of a Nigerian serving governor for money laundry, 
who then jumped bail in September of the same year and returned back to Nigeria.908 
Again, in 2010, former Nigeria state governor, James Ibori (1999-2007), convicted in 
the UK for fraud and money laundering and other related offences.909 The Human 
Rights Watch African Director, Daniel Bekele, noted that Ibori’s conviction ‘was about 
 
903 Ibid, (c). 
904 Similarly, see s3 Canada’s CFPOA, with similar defences. Conversely, the UK Bribery Act does not have a 
similar defence mentioned in A & B. 
905 See United States v. Kay -- 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004). The case gives a detailed analysis of FCPA’s 
legislative history. 
906 Section 7(5), UK Bribery Act 2010: (a) a body which is incorporated under the law of any part of the United 
Kingdom and which carries on a business (whether there or elsewhere), (b) any other body corporate 
(wherever incorporated) which carries on a business, or part of a business, in any part of the United Kingdom, 
(c) a partnership which is formed under the law of any part of the United Kingdom and which carries on a 
business (whether there or elsewhere), or (d) any other partnership (wherever formed) which carries on a 
business, or part of a business, in any part of the United Kingdom. 
907 Section 8, ibid.  
908 S Murray, ‘Profile: Joshua Dariye’ (BBC News, 24 July 2007) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/6908960.stm> 
accessed 21 April 2017. The article also states that he has been sacked as governor twice and returned to 
reclaim his position on both occasions, earning him the nickname "the cat with nine lives". 
909 R v James Ibori et al. [2018] EWCA 2291 (Crim); Human Rights Watch, ‘Nigeria: UK Conviction a Blow against 
Corruption’ (HRW, 17 Apr 2012) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/17/nigeria-uk-conviction-blow-against-




acknowledging global responsibility for helping to stop the devastating human cost of 
corruption in Nigeria’.910 This determination embarked upon by the UK government 
will, perhaps, deter corrupt actors contemplating the UK as haven for their proceeds 
of crime.  
At the heart of the UK Anti-Corruption Plan,911 is the International Corruption 
Unit (ICU) and the UK Bribery Act 2010 (UKBA), which represents one of the most 
robust legal regimes against bribery anywhere in the world. Unlike the US Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (as amended), the UKBA’s requirement applies to both 
domestic and foreign bribery acts. The UKBA introduces two general offences 
covering active912 and passive913 bribery, and a specific offence relating to the bribery 
of foreign public officials914, which applies to individuals and UK-registered companies. 
It also introduces a specific corporate offence of ‘failing to prevent bribery from 
occurring’,915 designed to make organisations responsible for bribery committed on 
their behalf. In other words, a corporate body is liable for failing to prevent active 
bribery on its behalf by employees, agents, or subsidiaries. Therefore, if a UK 
registered company operating in Nigeria bribes a Nigerian official, and the action of 
bribery is not exempted under the UKBA, such action of bribery is in contravention of 
the UKBA. However, by demonstrating ‘adequate procedures’ were in place to prevent 
corrupt acts, the organisation could mitigate against a corporate criminal conviction. 
Cooperating with investigative official(s) or self-reporting by the company could also 
result in a ‘Deferred Prosecution Agreement’ (DPA),916 rather than a criminal 
 
910 Human Rights Watch, Ibid.  
911 HM Government, UK Anti-corruption plan (Crown 2014). 
912 Section 1 UK Bribery Act 2010. 
913 Section 2. 
914 Section 6. 
915 Section 7. 
916 For definition of DPA, see Serious Fraud Office v Standard Bank Plc (Now known as ICBC Standard Bank plc) 
(2015) case no: U20150854, especially at [1] – [4]. The concept of DPA was first introduced in the US and, by 
s45 and Schedule 17 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, has been adapted and adopted in the UK. It is only 
applicable to an organisation and not for individuals. In the UK a DPA must be approved by the court, in 




conviction.917 The UK Bribery Act prohibits facilitation payment unlike the US FCPA 
and Canada’s Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act.918  
The international corruption unit (ICU) is part of the UK anti-corruption 
framework, and it is under the purview of the UK National Crime Agency. ICU’s main 
functions include investigating money laundering in the UK resulting from corruption 
of high-ranking officials overseas; bribery involving UK–based companies or nationals 
that has an international element; and cross-border bribery where there is a link to the 
UK; and other functions.919 The UK government’s international anti-corruption plan 
investigates international corruption from other countries, such as ‘bribery by UK 
companies or individuals in developing countries’,920 including Nigeria.921  
International cooperation is crucial in curbing global corruption. Moreso, the 
impact of corruption in developing countries can reverberate around the world. For 
instance, according to the US Senator Richard Lugar (1977-2013), corruption 
exacerbates global poverty, terrorism, and instability.922 In other words, global 
cooperation could potentially resolve national concerns before they become global 
challenges. At the heart of international co-operation on bribery, is the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Convention).923 
 
917 Serious Fraud Office v Rolls-Royce Plc & Rolls-Royce Energy Systems Inc (2017) case no: U20170036, where a 
DPA was approved by the courts; cf. Serious Fraud Office (SFO): R v Sweett Group plc (unreported), details 
available at SFO https://www.sfo.gov.uk/cases/sweett-group/ accessed 6 June 2017. DPA was not offered in 
this case because of Sweett’s self-reporting and cooperation shortcomings. Sweett Group PLC was sentenced 
on 19 February 2016 and ordered to pay £2.25 million. The amount is broken down as £1.4m in fine, 
£851,152.23 in confiscation. For broader reading see also, S Arrowsmith et al., ‘Self-cleaning as a defence to 
exclusions for misconduct: An emerging concept in EC public procurement law? (2009) 6 Public Procurement 
Law Review 257-82. 
918 See the Bribery Act Guidance, p18, ibid. For more differences between FCPA and the UK Bribery Act 2010, 
see British Bankers Association, ‘Bribery Act 2010: Guidance on Compliance’, (BBA, 2011) 13 
<https://www.bba.org.uk/policy/financial-crime/anti-bribery-and-corruption/bribery-act-2010-guidance-on-
compliance/> accessed 6 June 2017.  
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(FCO); In addition to DfID’s extensive anti-corruption efforts, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
currently funds around 30 overseas projects that focus on anti-corruption and transparency, at p47-49.  
922 Oxfam Int’l, ‘US Congress Passes Law to End Secrecy in Oil, Gas, and Mining Industry’ (Oxfam, 15 July 2010) 
<https://www.oxfamamerica.org/press/congress-passes-law-to-end-secrecy-in-oil-gas-and-mining-industry/> 
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The Convention was adopted in 1997 and came into force on 15 February 1999. It has 
been adopted by 35 OECD countries and six non-OECD countries: Argentina, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Colombia, Russia, and South Africa.924 The Convention obliges member 
states to domesticate the convention and to prohibit the bribery of foreign officials in 
international business transactions. Before, many OECD countries allowed bribes to 
public officials in Africa, as a usual way of doing business.925 In 1997, when the OECD 
Convention was signed, nearly half of OECD members allowed bribe to foreign 
officials as tax deductible expenses.926 Much encouragement, therefore, has to be 
done to enable OECD non-members to adopt international anti-corruption 
standards.927 To this effect, the OECD Convention provides guidelines against bribery 
and extortion,928 and these OECD guidelines are recommended by the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), who have also issued Rules of Conduct to Combat 
Extortion and Bribery in International Business Transactions,929 prohibiting extortion 
and bribery for any purpose. Since these rules are not binding, corporations may 
decide not to adopt them.930 
 The World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO)931 are international institutions with an unequivocal wealth of 
experience and data that can assist Nigeria in tackling corruption. Even though reform 
programs must be driven from within, the World Bank and IMF932 are vital allies in the 
fight against corruption, providing policy advice and developmental finance to state 
governments. This WB approach in tackling corruption, according to Huther and Shah, 
 
924 Ibid. 
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930 Ibid. 
931 Ala'I, Padideh., ‘The WTO and the Anti-Corruption Movement’ (2008-2009) 6(1) Loyola University Chicago 
Int’l Law Review 259-278. 
932 Nigeria is a member of the IMF. The IMF works with its member countries to promote good governance and 
combat corruption. IMF surveillance involves annual reviews of countries’ economic policies, carried out 
through Article IV consultations. In the process, staff may advise on reforms contributing to good governance 
and discuss economic consequences arising from poor governance, inter alia. IMF provides technical 
assistance that benefits good governance. In addition, the IMF assists in strengthening countries’ capacity to 




is anchored on three main objectives: preventing fraud and corruption in the 
programmes and projects it finances; supporting international and regional initiatives 
to curb corruption; and helping individual countries develop policies and procedures 
to combat corruption.933 As a result, the World Bank could support Nigeria’s anti-
corruption efforts, for instance, by designing and implementing governmental anti-
corruption initiatives in areas within its mandate, and in partnering with other 
international institutions and bilateral aid donors.934 Through its country-specific 
advice, the WB could assist Nigeria in the area of economic policy reform and 
institutional strengthening aimed at improving governance, which then acts as an 
ancillary benefit in the reduction of corruption.935  
 Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) around the world are also 
participating with governments at different levels to curb corruption.936 Among the 
international NGOs, Transparency International (TI) aims to—curb corruption through 
international and national coalitions; encourage governments to establish and 
implement effective laws, policies, and anti-corruption programs; and encourage all 
parties to international business transactions to operate at the highest levels of 
integrity, guided by TI's Standards of Conduct.937 Transparency International has more 
than seventy national chapters that fight corruption at the national level, and it has 
contributed significantly to depict corruption as a public issue, cooperating with 
international organisations in actions against corruption.938 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
The above evidence demonstrates Nigeria’s anti-corruption efforts and how 
corruption, if not abated, undermines democracy, distort the economy, and restricts 
 
933 J Huther and A Shah, ‘Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs: A Framework for Evaluation’, (2000) World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2501, December. 
 
934 The World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank (World Bank 1997). The 
WB, and the Economic Development Institute can support government efforts by facilitating workshops for 
parliamentarians or journalists on anti-corruption and good governance issues. 
935 Ibid. 
936 I Carr & O Outhwaite, ‘The role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in combating corruption: Theory 
and practice’ (2011) 44(3) Suffolk University Law Review 615. 
937 S Kimeu, ‘Corruption as a challenge to global ethics: the role of Transparency International’ (2014) 10(2) 
Journal of Global Ethics 231. 




tobacco control efforts. It hinders the State and corporations in fulfilling its ‘respect, 
protect and remedy’ obligations. Corruption endangers individual rights, for it could 
allow TTCs to become indifferent to the impacts of their activities on the environment 
and on the health of the population. The effective control of corruption in Nigeria will 
therefore enable public agencies, institutions, and even the judiciary to hold TTCs 









This chapter continues with the overall aim of the research—to enhance the 
tobacco regulatory framework in Nigeria. As a result, the chapter will explore a 
humans-rights approach, with the objective of exploring solutions to enhance the 
control of transnational tobacco corporations. 
The application of a human rights-based approach to tobacco control has 
gained prominence and support in both academic research939 and litigation.940 The 
WHO FCTC, which is the world’s first international tobacco control treaty, not only 
recognises human rights as an integral part of tobacco regulation but also projects 
itself as a human rights treaty. This nexus is evident in the preamble of the WHO 
FCTC. The preamble cited several human rights treaties as one of the basis to give 
priority to the right to protect public health, and, as a result, several of the WHO FCTC’s 
decisions and guidelines have advocated for a human rights framework in tackling 
tobacco prevalence.941 Consequently, judicial bodies have embraced the WHO FCTC 
as a human rights treaty. For instance, the constitutional chamber of the Costa Rican 
supreme court stated that the FCTC is a human rights treaty.942 In addition, the United 
Nations associates human rights with tobacco control. After all, under the UN Human 
Rights Council Resolution 35/23, the United Nations acknowledged the right of 
physical and mental health in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
 
939 C Dresler and S Marks, ‘The Emerging Human Right to Tobacco Control’ (2006) 28(3) Human Rights 
Quarterly 601; HH Koh, ‘Global tobacco control as a health and human rights imperative’ (2016) 57(2) Harvard 
International Law Journal 433; MEC Gispen and BCA Toebes, ‘The Human Rights of Children in Tobacco 
Control’ (2019) 41(2) Human Rights Quarterly 340. 
940 See, BAT Uganda Ltd v Attorney General and the Center for Health, Human Rights and Development, No.46 
of 2006, Constitutional Court of Uganda (2019); British American Tobacco UK Ltd & Ors, R (on the application 
of) v The Secretary of State for Health [2016] EWCA Civ 1182; Vlaamse Liga tegen Kanker (Flemish Anti-Cancer 
League) et al. v Belgium Council of Ministers, Arrêt n° 37/2011 du 15 mars 2011, Constitutional Court of 
Belgium (2011). 
941 See for example Decision FCTC/COP/7/19: Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment No. 14, The right to the highest attainable standard of health (article 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/2000/4 , 11 August 2000; see also the decision of 
the FCTC/COP/7 (26). 
942 Constitutional Chamber of the Costa Rican Supreme Court. Request on the constitutionality of a proposed 
piece of legislation. Exp: 12-002657-0007-CO. Res. No 2012-003918, March 2012.; see also Peruvian 
Constitucional Tribunal, Jaime Barco Rodas contra el Artículo 3o de la ley N. 28705 – Ley general para la 




Development and urged nations to work towards the full implementation of the WHO 
FCTC. 
TTCs and the tobacco industry in general present a challenge for nations like 
Nigeria to achieve the UN human rights objectives, since TTCs’ activities have the 
potential to act as a catalyst for the violations of fundamental human rights, violations 
that are made prominent when transnational corporations invest in countries with weak 
governance.943 Under the ‘protect, respect and remedy’ framework of the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, corporations are to respect human rights. 
This represents the first and unique global standard for preventing and addressing 
adverse impacts on human rights linked to business activity. 
Against this backdrop, the chapter will explore the rights vulnerable to the 
activities of TTCs and the extent to which the Constitution of Nigeria serves as a viable 
instrument in protecting such rights. This chapter will examine the adequacy of the 
international human rights agenda in protecting rights impacted by the activities TTCs.  
 
6.2 Categories of Human Rights Vulnerable to The Activities of TTCs. 
 
 
In reality, these companies sell toxic products that not only kills 7 million people a year but also 
forces hard-pressed taxpayers to pick up the bill for the illnesses which they cause. It is an 
industry hooked on profit and devoid of responsibility… There is more, much more, to say about 
the tobacco industry and its inglorious history. Its suppression of research into the effects of its 
products, its longstanding involvement in tobacco smuggling, its bribery of government officials 
and other attempts to distort good decision-making, and its reliance on child labour. 944  
 
The following subsections will explore human rights violations associated with 
the tobacco sector. As highlighted in chapter five, the tobacco industry remains a 
subject of intense public scrutiny as a result of the improper conduct perpetrated by 
 
943 UN Environmental Programme (UNEP), Environmental Assessment of OgoniLand Report (UNEP 2011); MK 
Sinha (ed), Business and Human Rights (Sage 2013) 2. 
944 Dr Vera da Costa Silva, ‘Engagement with Tobacco Industry: Conflicting with UN principles and values’ 
(WHO FCTC, 11 July 2017) <http://www.who.int/fctc/secretariat/head/statements/2017/ungc-integrity-




the industry. Thus, the significance of human rights legislative provisions is to address 
such improper behaviour.945  
 
6.2.1 Right to Life and Health 
 
The fundamental human rights usually embodies the most important universal 
values of human beings. Generally, the rights are related to the preservation of human 
life, security of the person, fundamental labour rights, equality, and non-discrimination. 
Early human rights rhetoric related to health can be found under the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.946 Since then, nine core international human 
rights treaties have been adopted and brought into force. Four of them are relevant to 
the right to health and well-being: The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR, 1966), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR, 1966), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, 1979) and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC, 1989).  
Nigeria guarantees the right to life under its international, regional, and national 
obligations with the UN, the African Union and the 1999 Constitution, respectively. The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)947 was ratified by the 
Nigerian government, as well as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).948 The ICCPR states that ‘every human being has the 
inherent right to life…protected by law’.949 The 1999 Nigerian Constitution also 
 
945 Dr Vera Luiza da Costa e Silva, ‘Human Rights and Tobacco Control’ (Open-ended intergovernmental 
working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights 
Obligations of Transnational Corporations and other business enterprises, Geneva, Palais des Nations, 26 Oct 
2016). See also Carolyn Dresler et al., ‘Human rights-based approach to tobacco control’ (2012) 21(2) Tobacco 
Control 208-211. 
946 Article 25, The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘the right to a standard of living 
adequate for health and well-being of himself and his family including food, clothing, housing and medical care 
and necessary social service’. 
947 Adopted 16 Dec 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 1976, G.A Res. 2200 A (XXI). 
948 Adopted 16 Dec 1966 and entered into force 3 Jan 1976, G.A Res. 2200 (XXI). ICCPR and ICESCR were both 
ratified by Nigeria on 29 July 1993. As at June 2017, Nigeria is yet to sign the first Optional Protocol (1966) to 
the ICCPR, under which an individual, who asserts that his rights as contained in the ICCPR have been violated 
and who has exhausted all domestic remedies, can submit written communications to the UN Human Rights 
Committee.    




stipulates in section 33(1) that ‘every person has a right to life’. Similarly, the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter), which Nigeria ratified950 and 
domesticated951, stipulates that ‘human beings are inviolable’,952 and ‘shall be entitled 
to respect of his life and integrity of his person’.953 The African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission), the quasi-judicial body mandated with the 
interpretation and enforcement of the African Charter, echoed this position in Sudan 
Human Rights Organisation & Another v Sudan, where the Commission expressly 
states that the right to life in article 4 of the African Charter ‘is the supreme right of the 
human being…basic to all human rights and without it, all other rights are without 
meaning’.954 
 In addition to the right to life, international human rights instruments have also 
adopted the right to health. For instance, the WHO FCTC, ‘reaffirms the right of all 
people to the highest standard of health’.955 Similarly, article 25(1) of the UN Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948 provides the right for an adequate standard of the 
health and well-being, including medical care and the right to security in the event of 
sickness and disability. Furthermore, the right to health is expressed in both the ICCPR 
and ICESCR. Article 12 of the ICESCR provides that the right to health includes ‘the 
rights of everyone to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health,’ 
imploring Convention members to take adequate steps to realise this right. Some of 
these adequate steps, appearing as guidelines in Paragraph 2 of Article 12, include 
the improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; the 
prevention, treatment, and control of epidemic and other diseases; and the creation of 
conditions that will guarantee medical attention and service in the event of sickness. 
The UN General Assembly also underscored the relationship between health and the 
environment: ‘all individuals are entitled to live in an environment adequate for their 
 
950 The African Charter was ratified by Nigeria on 22 June 1983. 
951 The African Charter was domesticated by Nigeria as part of her law through the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap. A9, Laws of the Federation 2004 to enable the 
Charter have effect at the municipal level. The Nigerian Supreme Court in Abacha v. Fawehinmi (2000) 6 NWLR 
(pt.660) 228, held inter alia that the Charter has some international flavour, and, in that sense, it cannot be 
amended, watered down or side-tracked by and Nigerian law.  
952 Article 4, African Charter. 
953 Ibid.  
954 Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Another v Sudan, Communication No. 279/03, 296/05, 28th ACHPR AAR 
Annex (Nov 2009-May 2010) [146]. 
955 Forward to the WHO FCTC: ‘The WHO FCTC is an evidence-based treaty that reaffirms the right of all people 




health and well-being’.956 Furthermore, the United Nations Sustainable Developmental 
Goals (SDGs) advocates for the promotion of healthy lives and well-being for all 
ages.957 In addition, article 3 of the WHO FCTC urges members, such as Nigeria, to 
give priority to the ‘right to protect public health’958 from the devastating health 
consequences of tobacco consumption and exposure to tobacco smoke. The African 
Charter also reaffirms the right to health. Article 16 states that ‘every individual shall 
have the right to enjoy the best attainable standard of physical and mental health’. 
Article 16(2) further states that any party to the Charter ‘shall take the necessary 
measures to protect the health of their people and to ensure that they receive medical 
attention when they are sick’. Article 24 of the African Charter provides for the 
entitlement of all people to a satisfactory general environment favourable to their 
development, as pertinent to attaining the right to health. 
At the national level, section 17(3)(c) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria (FRN) (as amended) provides for the state to guarantee the health, 
safety, and welfare of all persons. This constitutional provision recognises the health 
rights of Nigerians. However, such rights under s17(3)(c) are classed as ‘second 
generation rights’959 because they fall under Chapter II960 of the Constitution, and by 
virtue of section 6(6)(c) of the same Constitution, such rights are non-justiciable. In 
other words, the judiciary would not adjudicate on any of the non-justiciable provisions, 
except where they are incorporated in legislation or executive actions.961 Nonetheless, 
Nigerian courts have recourse to international and regional human rights instruments, 
which Nigeria is already a party to, such as the African Charter. The Nigerian courts 
can enforce the right to health by reading it into other justiciable rights, such as the 
right to life.  
Although Oduwole and Akintayo argue that the right to health may not have 
attained the same standard with the right to life962, this contention, however, is laid to 
 
956 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 45/94. 
957 Goal 3, SDGs. One of the targets of Goal 3 is to ‘strengthen the implementation of the WHO FCTC on 
tobacco control in all countries’. 
958 Preamble to the WHO FCTC. 
959 O Oluduro (note 534) 240. 
960 Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy under the 1999 Constitution FRN. 
961 See AG Ondo State v. AG Federation (2002) 9 Nigerian Weekly Law Report (part 772) 222. 
962 J Oduwole & A Akintayo, ‘The rights to life, health and development: The Ebola virus and Nigeria’ (2017) 




rest by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR Committee), 
when it submitted that ‘health is a fundamental human right indispensable for the 
exercise of other human rights.963 The right to health is an essential feature of 
international, regional, and national instruments. The right to health, therefore, is an 
essential right without which other rights may be made redundant.964 As an illustration, 
a person with ill health and no access to adequate healthcare is unlikely to appreciate, 
much less exercise, any other rights. This illustration indicates that the right to health 
consist of two main components: the first relates to the availability of timely and 
appropriate healthcare; the second relates to the protection of public health through 
measures such as the provision of potable water and health-related education and 
information.965 Note that this section is mainly on the public health dimension of the 
right to health — that is, the prevention of diseases and safeguarding the health of the 
population. 
However, the use of the term ‘right to health’ is not without its objection. On the 
one hand, some have argued that ‘the right to healthcare’ and ‘the right to health 
protection’ are better descriptions of the legal guarantee of the right to health because 
health itself cannot be guaranteed.966 On the other, it is argued that the legal guarantee 
of the right to health goes beyond the mere provision of healthcare and health 
protection, as illustrated under international, regional and some domestic human rights 
instruments.967 However, Ngwena and Cook argue that there is necessarily no real 
conflict between the different terms, because the ultimate objective is to attain the 
highest standard of health.968 As a such, the research will adopt Ngwena and Cook’s 
position on the ‘right to health’.  
As to the meaning of health, the Preamble to the Constitution of the WHO 
defined it as the ‘state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not 
 
963 CESCR General Comment No. 14:  The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12). Adopted 
at the Twenty-second Session of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, on 11 August 2000 
(Contained in Document E/C.12/2000/4) at para 1. Italics added for emphasis.  
964 See also Purohit & Another v The Gambia (2003) African Human Rights Law Report 96. 
965 AR Chapman ‘Core obligations related to the right to health and their relevance for South Africa’ in D Brand 
& S Russell (eds), Exploring the core content of socioeconomic rights: South African and international perspectives 
(Protea Boekhuis 2002) 45. 
966  B Toebes ‘Towards an improved understanding of the international human right to health’ (1999) 21 Human 
Rights Quarterly 662-663. 
967 Ibid. 
968 C Ngwena & R Cook ‘Rights concerning health’ in D Brand & C Heyns (eds) Socioeconomic Rights in South 




merely the absence of disease or infirmity’.969 According to the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR Committee), the quasi-judicial body 
responsible for the exposition and enforcement of the ICESCR, the right to health is 
not a right to be healthy, but a right to embrace a wide range of socio-economic factors 
that can lead to a healthy life, including the underlying determinants of health, such as 
food, housing, safe working conditions, and a healthy environment.970  
Accordingly, how do TTCs violate the right to health, a right so intricately linked 
to the right to life. They do so when their actions or products endanger individual well-
being. It is common knowledge that there is a correlation between tobacco use and 
the development of health issues,971 a position that is undisputed by TTCs’ 
representatives.972 As a result, any unwillingness on the part of the Nigerian 
government to prevent any corporate human rights infringements constitutes a breach 
of the constitution, despite TTC contending that tobacco control legislation violates 
their fundamental rights.973 In some cases though, it appears whenever TTCs’ rights 
contravene health policies or the right to health, the right to health mostly prevails. For 
instance, in Philip Morris et al. v Republic of Uruguay974, a bilateral trade (BIT) dispute 
brought before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment disputes 
tribunal,975 the contention was the infringement of the claimant’s rights, including 
proprietary rights, by the respondent. However, the tribunal accepted the findings of 
one of the Respondent’s experts that the government of Uruguay enjoys 
unquestionable and inalienable rights to protect the health of its citizens, and on this 
premise, the State has the authority to condition the commercialisation of a product or 
service, and this will consequently limit or condition the use of the trademark of 
 
969 Constitution of the World Health Organisation available. In addition, the WHO Constitution was the first 
international instrument to enshrine the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health as a 
fundamental right of every human being ("the right to health"). 
970 CESCR General Comment No. 14:  The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), Adopted 
at the Twenty-second Session of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, on 11 August 2000 
(Contained in Document E/C.12/2000/4) at para 4.   
971 See Preamble to the WHO FCTC; See also issues of green tobacco sickness in tobacco farming, JS McBride et 
al., ‘Green Tobacco Sickness’, (1998) 7 Tobacco Control 294; MC Kulik et al., ‘Tobacco growing and the 
sustainable development goals, Malawi’, (2017) 95 Bulletin of World Health Organisation 362–367. 
972 British American Tobacco et al. v Secretary of state for Health [2016] EWHC 1169 (Admin); Philip Morris 
Brands SARL et al. v Oriental Republic of Uruguay (2016) ICSID case no. ARB/10/7 at para 74; see also Case 
C-547/14 Philip Morris Brands SARL and Others (delivered on 23 December 2015).  
973 Ibid. 
974 ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7. 




TTCs.976 Similarly, the Advocate General of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
in Philip Morris Brands SARL and Others,977 rejected the submission presented by the 
TTCs and underpinned its decision on the importance of public health protection.978 
The Court held that the pursuit of health is a fundamental objective of the European 
Union (EU), and the health interest and rights are superior to other conflicting rights.979  
Another example that illustrates the superiority of the right to health against 
other conflicting rights is Commission v. Brazil,980 a non-tobacco litigation. In this case, 
the Brazilian government approved a road-building program that resulted in the 
displacement of the Yanomami Indians from their ancestral land in the Amazon and, 
as a result, they were exposed to epidemics, including influenza, tuberculosis, and 
measles. They argued that the government had not taken adequate action in 
addressing these health issues. The Commission accepted the findings and ruled that 
the failure of the Brazilian government to address the health issues violates the rights 
to preserve the health and well-being of the Yanomami Indians, as recognised under 
Articles VIII and XI of the American Declaration of the Right and Duties of Man. 
Besides, under international law, the ICESCR obligates all States Parties to recognise 
the right to the ‘enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health’.981 The General Comment 14 from the ICESCR Treaty Committee states that 
health is a fundamental human right indispensable for the exercise of other human 
rights.982 The term indispensable indicates the absolute importance of health even to 
the point of being necessary for other rights to exist. International judicature have 
leaned towards this position, as demonstrated in Brazilian Commission and Republic 
of Uruguay.  
 The significance of the right to health and life, especially in the context of 
tobacco control litigation, appears to outweigh any conflicting rights presented by 
 
976 Uruguay (note 974) [432]. 
977 C-547/14 (4th May 2016) ("Philip Morris"). 
978 Ibid. [57]. 
979 Ibid. see for example paragraphs [61], [144], [156], [170], [176] and [197]. The Court emphasised as 
considerations warranting the elevation of public health as a guiding principle, the "addictive effects" of 
tobacco and its impact upon children who, because of addiction, were to be treated as a "particularly 
vulnerable class of consumers". 
980 Commission v. Brazil (1984) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case 7615 (Brazil). 
981 Article 12. 
982 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, CESCR General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health (art. 12), 1, U.N. Doc. EC.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) italics by author; see also Amartya Sen, 




TTCs.983 However, according to Dresler et al., more attention should be given to the 
impact of the tobacco epidemic on human rights and to the potential of a human rights 
perspective to tobacco control as an element of future laws—norm de lege ferenda.984  
 
6.2.2 Right to A Healthy Environment. 
 
 
The tobacco industry uses resources such as wood, water and energy and involves the use of 
agrochemicals. As in all manufacturing, our processes result in waste materials and our 
product leaves waste in terms of cigarette butts and packaging.  
We aspire to maintain our position at the forefront of businesses actively minimising their 
environmental impacts and expect our Group companies to operate to consistently high 
standards of environmental performance everywhere — BAT985 
 
Nigeria is obliged under Article 18 of the WHO FCTC (Convention) to protect the 
environment from tobacco smoke986, cultivation, and manufacturing. The right to a 
healthy environment is also recognised in Nigeria under the regional instrument of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: ‘All peoples shall have the right to a 
general satisfactory environment favourable to their development’.987 Although the 
African Charter fails to provide the meaning of ‘satisfactory environment’ in article 24, 
it is nevertheless the first broadly ratified international human rights instrument 
explicitly recognising a right to the environment.988 The reference of ‘All peoples’989 
under article 24, suggests the right as being a collective one rather than an individual 
human right. Therefore, for an individual to have good health, society should have 
good public health policies. The African Charter was re-enacted as a municipal law by 
the Nigerian National Assembly, on the 17th of March 1983, under the African Charter 
 
983 C Dresler et al., ‘The Emerging Human Right to Tobacco Control’ (2006) 28(3) Human Rights Quarterly, 
599,651. 
984 Ibid at p650. 
985 BAT, ‘Business Principles and Framework for CSR: the principle of good corporate conduct’, (BAT, unknown 
date) <British American Tobacco p.l.c.'s Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility (bat.com)> accessed 24 
July 2017. 
986 WHO FCTC’s Guidelines on Protection from Exposure to Tobacco Smoke [4]. 
987 Article 24 African Charter – Right to a general satisfactory environment. 
988 OW Pedersen, ‘European Environmental Human Rights and Environmental Rights: A Long Time Coming?’ 
(2008) 21 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 73-111. 




on Human and Peoples' Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act.990 The 
domestication of the African Charter resulted from the fact that Nigerian international 
treaties are not self-executing; they need to be domesticated into local legislation 
before it can be enforced. 
 The first international instrument that could arguably be implied to 
environmental rights is the Charter of the United Nations.991 The UN Charter was 
adopted 26 June 1945 and entered into force 24 October 1945. It sets out the purpose 
of the United Nations, including the protection of human rights, the maintenance of 
international peace and security, as well as the promotion of economic and social co-
operation. Environmental issues are not expressly mentioned in the UN Charter; 
however, these social and economic provisions lay the foundation to incorporate 
environmental protection into the human rights agenda.992 Environmental degradation 
negatively affects the standard of living, employment, health, and social progress, 
thus, making environmental protection essential to achieving the Charter’s goals. The 
requirement that States promote and respect these social and economic interests, as 
well as human rights and fundamental freedoms, provide a basis for imposing positive 
state obligations to protect the natural environment.993 Other instruments that include 
provisions to protect the environment are the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination994, Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,995 among other international 
instruments.996  
The Stockholm Declaration of 1972 expressly recognised the correlation 
between human rights and the environment.997 The declaration proclaimed that man’s 
natural and human-made environment ‘are essential to his well-being and to the 
enjoyment of basic human rights – even to the right to life itself’. Although the 
 
990 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Chapter A9 (Cap 10 LFN) 
(No.2 of 1983) Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. 
991 Charter of the United Nations, 1 U.N.T.S. XVL (24 October 1945). 
992 United Nations Environment Programme and anor, UNEP Compendium on Human Rights and the 
Environment: selected int’l legal materials and cases (UNEP 2014) <http://www.ciel.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/UNEP_Compendium_HRE_Mar2014.pdf> accessed 24 July 2017. 
993 Ibid. 
994 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (21 Dec 1965). 
995 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (18 Dec. 1979) 
996 For more of the instruments and further reading see the UNDP Compendium (note 993). 




declaration is non-binding and does not proclaim a fundamental human right to a 
healthy environment, it recognises that an essential healthy environment is imperative 
for the enjoyment and exercise of human rights.998 Furthermore, treaty bodies that 
oversee the implementation of international human rights conventions produce 
General Comments connecting environmental issues with the other protected rights. 
For example, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights found ‘a 
healthy environment’ was part of the right to health, when it interpreted Article 12.2 of 
the ICESCR.999 Therefore, what these interpretations reveal is that if the activities and 
products of TTCs have a negative impact on the environment, TTCs may have 
interfered with fundamental human rights to such an extent that they violate other 
rights.1000  
 Subsequently, several non-binding but widely accepted Declarations 
supporting the individual’s right to a clean environment were adopted, such as the 
1982 World Charter for Nature.1001 The Charter does not expressly provide for the 
individual’s right to clean environment, but it was one of the first instruments to 
recognise rights of nature, distinct from the rights of humans. There is also the 1989 
Declaration of The Hague on the Environment that acknowledges the ‘right to live in 
dignity in a viable global environment…’1002 Furthermore, the UN General Assembly 
passed a resolution in 1990 to ‘[r]ecognise that all individuals are entitled to live in an 
environment adequate for their health and well-being’ and that ‘member States and 
Intergovernmental and non-governmental organisation to enhance their efforts 
towards ensuring a better and healthier environment’.1003   
 Also worthy of consideration is the 1994 Draft Declaration of Principles on 
Human Rights and Environment appended to the Report of the UN Special Rapporteur 
on Human Rights and Environment, Fatima Zohra Ksentini.1004 The Report regarded 
the ‘right to a healthy and flourishing environment’ as ‘evolving’ while also 
 
998 Dinah Shelton, ‘Human Rights, Environmental Rights and the Right to Environment’ (1991) 28 Stanford 
Journal of Int’l Law 1103,112. 
999 ESCR Committee, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health. 
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acknowledging ‘a universal acceptance of environmental rights recognised at the 
national, regional, and international levels’.1005 The Draft Declaration provides that ‘[a]ll 
persons have the right to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound environment’ and 
that this right and other human rights, including civil, cultural, economic political and 
social rights, are universal, interdependent and indivisible.1006 However, the report is 
criticised for being politically motivated and vague.1007 
 The Rio Declaration on Environmental and Development, adopted at the United 
Nations Conference on Environmental and Development in 1992, endorsed the nexus 
between humans and the environment. It gives prominence to the integration of the 
environment and development, allowing for a healthy and productive life in harmony 
with the environment.1008 Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration gives significance to 
environmental activist to act towards the protection of the environment. Recently 
drafted international human rights instrument do not embody a distinct right to a 
healthy environment; they do so impliedly, just as some of the declarations above. 
These include the 1989 Convention on the Rights of a Child (CRC) and the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention.1009 Article 24 of the CRC, for 
instance, recognises ‘the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
health standard’ and mandates State parties to consider the ‘dangers and risks of 
environmental pollution’. Article 29 also includes respect for the environment as one 
of the goals of educational programmes.  
 Healthy environment, as a right, is not enshrined in the 1999 Constitution, FRN. 
Section 20 of the Constitution states that ‘the State shall protect and improve the 
environment…’ The section, however, implies that the Government of Nigeria must 
take into consideration environmental impact in its decision-making policy. Section 20 
is under Chapter II and, as established earlier, they are non-justiciable. They are not 
enforceable against the State by virtue of section 6(6)(c) of the Constitution FRN.1010 
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They would have been justiciable if they had been under Chapter IV of the 
Constitution, in accordance with the ‘good’ practices list on environmental rights 
published by The UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment.1011  
The Nigerian government should endeavour to make environmental rights 
justiciable under the Constitution. Research suggests that environmental rights 
provisions in the constitution, such as in Brazil and Argentina, have somewhat 
improved environmental and human rights outcomes.1012 In Brazil, the 1988 
Constitution contains substantive and procedural environmental rights directing the 
public prosecutor (Ministerio Publico) to conduct investigations and file civil suits to 
protect the environment. Not only has the public prosecutor been particularly active on 
the environmental front, but it has also exerted the threat of prosecution to negotiate 
settlement agreements with alleged polluters.1013 In Argentina, section 41 of the 
constitution protects the right to a healthy and balanced environment fit for human 
development. This constitutional provision was invoked in the Argentinian Supreme 
Court case between Mendoza Beatriz Silva and the National Government of Argentina 
et al.1014 In the case, a group of concerned residents of the Matanza-Riachuelo River 
basin filed a complaint against the government and private companies, based in part, 
on the constitutional right to a healthy environment. They sought remedy for the 
environmental damage caused. The Court ordered the government and the other 
defendants to undertake a wide range of remedial actions without delay. The two 
examples—Brazil and Argentina—appears to demonstrate that domestic legal 
institutions can protect human rights and the environment when charged with a clear 
mandate and support. 
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 Nigeria has a dualist approach1015 concerning its relationship with international 
law. What this means in practice is that international law must be incorporated into 
domestic legislation to have the force of law, otherwise they serve only as persuasive 
argument.1016 As aforementioned, the non-justifiability of Chapter II provisions, by 
virtue of section 6(6)(c) of the Nigerian Constitution, has led to the refusal of the 
Nigerian courts to adjudicate directly on any of its provisions, save where they are 
incorporated in legislative or executive orders.1017 The African Charter, domesticated 
into the national legislation, goes beyond both civil and political rights to include social-
economic, cultural and solidarity rights. While it can be argued that the African Charter 
generally supplements the Constitution, there are certain rights under the African 
Charter that are identified by the constitution as unenforceable.1018  
The status of the African Charter was considered in the Abacha v 
Fawehinmi.1019 The Nigerian Supreme Court held that the Charter is part of the 
Nigerian legislation by virtue of domestication; however, the Charter was held not to 
be superior to the Constitution because its international flavour does not prevent the 
National Assembly or the Federal Military (as in this instance) from repealing it. A way 
round this lack of enforcement is to underpin the unenforceable rights with the 
enforceable ones, such as with the right to life under section 33 of the constitution. 
Consequently, when TTCs violate environmental rights that are nonjusticiable, the 
environmental rights has to be embedded with the justiciable rights before it could be 
enforced. This should not be the case, considering that Nigeria is a party to the WHO 
FCTC, a Convention that urges members to protect the environment from the activities 
of TTCs.1020 Environmental rights, as well as health rights, should be justiciable to 
enhance accountability. After arguing that environmental rights should be justiciable, 
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the next paragraph will then demonstrate how activities and products of TTCs violate 
environmental rights.   
The environmental lifecycle of tobacco can be roughly divided into four stages: 
tobacco growing and curing; product manufacturing and distribution; product 
consumption; and post-consumption waste. Each stage poses environmental and 
health concerns. 
Tobacco growing and curing. Vast acres of land have been dedicated to 
cultivating tobacco, notably in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs).1021 These 
acres of land are as a result of deforestation, which has many environmental 
consequences—including loss of biodiversity, soil erosion and degradation, water 
pollution and increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide.1022 Findings suggest that 
between 2 – 4% of deforestation globally is as a result of tobacco cultivation, even 
though it accounts for less than 1% of the world’s agricultural land use.1023 This 
process has an impact on forest reserves in LMICs that in Malawi, the government 
declared tobacco as a significant driver of deforestation.1024 In Tanzania, Sauer and 
Abdallah found that tobacco production 'is still dominated by small-scale subsistence 
farmers’ without scientific agricultural practices. As such, the production expansion is 
only possible through the clearing of additional forest land.1025 According to the study, 
tobacco farmers in the study area deforest new woodlands every season for 
plantation. They also use wood for flue-curing, which is burning wood on kilns at high 
temperature for Virginia tobacco production, resulting in deforestation and soil 
degradation.1026  
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Tobacco growing usually involves substantial use of chemicals, including 
pesticides, fertilisers and growth regulators,1027 and when discharged into the 
environment, this chemicals may contaminate sources of drinking water. In the Nueva 
Segovia Department of Nicaragua, where most tobacco farms are close to essential 
rivers, researchers found pesticides have contaminated both the superficial aquifer 
and the deep groundwater.1028 Studies in Brazil have also found excessive 
agrochemical residues in waterways near tobacco farming communities.1029 This 
practice has continued unabated because of intensive lobbying and investments by 
TTCs in LMICs,1030 as well as many of these countries have limited legislative and 
economic capacities to resist the influence and investments of TTCs, leading to short-
term economic benefits for some farmers and long-term social, economic, health and 
environmental detriments for others.1031 
Manufacturing and Production. It is estimated that global tobacco 
manufacturing produced over 2 million tonnes of solid waste; 300,000 tonnes of non-
recyclable nicotine-containing waste; and 200,000 tonnes of chemical waste.1032 For 
the annual cigarette production to remain constant for the last 20 years (output 
increased from 5 to 6.3 trillion cigarettes annually), tobacco factories would have 
deposited a total of 45,000,000 tonnes of solid wastes, 6,000,000 tonnes of nicotine 
waste and almost 4,000,000 tonnes of chemical wastes during this time.1033 Other 
toxic by-products of tobacco manufacturing or chemicals used in manufacturing 
include ammonia, hydrochloric acid, toluene, and methyl ethyl ketone.1034 
Post Consumption. The exposure of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), 
colloquially referred to as secondhand smoke, can lead to various respiratory health 
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issues, especially among children.1035 Exposure to residual chemicals in smoking 
environments may also have human health impacts. Residual tobacco stays on 
surfaces, including the smoker’s, and can even remain on dust. Unlike ETS, which has 
inhalation as a single pathway for exposure, residual tobacco can be inhaled, ingested, 
or absorbed dermally.1036 Some other post-consumption issues include the non-
extinguished cigarette light, which remains a significant cause of accidental fire.1037 
Post-consumption waste. The environmental impact of disposing cigarettes, 
plastic, metal, and butane used in making cigarette lighters are also a key concern.1038 
The discarded cigarette releases hazardous substances, such as arsenic, lead, 
nicotine and ethyl phenol into the aquatic environment and soil.1039 In 2014, for 
instance, over two million discarded cigarette butts were picked up from beaches and 
water edges across 91 countries.1040 Lastly, tobacco emission from smoking directly 
generates 2.6 million tonnes of carbon dioxide and about 5.2 million tonnes of 
methane.1041 
 
6.2.3 Rights of the Child 
 
This section will focus primarily on child labour in tobacco farming.1042 The tobacco 
sector is not unique in its use of child labour. The distinction is the damage caused by 
the tobacco crop to the health and physical development of a child-worker on a 
tobacco plantation.    
The first international legally binding text recognising all the fundamental rights 
and interests of a child was when the International Convention on the Rights of the 
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Child (CRC) was adopted on 20 November 1989.1043 Aside from being the most ratified 
instrument of international law, the CRC wields significant influence, shaping the law 
and policy of a child’s status.1044 Nigeria became a signatory on 26 January 1990 and 
ratified the CRC on 19 April 1991. Under the CRC, a child means every human being 
below the age of eighteen years.1045According to Archard, it is now standard to 
categorise the rights of a child in the context of the CRC: provision, protection, and 
participation.1046 While article 24(1) makes provision for States to ‘recognize the right 
of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health and to provide 
facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health’, Article 19 (1) CRC 
urge States to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental abuse, including 
sexual abuse. In addition, Article 32 CRC, urge States Parties to protect the child from 
violations ranging from exploitation to interference with the child's education. 
Therefore, exploiting and withdrawing a child from school to work on a tobacco farm, 
where they can get exposed to green tobacco sickness and pesticides, is a breach of 
the CRC.  
On the regional level, Nigeria signed and ratified the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child (African Charter).1047 Even though the African Charter 
corresponds with the CRC, the African Charter has a distinctive African piquancy 
reflected in its preamble, which states ‘that the situation of most African children, 
remains critical due to the unique factors of their socio-economic, cultural, traditional 
and developmental circumstances, natural disasters, armed conflicts, exploitation, and 
hunger…’. Viljoen is of the view that the adoption of child rights instrument in the 
regional context is setting a higher standard for the child in numerous respects, which 
also incorporates some uniquely 'African' aspects; therefore, the African Children's 
Charter envelopes an African perspective, and sets a higher level of protection for 
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children than its UN equivalent.1048 Article 14 of the African Charter states that ‘every 
child shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical, mental and 
spiritual health’. On child labour and hazardous work, Article 15 states that ‘every child 
shall be protected from all forms of economic exploitation and from performing any 
work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s physical, 
mental…social development’. 
On the national front, the Nigerian Child Rights Act (CRA) 2003 was 
promulgated as a result of the domestication of the international and the regional 
instruments of the rights of a child. The CRA represents a significant move for the 
protection of a child, as it transposed and consolidated all laws relating to children, 
including the CRC. The rights and responsibilities of children, as well as the duties and 
obligations of government, parents and other authorities, organisations, and bodies, 
are stipulated in the CRC. It provides for the establishment of the Child Rights 
Implementation Committees at the National, State and Local Government levels. The 
Committees are to ensure that there is a political commitment at all levels to fulfilling 
the implementation of the provisions of the CRA 2003, through research, investigation, 
and jurisprudence.1049 Concerning the health of a child, section 13 of the CRA states 
that ‘every child is entitled to enjoy the best attainable state of physical, mental and 
spiritual health’, and every Government, parent, guardian, institution, among others, 
should aim to achieve this objective.  
The violation of child’s rights, including child labour, have been associated with 
the tobacco process. Fadare, for instance, avers that children in Nigeria are withdrawn 
from school to work on tobacco plantation, sometimes due to poverty,1050 in violation 
of not only section 15 of the CRA but also section 2 of the Compulsory, Free Universal 
Basic Education Act 2004, which accords the child the right to free compulsory 
universal primary education.1051 Babalola also observed children—eight years old and 
above—working on a tobacco plantation, carrying out functions such as transplanting 
and watering tobacco seedlings in the nurseries, applying fertilizer on tobacco plants, 
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topping and suckering, harvesting and sorting tobacco leaves, and stringing and 
grading the cured tobacco leaves.1052 These children are being exposed to pesticide 
and acute nicotine poisoning, a condition also known as Green Tobacco Sickness 
(GTS).1053 GTS damages the health of workers who cultivate and harvest tobacco. It 
occurs when workers absorb nicotine through the skin as they encounter matured 
tobacco leaves. Symptoms of GTS include nausea, vomiting, headache, muscle 
weakness, and dizziness.1054 Exploitative child labour is prohibited under section 28 
of the CRC, while the Nigerian Labour Act1055 prohibits all young persons from any 
employment injurious to health. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
estimates about 15 million children under the age of 14 are involved in child labour 
across Nigeria.1056 The US Department of Labour in its 2010 report states that Nigeria 
is witnessing the worst form of child labour particularly in agriculture, including tobacco 
farming.1057 Underaged children working on tobacco farms, encountering hazardous 
conditions with little or no remuneration corresponds with the International Labour 
Organisation’s (ILO) terminology of child labour: ‘child labour is work that harms 
children’s well-being and hinders their education, development and future 
livelihoods’.1058 And the worst form of child labour, according to Article 3 of ILO 
Convention No. 182(d), is ‘work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it 
is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of a child’. 
Child labour and nicotine poisoning are also challenges faced in the developed 
world.1059 In the US, children aged over 12 years are permitted to work for unlimited 
hours on tobacco farms with parental permission and outside school hours.1060 
However, a study carried out by Human Rights Watch in 2013 found that three quarters 
of the children interviewed—aged between 7 and 17—reported symptoms consistent 
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with acute nicotine poisoning and pesticide exposure.1061 According to public health 
experts and research, long-term and chronic health effects of pesticide exposure 
include respiratory problems, cancer, neurologic deficits, and reproductive health 
problems.1062 
 Malawi, the world’s largest producer of burley leaf tobacco1063 and one of the 
least developed countries in the world, 1064 is severely affected by the many negative 
consequences of tobacco consumption and production due to having few tobacco 
control policies.1065 Although Malawi’s Employment Act of 2000 prohibits children 
younger than 14 years from working, it is not enforced.1066 It is estimated that 80,000 
children work on tobacco farms in Malawi,1067 with child labour saving the tobacco 
industry an estimated $10.7million annually due to non-remunerative child labour from 
2000-2010.1068 Likewise, Otanez et al. estimate that the tobacco companies benefit 
from $1.2 billion in unpaid child labour costs in the top 12 tobacco growing developing 
countries.1069 The tobacco industry in Malawi is dominated by two global leaf-buying 
companies: Alliance One International and Universal Corporation—represented 
nationally as Alliance One Malawi and Limbe Leaf, respectively.1070 These two 
companies sell tobacco leaf to British American Tobacco, Imperial Tobacco, Japan 
Tobacco, and Philip Morris International.1071 The issue of child labour in supply chains 
extends to most TTCs. Research conducted by MSCI listed 62 companies and their 
supply chains involved in the allegation of child labour and three TTCs were accused 
of the most severe allegations: Japan Tobacco, Imperial Tobacco, and BAT.1072 BAT 
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stated it was aware that around 130,000 school-age children were living on farms that 
supplied BAT, but it was also working to ensure an effective and consistent child labour 
policy across all its supply chain.1073 
Against this backdrop, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) urged the 
tobacco industry to address important decent work deficits, such as poor working 
conditions at the workplace, exposure to hazardous and dangerous work, long hours 
and low pay, as well as child labour.1074 In addition, companies worldwide are under 
pressure to act following a G20 summit in Hamburg, Germany, where world leaders 
committed to take ‘immediate and effective measures to eliminate child labour by 
2025’.1075 
 
6.2.4 Economic and Social Rights 
 
Economic and Social rights in Nigeria are traceable to a few international 
instruments that Nigeria is a party to, particularly the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).1076 As part of its treaty obligations, 
Nigeria is required to take steps towards the progressive realisation of economic and 
social rights.1077  
 The significant harms of tobacco use in developing countries are usually 
understood primarily as a health issue, so it overlooks the significant impact of tobacco 
on social, economic, and environmental rights. These rights may be expressed 
differently from country to country or from one instrument to another. The basic list, 
according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, includes 
workers’ rights, right to social security and social protection, protection of and 
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assistance to the family, right to an adequate standard of living, right to health, 
education and cultural rights.1078   
The Constitution of the FRN 1999 provides for social and economic rights, albeit 
in the form of the 'Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy' 
(Directive Principles). These rights are under a separate chapter in the 1999 
Constitution, different and distinct from the chapter on Fundamental Human Rights. 
These Directive Principles include the social and economic objectives of the state: the 
right to adequate means of livelihood, the right to health, the right to education, the 
rights of children, the right to protect the young person and the aged, and the right to 
the Environment, among other rights. It is pertinent to note at this point that the 
activities of TTCs have infringed upon some of these rights, as revealed in previous 
sections of this research.1079  
Tobacco control is a developmental issue, and its success relies on the work of 
other sectors such as commerce, trade, finance, justice, and education. For this 
reason, the international community agreed to include the WHO FCTC in the UN’s 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).1080 According to the WHO FCTC, the 
inequitable burden of tobacco, both within and between countries, is particularly 
troubling, as tobacco is a barrier to the UN sustainable development goals.1081 Poor 
and marginalised countries are more likely to consume tobacco, with younger ages at 
risk of exposure to second-hand smoke.1082  
Each year tobacco costs the global economy nearly 2% of its gross domestic 
product (GDP) due to medical expenses and lost productive capacities from premature 
death and disease, which greatly impacts household level.1083 Tobacco-related 
medical expenditures, often out-of-pocket, can drive vulnerable households into 
poverty or force individuals to forgo life-saving care altogether. The misuse of limited 
family income fosters poverty and lowers worker’s productivity, as well as raising the 
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burden on new healthcare systems, which often struggle to cope with communicable 
diseases, let alone non-communicable diseases (NCDs). More than 80% of premature 
deaths from NCDs occur in low- and middle-income countries.1084 Tobacco farmers in 
Nigeria also encounter a cycle of poverty and economic hardship.1085 Some of the 
farmers are unable to clear their unsustainable loans or debts with the tobacco 
companies—the farmers receive loans from the tobacco companies. After deducting 
payment to the tobacco corporation for fertilisers, pesticides, tractors fees, et cetera, 
the remaining debt is carried forward to the next planting season, therefore, creating 
a cycle of poverty.1086 Tobacco farming—itself health-harming—often relies on 
unlawful or exploitative labour, including child labour, and contributes to environmental 
degradation.1087  
 
6.3 Nigeria’s Human Rights Responsibilities under the Nigerian Constitution. 
 
This section will examine Nigeria’s responsibility under its constitution and then 
Nigeria’s responsibility under international law.  
 Since achieving independence, Nigeria’s constitution has incorporated 
fundamental rights provisions. The first set of fundamental rights was introduced into 
the Nigerian constitution on the advice of the Willink Commission, which was set up 
by the British colonial administration to consider the position of minority groups with 
majority groups after independence.1088 The Nigerian Independence Constitution of 
1960 incorporated human rights provisions, laying the foundation for subsequent 
Constitutions, such as the 1979 and the current 1999 constitution. Conversely, the 
 
1084 Ibid. 
1085 Marty Otanez, ‘Social disruption caused by tobacco growing’ (study conducted for the Second meeting 
study group on economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing – WHO FCTC, Mexico City, Mexico, 
17-19 June 2008); E Cadmus et al., ‘The reality of tobacco farmers exploitation in a region in Nigeria’ (2018) 
16(1) Tobacco Induced Diseases 394; WHO, ‘Tobacco and poverty: a vicious circle’ (WHO Regional Office for 
the Eastern Mediterranean 2004). 
1086 E Cadmus etal., ‘The reality of tobacco farmers exploitation in a region in Nigeria’ (2018) 16(1) Tobacco 
Induced Diseases in J Elliott etal.(eds), Tobacco Induce: Diseases Abstract Book: 17th World Conference on 
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fundamental human rights section of the constitution was suspended under past 
Nigerian military administration. From Nigerian independence in 1960 to 1999, six 
successful military coups occurred and lasted for a cumulative period of 30 years. 
 The pre-1979 Constitution concentrated on natural rights1089 and less attention 
on civil and political rights while economic, political, and social rights were not 
included.1090 The 1979 and 1999 Constitution widened the scope of rights. The 
broader scope of rights ranges from the right to life and dignity of the human person, 
to the freedom from discrimination and the right to ownership.1091 The 1999 
Constitution, under chapter II, recognised political, social, educational, and economic 
rights. However, section 41 of the 1999 Constitution allows the government to 
derogate from social and economic rights provided it is in the interest of defence, public 
safety, public health, and other interests cited under the s41. Moreover, the SEC rights 
are nonjusticiable, even though some sections are couched in the mandatory 
language of ‘shall’.1092 The courts have held this nonjusticiable position for over three 
decades.1093 Despite this position, the Nigerian Supreme Court (SC) held that the 
rights contained in Chapter II of the Constitution may be enforced under certain 
circumstances.1094 The SC further held that the provisions of Chapter II are 
unenforceable, but the constitution empowers the National Assembly to legislate on 
the provisions of Chapter II and enforce those rights against government bodies, 
private persons and organisations. Therefore, any step taken by the National 
Assembly in the furtherance of such a goal is valid and enforceable in the Nigerian 
courts.1095 
 
1089 Natural rights, that is, inalienable rights including rights to life and pursuit of happiness, freedom of 
speech, association and equality before the law. 
1090 M Akpan, ‘The 1979 Nigerian Constitution and human rights’ (1980) 2 Universal Human Rights 23 in O 
Amao, ‘CSR, Human Rights and the Law’, (note 124) p133. 
1091 Chapter IV of the Nigerian constitution, 1999. Note the similarities between the 1979 and 1999 
constitution.  
1092 See Justice Modibo Ocran, The Rule of Law and Delivering Justice in Africa, (Keynote Address at the Loyola 
University Chicago International Law Review Symposium, 15 February 2007). 
1093 See for example Okojie v. AG Lagos State (1981) 2 NCLR 337. 
1094 AG Ondo State v. AG of the Federation and 35 others (2002) 6 SC (part 1) 1. 
1095 In Government of South Africa et al. v. Grootboom et al.; Grootboom v. Osstenberg Municipality et al. 
CCT38/00 (2000), a similar approach was taken by the South African court in respect of section 7 (2) of the 
Constitution of South Africa which requires the state to respect, protect and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. 
The court held that even though the section also applied to provisions that are considered non-justiciable, but 
“given that socio-economic rights are expressly included in the Bill, the question is not whether they are 




 The human rights provisions in the Nigerian constitution is crucial in the tobacco 
regulatory framework. The human rights approach enables the court to grant 
injunctions to protect rights considered fundamental under tort law. For instance, in 
Gbemre v. Shell and others1096, the plaintiff argued that the provisions of the 
Associated Gas Re-injection Act (Continued Flaring of Gas Regulations) 1984 and the 
Associated Gas Re-injection (Amendment) Decree no. 7 of 1985, which allowed for 
the continuation of gas flaring, were inconsistent with the right to life and the right to a 
healthy environment guaranteed under the constitution. The court agreed with this 
argument and held that statutes permitting the flaring of gas in Nigeria, with or without 
permission, are inconsistent with the Nigerian constitution and, therefore, 
unconstitutional. As a result, the court directed the Attorney General of the federation 
and the Minister of Justice to take steps to amend the statutes governing gas flaring 
to bring it in line with the fundamental rights provisions of the constitution. The case 
reflects the progressive ambition of the court regarding non-justiciable human rights. 
Since most human rights, to a considerable extent, are interwoven, the court can link 
the justiciable rights together with the non-justiciable one to make such claims 
admissible and enforceable.  
In Gbemre, gas flaring may initially constitute an environmental objective of the 
State to improve the environment under section 20 of the Nigerian constitution; 
however, this section falls under the non-justiciable provision of the constitution, which 
should not have been heard in the Nigerian courts, but once the environmental 
objective is underpinned with a justiciable right, the case takes a whole new meaning. 
This creative approach has been used by the Indian Supreme Court to resolve the 
dilemma of non-justiciable rights. Similar to the Nigerian Constitution, the Indian 
Constitution1097 has two distinct rights: the justiciable and the non-justiciable human 
rights.1098 The provisions of the non-justiciable rights in the Indian Constitution provide 
that they 'shall not be enforced by any court'.1099 There is a clear and direct prohibition 
ousting the authority of the courts to address such rights. An alleged breach of the 
principles did not offer any grounds for redress in the Indian courts.1100 From 1977, the 
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1099 Ibid. Article 37. 
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Indian Supreme Court took a novel approach to resolve the dilemma of nonjusticiable 
rights,1101 whereby judges became outspoken supporters of the social and economic 
rights (SERs) and the oppressed through the instruments of social action litigation or 
public interest litigation.1102 Through this mechanism, the Indian court used the 
interpretation of the right to life and security of persons to usher in a regime of SERs 
protection. For instance, in Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh & ors,1103 the 
Supreme Court of India asserted the right to education for children even though that 
right is non-justiciable.1104 The Court construed that the right to education underpins 
the right to life because of its inherent fundamental importance. This approach adopted 
by the Indian Supreme Court to enhance and enforce SERs has, however, not been 
without criticism. The Supreme Court has been accused, inter alia, of judicial activism 
and politicising constitutional adjudication.1105 Notwithstanding the criticisms, the 
citizens of India appear to have found in their courts the opportunity to get their 
government to act on matters that appears to be elusive. This approach can limit the 
activities of TTCs in the context of tobacco regulatory. 
6.4 Nigeria’s Human Rights Responsibilities under International law. 
 
Under the classic doctrine of international law, States are responsible for 
upholding human rights.1106 United Nations treaties firmly establish that states are the 
primary duty bearers for the protection of human rights,1107 with some of the treaties’ 
provisions obligating states to regulate businesses in a way that ensures human rights 
are not violated.1108 International treaties, including the ICCPR, ICESCR, and ICERD, 
impose general obligations on states to ensure the enjoyment of rights and the 
 
1101 See PN Bhagwati, 'Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation' (1984-5) 23 Columbia Journal of 
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1104 India Constitution, Article 45 provides that the state shall endeavour to provide within a period of ten 
years from the commencement of the Constitution, free and compulsory education for all children until they 
complete the age of fourteen years. 
1105 Jamie Cassels, 'Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible?' (1989)         
37 American Journal of Comparative Law 496. 
1106 N Jagers, Corporate Human Rights Obligations: in search of accountability (Intersentia 2002) 137; 
       O De Schutter (ed), Transnational Corporations and Human Rights (Hart 2006) part 1. 
1107 JG Ruggie, ‘Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda’ (2007) 101 American Journal of 
Int’l Law 819. 





restriction of human rights violation by non-state actors.1109 Later treaties in time began 
to address business in a more direct and detailed manner,1110 such as the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),1111 
Convention on the Rights of a Child (CRC) and the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).1112  
 Nigeria has a duty to protect human rights under the principle of territoriality.1113 
This principle obliges the state to exercise due diligence to prevent and respond to 
violations of human rights within its territorial boundaries. This state responsibility is 
an old principle of international law. According to Chirwa, the principle emanates from 
the doctrines of state sovereignty and equality of states.1114 Similarly, Weiler avers that 
under conventional international human rights law, states are obliged to ensure that 
each of their citizens enjoy basic rights and freedoms and to safeguard those rights 
against the conduct of non-state actors.1115 Although states are not liable for the 
violation of non-state actors, they are, however, liable for failing to prevent the human 
rights infringements committed by state and non-state actors. For a state to be held 
liable for the actions of TTCs, the conduct has to breach positive international law in a 
manner that is attributable to the state, or a state must violate one of its obligations 
with regards to the regulation or supervision of TTCs,1116 or where a state fails to take 
appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish, and redress human rights violations 
of non-state actors.1117 
 
1109 For example, see article 2 of the ICCPR and article 2(1)(d) of ICERD. 
1110 For instance, article 2(e) of CEDAW imposes obligations on states to take all appropriate measures to 
eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organisation or enterprise.  
1111 CEDAW, GA res. 34/180, 34 UN GAOR Supp. (no.46) at 193, UN Doc. A/34/46, entered into force 3 
September 1981. 
1112 The CRPD and its optional protocol was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 13 December 2006 and 
opened for signature on 30 March 2007. 
1113  Mark Gibney et al., ‘Transnational State Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights’ (1999) 12 Harvard 
Human Rights Journal 267, 267. 
1114 DM Chirwa, ‘The Doctrine of state Responsibility as a Potential means of Holding Private Actors 
Accountable for Human Rights, (2004) 5 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1, 4. 
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1116 J Brunnee, ‘International Legal Accountability Through the Lens of the Law of State Responsibility’ (2005) 
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 Nigeria has a binding obligation to respect the fundamental rights recognised 
under the ICCPR without distinction of race, sex, language, or religion.1118 Article 
2(3)(a) and (b) of ICCPR includes the obligation to ensure that any person whose 
rights or freedom included in the ICCPR is infringed upon shall have this right 
determined by a competent judicial, administrative, or legislative authority or by any 
competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State.  
 Nigeria is also obliged under the ICESCR to respect, promote and fulfil 
economic, social and cultural rights.1119 The obligation to ‘respect’ requires that States 
refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of a human right. The 
obligation to ‘protect’ requires States to prevent third parties, including individuals, 
groups, corporations or other entities, from interfering with the enjoyment of a human 
right, and this also includes an obligation for the State to ensure that all other bodies 
subject to its control (such as transnational corporations based in that State) respect 
the enjoyment of rights in other countries.1120 To ‘fulfil’ contains the obligation to 
facilitate the full actualisation of the right in question, and where a right has been 
violated, the State has to redress it and provide an adequate remedy, which may 
include compensation.1121  
Furthermore, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights requires 
States to protect against the infringement of human rights arising out of the activities 
of non-state actors in relation to the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights. 
For instance, there is an underlining responsibility for States to ‘take appropriate steps 
to ensure that activities of the private business sector and civil society conform with 
the right to food’.1122 Another international instrument that recognised State’s duty to 
protect is the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, which was adopted in 1997. It states that the obligation to ‘protect’ includes the 
 
1118 See article 2(1) of ICCPR. 
1119 See Amnesty International Report, Nigeria: Are Human Rights in the Pipeline?  (Amnesty International 
Index: AFR 44/020/2004, Amnesty International 9 November 2004) 19. 
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State’s responsibility to ensure that private entities or individuals within its jurisdiction 
do not deprive others of their economic and social rights.1123 
 Nigeria ratified core of the international treaties in force,1124 but the impact, 
according to Amao, is less than one would expect because ‘Nigeria has failed to ratify 
necessary instruments that will enhance their application’.1125 For example, Nigeria 
has not acceded to the first optional protocol to the ICCPR (1976); therefore, Nigeria 
does not recognise the ICCPR Human Rights Committee to consider individual 
complaints regarding the violation of the covenant. Another example is the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a Communications Procedure 
(2014), which Nigeria has neither signed nor ratified. The CRC’s communication 
procedure allows children from ratified States to bring complaints about violations of 
their rights directly to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, provided there is 
no solution or redress, among other admissibility criteria.1126 Nonetheless, Nigeria 
established the National Human Rights Commission under the National Human Rights 
Acts 1995 to fulfil the resolution of the UN General Assembly that enjoins all member 
States to establish human rights institutions for the promotion and protection of 
fundamental rights.1127 However, the Commission lacks independence, constitutional 
backing, and resources, to mention but a few failures, leading to the inadequacy of the 
Commission to achieve its objectives.1128 
Again, Nigeria ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
domesticated it under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification 
and Enforcement) Decree;1129 thus, the African Charter is part of Nigeria’s domestic 
 
1123 See para.18. A similar Declaration was also submitted by the African Commission in the SERAC et al. v 
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law1130 and enforceable under the Nigerian constitution.1131 In Gbemre v. Shell and 
others1132, for instance, the court held that Shell’s flare gas activities in the course of 
oil exploration and production in the applicant’s community violated their 
constitutionally protected human rights (the protected rights include the rights to clean, 
poison-free, pollution-free environment) under the Nigerian Constitution and the 
African Charter. Even though there is no apparent justiciable right to ‘clean poison-
free, pollution-free and healthy environment’ under the Nigerian Constitution, the court 
relied on the cumulative use of constitutional provisions and on the provision of article 
24 of the African Charter to recognise and apply a fundamental right to a ‘clean poison-
free, pollution-free and healthy environment’. The impact of this decision is that it is 
possible to have recourse to the African Charter for rights that are not available under 
national law. After considering Nigeria’s obligation under international treaties, the 
research will now turn to the consider international regional judicial decisions.    
Drawing guidance from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (African Commission), the research will be informed by their decisions 
to hold States accountable for the failure to prevent human rights violation under the 
principle of State responsibility. The ECtHR’s approach on the relevance the state's 
responsibility to control private parties and corporations are notable in the case laws. 
For instance, in Lopez Ostra v. Spain,1133 a limited company, SACURSA, had a waste 
treatment plant in the town of Lorca, Spain. The plant was built with state subsidy on 
municipal land about 12 meters away from the applicant’s home. The plant 
commenced operation in July 1988 without a license from the municipal authorities 
contrary to the Spanish regulation. The complainant alleged that the plant emitted 
fumes, repetitive noise, and repulsive smell, therefore affecting the living conditions 
and health of her family. Although the Spanish authorities were not responsible for the 
acts in question, the court found that since the municipal authority permitted its land 
to be used, as well as the subsidy offered, the State was responsible for failing to 
 
1130 Garba v. Lagos State AG Suit ID/599M/91 and Agbakoba v. Director State Security Services (1994) 6 
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secure the right to private and family life, a right that is guaranteed under article 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
 Another important ECtHR case is Guerra and others v. Italy1134. The applicants 
lived in a town about one kilometre from a company’s chemical plant. During its 
production process, the company released a large amount of inflammable gas and 
other toxic substances. An explosion in the factory released tonnes of dangerous toxic 
substances and led to 150 people hospitalised. The applicants alleged that the Italian 
authorities failed to inform the public of the risks posed by the factory’s operations and 
on what was to be done in the event of an accident. The ECtHR held that the Italian 
authorities were in breach of article 8 of the ECHR (the right to private and family life) 
for failing to protect the people from the emissions and explosions. Both Guerra and 
Ostra cases indicate that a State could be held liable for the violations of human rights 
infringements by a third party within the State’s territory. 
 Under the Inter-American Court in Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras,1135 the 
court held that a third-party human rights violation can also lead to the international 
responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, ‘but because of the lack of due 
diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention’.1136 
In the said case, Rodriguez, a student, was alleged to have been detained without 
warrant, tortured by the police, and consequently disappeared without a trace. The 
Honduran government contended that the allegations against the police were false 
and that there was no credible evidence to prove otherwise. It was held that even 
though the attackers were private actors, the State was liable because of ‘the failure 
of the State apparatus to act’1137, including the failure to provide any remedy to the 
victim’s family and failure to find the victim or perpetrators.  
 In the same vein, the African Commission in SERAC & et al. v. Nigeria1138 held 
that African governments have a duty to monitor and control activities of multinational 
corporations. The Commission further held that African states should also ensure 
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respect for economic and social rights.1139 The African Commission, relying on its 
earlier decisions in Union des Jeunes Avocats/Chad1140 and the decision of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in Velásquez Rodriguez,1141 as well as the ECtHR 
in X and Y v. the Netherlands1142, held that governments have to protect their citizens, 
through appropriate legislation and effective enforcement, from damaging acts 
perpetrated by private parties.1143 The Commission criticised the Nigerian government 
for failing to exercise the necessary degree of care by allowing private actors to carry 
out the infringement.1144  
Having explored the constitution, international treaty obligations, and regional 
judicial decisions, the research has not only demonstrated that Nigeria has a 
responsibility to safeguard human rights, but it also shows that Nigeria has restricted 
its scope of accountability, such as categorising SERs as nonjusticiable under the 
Constitution; hence, what does it mean in relation to regulating the negative human 
rights impact of transnational tobacco corporations in Nigeria? The final part of section 
6.4 will explore the implications.    
Safeguarding the population from the impact of TTCs in Nigeria is challenging, 
partly due to the abundant resources of TTCs, the resources that could sometimes be 
used to interfere and weaken tobacco control, especially in low-income and middle-
income countries.1145 One of the ways Nigeria could enhance its human rights 
obligation is to change the nonjusticiable rights to justiciable ones. This could be 
achieved through legislation. The reason for the reform is because most of the human 
rights vulnerable to the activities of the transnational tobacco corporations, such as 
health, environment, and socio-economic rights, are classified as unenforceable rights 
under the Nigerian constitution. This position remains the same even if Nigeria adopts 
an international instrument. The effect of this position is that if Nigerian government 
lacks the political will to hold TTCs accountable, then the government cannot be held 
liable for most of the human rights impact of TTCs, therefore, weakening the overall 
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tobacco regulatory framework. A weak regulatory framework has the tendency to 
increase tobacco prevalence,1146 but as the regional judicial judgements 
demonstrates, the constitutional backing of all rights can force the State to act, either 
voluntarily or through judicial pronouncements. The result, therefore, could reinforce 
the tobacco regulatory framework.  
However, Nigeria cannot regulate the transnational tobacco corporations in 
isolation, particularly with the regulatory gaps identified in the research. As TTCs are 
influential transnational companies, international legal solution is necessary.1147 
According to the former WHO Director-General, Dr Brundtland, tobacco control is a 
global problem that requires an international response for any chance of success.1148 
For this and other reasons, Nigeria participated in the WHO FCTC, which serves as a 
coordinated global response to the tobacco crisis, yet international collaboration 
appears to be inadequate. For instance, the WHO FCTC lacks the authority to enforce 
compliance; it relies on the government to implement the Convention through domestic 
law and policy.1149  
Despite the adoption of the tobacco Convention, the Nigerian government 
cannot be held accountable for lacking the political will to hold TTCs liable for health, 
environmental and socio-economic rights violations. The reason is that such rights and 
objectives are deemed unenforceable under the Nigerian constitution.1150 This cycle, 
however, can be severed only by the deliberate action at the national level rather than 
by international treaties and conventions. On the one hand, international convention 
such as the one furthered by the WHO FCTC have shown meaningful results in 
achieving tobacco control,1151 but on the other hand, they are sometimes considered 
weak. Using the WHO FCTC as an example, Gostin et al. aver that the treaty has 
significant weaknesses: first, it contains ambiguous language, affording countries a 
broad discretion in implementation; second, it does not provide enough financial 
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resources to low-income and middle-income countries lacking sufficient capacity to 
implement and enforce policies outlined in the convention.1152 These weaknesses 
prove there is no single approach in regulating transnational tobacco corporations. At 
best, a multifaceted approach can build on each other—an approach that should 
include the cooperation of home States of transnational corporations. When home 
States are involved, the scope of involvement should be unambiguously defined, 
otherwise home States risk encroaching on the internal affairs of sovereign nations, 
resulting to what Fowlers claims to be a new form of ‘cultural imperialism’ in developing 
countries.1153 
Against this backdrop, Nigeria’s capacity to regulate human rights impact is 
somewhat weakened by the fact that the Nigerian government cannot be held 
accountable for lacking the will to hold TTCs liable for health, environmental and socio-
economic rights, since these rights are classified as unenforceable rights. TTCs, 
therefore, have a role to play in filling this regulatory gap and, most importantly, 
preventing human rights abuses within their sphere of influence. The next section 
below will focus on the responsibilities of TTCs in preventing human rights abuses.   
  
6.5 Human Rights Responsibilities of Transnational Tobacco Corporations. 
 
Transnational Tobacco Corporations exert immense power and resources, 
leading to challenges for states like Nigeria to adequately regulate the industry. In 
2008 the revenues of the five leading TTCs exceeded $300 billion.1154 In 2014, Philip 
Morris International’s net revenue was slightly over $80 billion1155 while Zimbabwe’s 
GDP was $19.4 billion.1156 With such immense revenue and international presence, it 
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would be demanding for developing countries to adequately regulate the activities of 
transnational tobacco companies—PMI1157 and BAT1158 operate in over one hundred 
countries. For example, in enforcing a judgement debt, TTCs could be insulated from 
liability by moving assets and operations to other countries,1159 a move that could 
potentially frustrate enforcement of the judgment debt against the organisation.1160 
Furthermore, regulation is also compounded by some governments who rely on the 
taxes generated from TTCs, creating a lack of willingness to regulate the industry.1161 
One-third of Malawi’s economy GDP, for instance, is predominantly from agriculture, 
therefore, the performance of the tobacco sector is key to Malawi’s short-term 
growth.1162 This narrative correlates with the remarks of Nigerian President, Olusegun 
Obasanjo,1163 when he admitted that the country cannot sacrifice the huge benefits 
BAT contributes to the economy,1164 which demonstrates a willingness to relax 
regulatory policies in favour of economic gains. However, the challenges could be 
tapered if only TTCs could religiously channel their resources and influence to promote 
human rights within the company and within their sphere of influence, such as their 
supply chain. This obligation to uphold human rights standards should not be viewed 
as a choice, but as a direct obligation under international law. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights explicitly imposes direct human 
rights obligations on private actors. According to the Preamble, ‘every individual and 
every organ of society … shall … promote respect for these rights and freedom’. The 
phrase ‘every individual and organ of society’ should therefore include TTCs. As 
emphasised by Henkin, the phrase captures all individuals and corporations, including 
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companies tighten hold on Washington under Trump’ (theguardian.com, 13 July 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/13/tobacco-industry-trump-administration-ties> accessed 18 
Sept 2017: The article indicate how TTCs are influential in the USA through making donations to politicians and 




market and cyberspace.1165 This all-embracing position has been reiterated by the UN 
Commission on Human Rights.1166 In addition, the general comments of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) explicitly obliged non-
State actors to realise the economic, social and cultural rights entrenched in the 
ICESCR.1167 This position resonates with several other international Declarations that 
imposed both positive and negative duties on private actors concerning socio-
economic rights.1168 Under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
business enterprises should espouse the fundamental rights, and they should address 
any adverse human rights impacts within their sphere of influence,1169 regardless of 
their size, sector, operational context, ownership, and structure.1170 
Moreover, when States, business organisations, and people adhere to their 
human rights obligations, it becomes a cooperation that benefits society. This view 
was enunciated by the UN Human Rights Commissioner, Mary Robinson, when she 
declared that business needs human rights and human rights need business.1171 The 
real progress in human rights, according to Robinson, will require innovative beneficial 
partnerships at all levels from governments to corporations, and to the broader civil 
society.1172 Likewise, Pogge believes the focus on human rights should be a 
collaborative one,1173 with the responsibility on government, organisations, and 
individuals to ensure all members of society have secure access to the objective of 
human rights.1174 Therefore, for organisations to realise their human rights obligations, 
 
1165 Louis Henkin, ‘The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets’ (1999) 25 Brooklyn 
Journal of International law 17, 25.  
1166 UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 2nd 
Session, 1 August 2000, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/Rev.1, at p17.  
1167 See General Comment No. 12, The Right to adequate food (Article 11) 12 May 1999 at [20]. 
1168 For instance, para 12(e) of the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development and Programme of Action, 
adopted by the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen on 12 March 1995, UN Doc. A/ CONF. 
166/9 (1995), states that ‘national and transnational corporations to operate in a framework of respect for the 
environment … with proper consideration for the social and cultural impact of their activities’. Similarly, see also, 
Article 2 of The UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted on 20 Nov 1963, 
by the UN General Assembly Resolution 1904 (XVIII). See also the UN Global compact which calls on all 
transnational corporations to observe the fundamental rights of workers, human rights and the environmental 
standards.  
1169 Principle 11, UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. See also Principles 12-24. 
1170 Principle 14, ibid.  
1171 Mary Robinson, Building Relationship That Make a Difference’ in Denise Wallace, Human Rights and 
Business: A Policy-Oriented Perspective (Brill Nijhoff 2015) 147. 
1172 Ibid.  
1173 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Polity Press and Blankwells 2002) 47.  




there should be a complete shift from profit maximisation to an ardent commitment to 
the human rights agenda. 
Under their corporate governance framework, TTCs claim to recognise human 
rights as part of their business policy. In recognition to respect human rights, BAT 
affirmed commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.1175 Philip Morris 
International (PMI) also gave similar recognition to respect human rights.1176 Both 
firms’ expression to respect human rights demonstrates the influence or impact of 
international law and voluntary codes on TTCs’ human rights agenda. Following on 
from these expressions, TTCs should, truly, commit to addressing and promoting any 
human rights matter within its sphere of influence. The next section would now 
examine the influence international voluntary codes have on TTCs. 
 
 
6.6 Voluntary Codes of Conduct and TTCs. 
 
TTCs, including PMI and BAT, have recognised international voluntary codes 
of conduct that expressly commits to respecting human rights.1177 Both corporations 
have included international voluntary instruments as part of their corporate code of 
conduct,1178 as well as defined ethical standards in their policy statements. Philip 
Morris International, for instance, is committed to business practices in line with the 
United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.1179These 
international codes of conduct are voluntary behavioural principles, standards or 
guidelines.1180 The diverse codes available to TTCs include international public codes 
of conduct, private company codes of conduct, industry association codes of conduct, 
and nongovernmental (NGO) codes of conduct. Private company codes, such as 
BAT’s Standard of Business Conduct (SoBC), appear to be the most common 
 
1175 BAT, Journey: human rights report 2020 (BAT 2020). 
1176 PMI, ‘Our Commitment to Human Rights’ (PMI, date unknown) <pmi-human-rights-
commitmenta280c4bd6c7468f696e2ff0400458fff.pdf> accessed 16 Sept 2017. The UN Global Compact is a 
principle-based framework for businesses, stating 10 principles in the areas of human rights, labour, the 
environment and anti-bribery. More on the Guiding Principles and Global Compact will be dealt with below. 
1177 Ibid.  
1178 Ibid. 
1179 Ibid.  
1180 SD Murphy, ‘Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level’ (2005) 43 Columbia 




because TTCs conceived the codes themselves. Industry association codes are like 
private codes except they belong to an entire industry or group of companies within 
the same industry.1181 The NGO codes are created by organisations with interests in 
labour, environment, human rights, among other interests. Usually NGOs’ codes are 
in response to a significant incident of multinational corporation conduct; for instance, 
the 1977 Global Sullivan Principles was for multinational corporations to dissociate 
from the principle of segregation in South African, as a way of protesting against 
apartheid.1182 The principles were later relaunched in 1999 as a more general code, 
known as the Global Sullivan Principles of Social Responsibility.1183 The Global 
Sullivan Principles advocates the support for human rights, including equal 
opportunities and freedom of association.  
The following part below examines the international voluntary codes that have 
somewhat influenced human rights policy of TTCs. 
ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles—the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (MNE Declaration)1184 is the 
only tripartite U.N. agency that brings together representatives from governments, 
employers, and workers in 187 member States to set labour standards, develop 
policies and devise programmes promoting decent work for all.1185 It provides in 
paragraph 8 that ‘[a]ll the parties concerned by this Declaration…should respect the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the corresponding International 
Covenants (1966) adopted by the General assembly of the United Nations, as well as 
the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation’. 
 The MNE Declaration calls upon transnational corporations to take decisive 
measures in creating employment opportunities, ensuring security of employment, 
promoting equality, providing favourable work conditions and health and safety. The 
 
1181 For instance, the Zimbabwean ‘Tobacco Industry Code of Conduct’ under the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement: Tobacco Industry, Statutory Instrument 70, 2017 [CAP.28:01]. The ‘code’ is, a set of agreed 
principles and acts, designed to regulate and promote good behaviour at workplace, see section 6.  
1182 SP Sethi and OF Williams, ‘Global Code of Conduct: an assessment of the Sullivan Principles…Lessons 
Learned and Unlearned’ (2000) 105(2) Business and Society Review 169-200. 
1183 JB Stewart, ‘Amandla! The Sullivan Principles and the battle to end apartheid in South Africa, 1975-1987’ 
(2011) 96(1) Journal of African American History 62. 
1184 Adopted by the Governing Body of the International labour Office at its 204th session (Geneva, November 
1977) and amended at its 279th (Nov 2000), 295th (March 2006) and 329th (March 2017) sessions.  
1185 International Labour Organization, ‘About the ILO’ (ILO, 2017) <http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-




ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work1186, for instance, 
commits members to respect and promote principles and rights in four categories: 
freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining, the elimination of forced or compulsory labour, the abolition of child labour, 
and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.  
Unlike the MNE Declaration that is non-binding and unenforceable, the ILO 
Declaration and Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work has a follow-up procedure 
that provides three ways to help countries, employers and workers achieve the full 
realisation of the Declaration’s objectives through annual review, global reports, and 
technical cooperation projects.1187  
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines)—The OECD is an institution of 35 
countries from developed and emerging countries. It adopted a declaration on 
international investment and multinational enterprises, which are recommendations by 
governments to multinational enterprises operating in, or from, adhering countries. The 
Guidelines provide voluntary principles and standards for responsible business 
conduct consistent with applicable laws and internationally recognised standards, 
serving as a link between Member State and transnational organisations.1188 It calls 
on corporations to respect the internationally recognised human rights of those 
affected by their activities,1189 as expressed in the International Bill of Human 
Rights,1190 and urges multinational corporations to carry out human rights due 
diligence as appropriate to their size, nature, and context of operations, as well as to 
protect public health and safety, among other recommendations.1191 Although they are 
not legally binding, corporations are charged to respect the Guidelines wherever they 
operate. Therefore, to ensure a measure of enforceability, each adhering OECD 
 
1186 Adopted by the International labour Conference at its 86th Session, Geneva, 18 June 1998 (annex revised 
15 June 2010). 
1187For an expansive explanation see, ‘ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at work’ (note 
1185). 
1188 OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Publishing 2011) 17, [1]. 
1189 Ibid p19, para 2. 
1190 Ibid. The Int’l Bill of Human Rights, which consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
main instruments through which it has been codified: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and to the principles concerning 
fundamental rights set out in the 1998 International Labour Organisation Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work. 




member is required to establish a ‘national contact point’ (NCP), whose leading role is 
to further the effectiveness of the Guidelines by undertaking promotional activities, 
handling inquiries, and contributing to the resolution of issues arising from the alleged 
non-observance of the guidelines.1192 However, NCPs have been criticised for lacking 
the resource to investigate complaints and to provide an effective mediation 
service.1193  According to critics, the NCPs reject far too many complaints and, of those 
accepted, the vast majority do not result in outcomes that end corporate misconduct, 
provide victims with remedies for harms incurred, or bring about changes to corporate 
behaviour.1194 The guidelines may represent no more than a corporate marketing 
opportunity rather than an authentic opportunity to moderate corporate behaviour.1195  
 UN Global Compact. In 1999, the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, 
launched the UN Global Compact (GC), a voluntary initiative designed to encourage 
corporations to commit to ten principles based on four themes: human rights,1196 
labour, environment, and anti-corruption.1197 These themes or principles are derived 
from international instruments: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Labour Organisation’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption.1198 The initiative aims for businesses to adopt 
these principles in their practice,1199 serving as a key entry point for engaging business 
and improving the United Nations ability to work with the private sector.1200  
 To participate in the GC, the company’s chief executive officer is expected to 
write to the UN Secretary-General expressing support for the initiative, and then 
 
1192 OECD, ‘About the NCP’ (OECD, 2017) <https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/ncps/> accessed 22 Sept 2017. 
1193 John Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of the UN 
Special Representative on human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises (7 April 
2008) UN Doc A/HRC/8/5, at para 98. 
1194 S Khoury and D Whyte, ‘Sidelining corporate human rights violations: the failure of the OECD’s regulatory 
consensus’ (2019) 18(4) Journal of Human Rights 363.  
1195 O Amao, CSR, Human Rights and the Law (Routledge 2011) 36. 
1196 Principle 1&2 are on human rights. Principle 1:  Businesses should support and respect the protection of 
internationally proclaimed human rights; Principle 2: and, make sure that they are not complicit in human 
rights abuses. 
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1199 George Kell, ‘12 years later: Reflections on the growth of the UN Global Compact’ (2012) 52(1) Business 
and Society 31, 32. 
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publicly advocate it.1201 As a condition for participation, companies are required to 
submit annual report on compliance, although they may be selective as to what they 
include in the report. Failure to comply may lead to delisting and labelling the company 
as ‘non-communicating’.1202 PMI declared commitment to the Global Compact in 2015 
to improve reputation and influence UN agencies;1203 however, following a board 
meeting in 2017, the UN Global Compact officially announced their decision to exclude 
tobacco companies from participating in the initiative.1204  
United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Guiding 
Principles). 
In 2005, the UN appointed Professor John Ruggie a Special Representative on 
human rights and business to ‘identify and clarify’ existing standards and practices of 
corporate responsibility and accountability. His first report in 2008 to the UN Human 
Rights Council disclosed underlining challenges: 
 
The root cause of the business and human rights predicament today lies in the governance 
gaps created by globalization – between the scope and impact of economic forces and actors, 
and the capacity of societies to manage their adverse consequences. These governance gaps 
provide the permissive environment for wrongful acts by companies of all kinds without 
adequate sanctioning or reparation. How to narrow and ultimately bridge the gaps in relation to 
human rights is our fundamental challenge.1205 
 
According to Ruggie, companies claim they respect human rights but only a few have 
systems in place to demonstrate the claim with any degree of confidence.1206 As part 
of his recommendation, he proposed a tripartite international framework on human 
rights corporate accountability which he referred to as ‘protect, respect and remedy’, 
 
1201 Y Eijk et al., ‘United Nations Global Compact: an ‘inroad’ into the UN and reputation boost for the tobacco 
industry’ (2008) 17(e1) Tobacco Control e66.   
1202 Ibid.  
1203 Ibid.  
1204 UN Global Compact (UNGC), UN Compact integrity policy update (UNGC, 13 Oct 2017). 
1205 John Ruggie Report, A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008. 
1206 John Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: Towards operationalizing the ‘protect, respect and remedy’ 
framework, report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, UN Human Rights Council, 




and these guiding principles were endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council.1207 The 
three core guiding principles could be understood as a coherent whole and should be 
read in terms of their objective to enhance business and human rights standards and 
practices.1208 The Guiding Principles apply to all States and all business enterprises, 
both transnational and others, regardless of size, sector, location, ownership, and 
structure.1209   
 The first principle—to protect—addressed the settled position in international 
law that states have the primary duty to protect against human rights violations. States 
individually are the primary duty-bearers under international human rights law, and 
collectively they are the trustees of the international human rights regime.1210 The duty 
of states in this regard is unequivocal. States would be perceived as violating their 
international human rights law obligations where such abuse can be attributed to them, 
or where they fail to take appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress 
private actors’ abuse.1211 It strongly advocates home States to set out the expectation 
that businesses respect human rights abroad, especially where the State is involved 
in, or supports, those businesses.1212 It also gives practical examples of how the state 
can influence human rights compliance in business organisations. One example is 
where a State conducts commercial transaction with business enterprises, therefore, 
providing the State with a unique opportunity to promote awareness and respect for 
human rights, such as through the terms of contract.1213 
 The second core principle is on corporations to respect human rights. This 
means that corporations should avoid infringing on the human rights of others, and 
they should address adverse human rights impacts within their space of involvement 
wherever they operate.1214 On this core principle, Ruggie focuses on the role of 
corporations. He disagrees with the discourse limiting the set of responsibilities to hold 
 
1207 The Special Representative annexed the Guiding Principles to his final report to the Human Rights Council 
(A/HRC/17/31), which also includes an introduction to the Guiding Principles and an overview of the process 
that led to their development. The Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding Principles in its resolution 17/4 
of 16 June 2011. 
1208 OHCHR, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: implementing the United Nations “protect, 
respect and remedy” framework (United Nations 2011) 1.  
1209 Ibid.  
1210 Ibid. commentary on Principle 4 at p7. 
1211 Ibid. p3. 
1212 Ibid. p4. 
1213 Ibid. commentary on Principle 6 at p8. 




corporations accountable. He believes that since corporations can affect all 
recognisable rights, corporations should, therefore, consider every rights. He further 
argues that the duty to respect is defined by social expectations.1215 However, social 
expectation, according to Amao, is not sufficient to guide corporate actions and, for 
that reason, there should be ‘more clarity as to what is owed, which the law may be 
best placed to provide’.1216   
The third core part of the framework is access to remedy. The Guiding 
Principles recommends that home states should strengthen judicial and non-judicial 
capacity that is accessible and equitable to address complaints and enforcement 
against organisation within their authority. Under the commentary of the Guiding 
principles, the remedy may include apologies, restitution, rehabilitation, financial or 
non-financial compensation and punitive sanctions (whether criminal or administrative, 
such as fines), injunctions or guarantees of non-repetition.1217 The Guiding Principles 
recommend business organisations to establish or participate in operational-level 
grievance mechanisms accessible directly to individuals and communities who may 
be adversely impacted by a business enterprise.1218 This company-led, non-judicial, 
and non-state remedy is typically administered by enterprises alone or in collaboration 
with other relevant stakeholders, or may be provided through a mutually acceptable 
external expert or body.1219 Non-judicial grievance mechanisms, either state or non-
state, should meet specific criteria under the Guiding Principles, including legitimacy, 
accessibility, and transparency.1220 However, the major challenge with this sort of non-
judicial grievance mechanism is enforceability, without which the non-judicial process 
would likely be nugatory.  
Having discussed the core aspects of the guiding principles, the next paragraph 
will focus on how TTCs should address their adverse human rights impact. 
According to the Guiding Principles, TTCs should carry out human rights due 
diligence to identify, prevent and mitigate human rights impacts as an ongoing 
 
1215 Ruggie Report (note 1205). See also Guiding Principles (note 1208).  
1216 O Amao, Corporate social responsibility, Human rights and the Law (Routledge 2011) 46. See also Guiding 
Principles, ibid.  
1217 OHCHR (note 1208) 27.  
1218 Principle 29 at p31. 
1219 Ibid.  




concern.1221 This procedure should comply with national laws and circumvent the risks 
of human rights infringement,1222 including assessing actual and potential human 
rights impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking and communicating 
the responses.1223 The context in which a company operates—its activities and the 
relationships associated with those activities—determines the scope of human rights-
related due diligence.1224 Therefore, the scope of due diligence in the tobacco industry 
should be wider than an industry producing less harmful product or service. In line with 
the Guiding Principles, due diligence involves an inductive and fact-based process 
guided by three set of factors: (a) due diligence includes adverse human rights impact 
business enterprise may cause through its own activities or through its operations, 
products or services by its business relationships (b) due diligence varies in complexity 
according to the risk and size of the corporation, and the nature and context of its 
operations (c) due diligence is an on-going process, recognising that the human rights 
risks may change over time as business operations and operating-context evolve.1225 
However, Brown argues that the due diligence referenced in international 
instruments are inadequate to change corporate behaviour, considering that they are 
not legally binding on transnational corporation and therefore unenforceable.1226 
Brown further argues that states governments should legislatively mandate due 
diligence with enforceable remedies, and, also, the definition of due diligence be 
expanded to enhance the obligations of multinational companies to provide human 
rights protection.1227 Besides, without fines and criminal sanctions, the burden of 
enforcement under tort law falls on the victim who are least equipped to meet it, and 
the formidable legal defence of transnational corporations could serve as an obstacle 
to enforce compliance.1228 
 
1221 Ibid.  
1222 John Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises (7 April 2008) UN Doc A/HRC/8/5, at para 98. 
1223 Principle 17, Guiding Principles, ibid.  
1224 Ibid., para 25. 
1225 Ibid.  
1226 RC Brown, ‘Due diligence ‘hard law’ remedies for MNCs labor chain workers’ (2018) 22(2) UCLA Journal of 
Int’l Law and Foreign Affairs 119, 128. 
1227 Ibid.  




With the Guiding Principles and other international codes on businesses and 
human rights, the question now is, what impact do they have on TTCs? The paragraph 
below will give an account of the impact of international initiatives on TTCs, vis-à-vis 
the UN Guiding Principles (GPs).  
International human rights initiatives, such as the GPs, have had an impact over 
TTCs, at least by raising public awareness. TTCs have also embedded the GPs in 
their governance framework partly due to the voluntary and non-legally binding nature 
of the GPs, which are responsibilities rather than duty. As an example, the Human 
Rights Policy of Japan Tobacco International (JTI), which also applies to suppliers and 
other business partners working on behalf of the company, recognised the GPs.1229 
Equally, PMI1230 and BAT1231 have both adopted the GPs. The potential benefit could 
be the implementation of human rights due diligence as an integrated part of TTCs’ 
operations and supply chain.1232 As an example, PMI have recognised the harmful 
effect of their products and the impact it has on human rights, subsequently leading to 
the development of less harmful tobacco products.1233 The use of less harmful 
alternatives, as research suggest, can reduce exposure to toxic chemicals that can 
lead to cancer in cigarette smokers.1234 However, applying the UN Guiding Principles, 
the Danish Institute of Human Rights1235 concludes that tobacco production, 
marketing, and consumption are irreconcilable with the right to health.1236 To reconcile 
the differences, therefore, there should be a seismic shift from TTCs’ recognition of 
human rights to the full realisation of human rights, which entails an overhaul of their 
operations, including their tobacco products.  
 
1229 Japan Tobacco International, JT Group Human Rights Policy (JTI, 1 Sept 2016).  
1230See PMI human rights policy (note 1157). 
1231 BAT, ‘Human Rights and Modern Slavery’ (note 1175). 
1232 Principle 13 page 14, Guiding Principles (note 1208).  
1233 PMI, ‘Assessing risks reduction’ (PMI, 31 July 2019) <https://www.pmi.com/science-and-
innovation/assessing-risk-reduction>; PMI, ‘Creating Less Harmful Alternatives to Smoking’ (PMI, 31 July 2019) 
<https://www.pmi.com/science-and-innovation/creating-less-harmful-alternatives-to-smoking-cigarettes> 
both articles accessed 9 October 2017. 
1234 L Shahab, et al. ‘Nicotine, Carcinogen, and Toxin Exposure in Long-Term E-Cigarette and Nicotine 
Replacement Therapy Users: A Cross-sectional Study’ (2017) 166(6) Annals of Internal Medicine 390-400. 
1235 The Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) is an independent human rights institution mandated to 
promote human rights through advice to public actors. The DIHR collaborated with Philip Morris International 
Inc. (PMI) to develop a human rights implementation plan across PMI’s value chain, including risk assessment, 
gap analysis and action plan. The collaboration was from September 2016 to August 2017.  
1236 Danish Institute for Human Rights, ‘Human Rights in Philip Morris International’ (DIHR, 4 May 2017) 





However, sole reliance on the international voluntary codes to initiate a 
comprehensive change in the industry is rather inadequate, given the voluntary nature 
and the insufficient enforcement of the codes at the international level.1237 Currently, 
national legal framework acts as an enforcement mechanism, as illustrated under the 
WHO FCTC. However, enforcement in Nigeria is weak.1238 Moreover, government in 
developing countries disregard human rights abuses by multinational corporations, 
following economic losses.1239 As a result, enforcement within an international context 
or framework should be enabled.1240 This international enforcement process, perhaps 
led by the United Nations, should be empowered to hold multinational corporations 
accountable for human rights abuses, which would lead to the global harmonisation of 





Despite the growing importance of addressing human rights issues with 
international human rights initiatives, responsibility in this area is voluntary.1242 For 
corporate businesses, the international human rights responsibilities are rarely framed 
in mandatory language.1243 As a result, international human rights laws neither binds 
nor provides any real mechanism to hold TTCs accountable. Therefore, to advance 
the benefits of these international initiatives in Nigeria, domestication and a robust 
enforcement framework is crucial to enhance tobacco control. However, awareness of 
these human rights initiatives holds a commanding significance, exemplified by TTCs 
recognising international human rights initiatives, including the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights, under their governance framework. The advantage 
 
1237 E Giuliani and C Macchi, ‘Multinational corporations’ economic and human rights impacts on developing 
countries: a review and research agenda’ (2014) 38 Cambridge Journal of Economics 479, 486. 
1238 OB Igbayiloye et al., ‘Legal response to human rights challenges of MNCs in Nigeria’ (2015) 6 Nnamdi 
Azikiwe Uni. Journal of Int’l Law and Jurisprudence 106, 114. 
1239 Giuliani (note 1237) 480. 
1240 Ibid at p485. 
1241 RC Brown, ‘Due diligence  “hard law” remedies for MNC labor chain workers’ (2018) 22(2) UCLA Journal of 
Int’l Law and Foreign Affairs 119, 126-7. 
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of which only goes to show that international law and initiatives can influence corporate 
policy. However, the crux of the matter is the transition from recognition to 
implementation of the objectives of these human rights instruments and initiatives.  
Furthermore, human-rights based approach serves as a useful tobacco control 
tool in Nigeria, especially when non-justiciable rights are associated with justiciable 
ones.1244 Once the connection is established—because people’s inalienable right build 
on each other—1245restitution can be pursued in court, as illustrated in the chapter. In 
addition, as the Nigeria company law recognises corporate entities as natural 
persons,1246 corporations should therefore be placed on the same pedestal as 
humans.  
Finally, this thesis recommends the establishment of a well-resourced 
independent Human Rights Reporter or Commissioner with the mandate to 




1244 Non enforceable by the courts. 
1245 Michelle Bachelet, Opening Statement by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 39th session of the 
Human Rights Council, 10 Sept 2018. 




Chapter Seven. General Conclusion and Recommendations   
 
The research evaluates the adequacy of Nigeria’s legal framework at regulating 
the activities of the tobacco industry, and what role, if any, CSR has in the regulatory 
framework. To this end, it analysed the laws, international instruments and institutional 
structure governing the tobacco industry, as well as TTCs’ corporate social 
responsibility statements and actions. Consequently, the research found a 
considerable amount of improvement in the current tobacco control framework 
compared to the one it replaces. However, the research identified substantial 
inadequacies. Issues ranging from unlawful interference by TTCs to weak 
enforcement have rendered tobacco control somewhat inadequate. Most importantly, 
the regulatory framework in part fails to actualise the objective of the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, which it purports to domesticate. Adequate 
representation of the Convention is fundamental to tobacco control in Nigeria. Given 
that international law has inherent limitations in holding TTCs accountable,1247 the 
national legal framework therefore serves as an enforcement mechanism for such 
laws. Moreover, before a ratified treaty is enforceable in Nigeria, it must be enacted 
as a domestic legislation.1248  
The second part of the research question explored what role CSR could have 
in the regulatory framework. This is because Ruggie argues that a regulatory alliance 
between government and business could enrich the regulatory framework.1249 While 
legal pronouncements are government’s contribution to the regulatory alliance, 
business contribution to the alliance could be—among others—corporate social 
responsibility, a deliberate business culture that is hinged on internal control and 
accountability. In answering this part of the research question, the thesis first gave 
scope to a fluid concept, identifying common themes and debates intended to 
establish a general understanding of CSR. Second, it captured the symbiotic 
relationship between law and CSR, especially how they both converge and advance 
 
1247 M Ssenyonjo and MA Baderin (eds), International Human Rights Law: six decades after the UDHR and 
Beyond (Taylor and Francis 2010) 263, 578. 
1248 E Egede, ‘Bringing Human Rights Home: an examination of the domestication of human rights treaties in 
Nigeria’ (2007) 51(2) Journal of African Law 249, 283.  
1249 John G Ruggie, ‘Multinational as global institution: power, authority and relative autonomy’ (2018) 12(3) 




each other. It argues that the law should engage with CSR, especially considering the 
notoriety of the industry. The law should therefore mandate a sub-set of CSR to make 
it meaningful, creating a quasi -mandatory and -voluntary approach to CSR. It then 
draws attention to CSR statements of TTCs and depicts how the National Tobacco 
Control Act of 2015 severely constrains CSR practices. The Act prohibits any form of 
public promotion, sponsorship, and advertisement of CSR in the tobacco industry, 
leading to an unusual industry-specific CSR performance. The discovery of the 
restriction steered the answer to the research question in a different direction from 
what was initially intended. Despite the restrictions, the research findings suggest that 
CSR could drive internal processes and ethical values. To present it another way, 
when legislative control over TTCs is ineffective, and perhaps even counterproductive, 
the responsibility that is needed is for corporations to fill the gap, which is already 
driven by their claims to advance CSR objectives. The result of which could therefore 
benefit the broader tobacco control framework.  
In accomplishing the research objectives, chapter four explored other laws that 
could supplement tobacco control regulations, thereby enhancing the general 
regulatory framework. In other words, chapter four identified a network of laws, 
regulations and agencies that could function collectively to ensure the regulation of 
TTCs. In line with this objective is article 19(1) of the WHO FCTC, which asserts all 
Parties to consider ‘promoting their existing laws … to deal with criminal and civil 
liability’ for the purpose of tobacco control. The laws presented in chapter four fulfil this 
purpose. They could augment the primary tobacco legislation—that is the NTCA 
2015—in areas such as environmental protection. Article 18 of the WHO FCTC 
requests parties signing up to the treaty to protect the environment from ‘tobacco 
control and manufacture’. However, the NTCA is weak on this objective. There is no 
comprehensive reference to environmental issues on tobacco manufacture, as 
suggested under the WHO FCTC. The research demonstrated, in chapter four, that 
other laws could be ‘promoted’, as suggested under article 19(1) WHO FCTC, to serve 
as an intricate part of the tobacco regulatory framework. One such law that could be 
enhanced to protect the environment against the impact of the tobacco industry is the 
National Environmental Standards and Regulatory Enforcement Agency Act 
(NESREA). However, the findings suggest that there are deficiencies in the laws cited 




concerning the Tobacco industry, but it is perceived has having a limited effect. 
Challenges of budgetary constraint, inadequate human and institutional capacity, lack 
of public awareness and education, weak enforcement and communication with 
relevant stakeholders are concerns that need attention. The research also identified 
similar deficiencies affecting other tobacco control regulatory bodies and regulations. 
Addressing all these deficiencies would strengthen the tobacco regulatory framework. 
Furthermore, the research findings suggest an urgent need for tougher anti-
corruption measures. Unconscionable social and corporate practises will only weaken 
the regulatory framework, including the implementation and enforcement of tobacco 
regulations. The research suggests that, without strong anti-corruption measures, it 
would be a challenge for the Nigerian government to meet its responsibilities under 
national and international law because corrupt acts manifest itself in extra-legal and 
criminal practices. After all, smuggling,1250 fostered by weak anti-corruption measures, 
has made Nigeria one of the main transit and transit-destination countries for illicit 
tobacco products,1251 creating a challenge to eliminate illicit trade in tobacco products 
under its protocol obligation with the WHO FCTC.1252  
In Chapter 6, the research argues that a human rights-based approach can be 
achieved in the context of controlling the tobacco industry in Nigeria. It illustrates the 
nexus between human rights and tobacco regulation. The study discussed how the 
activities of TTCs affect certain categories of human rights. It then explored the 
responsibilities of the Nigerian government to protect against negative corporate 
impact and the responsibilities of TTCs to society. The research findings suggest 
human rights provisions in the constitution could compel TTCs to act responsibly, 
provided the non-justiciable rights, such as the right to a healthy environment and the 
right to health, are elevated to justifiable rights either through legislative changes or 
judicial precedents.  
 
1250 P Jha & FJ Chaloupka (eds) Tobacco Control in Developing Countries (OUP 2000). 
1251  See WHO FCTC (note 730). 
1252 OO Ewetan and E Urhie, ‘Insecurity and Social Economic Development in Nigeria’ (2014) 5(1) Journal of 




The Nigerian judiciary could also draw guidance from landmark foreign judicial 
decisions,1253 where non-justiciable rights are reinforced with justiciable rights.1254 This 
novel approach underscores the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights 
and, indeed, the judiciary is crucial in this regard. 
 
Recommendations 
The research draws attention to some of the inadequacies of the National Tobacco 
Control Act 2015 (NTCA). By addressing the gaps, policymakers and legislators could 
fully align the NTCA with the aims and objectives of the WHO FCTC in which it intends 
to represent. The research recommends the following to enable the legislation:  
1) The federal legislative body should be responsive in approving regulatory 
directives initiated by the Minister of Health. According to section 39 of the 
NTCA 2015, the two Houses of the National Assembly must approve all tobacco 
control regulations issued by the Minister of Health. However, the approval has 
been a protracted process. This presents ongoing challenges for the Ministry, 
and it delays implementing the directives of the WHO FCTC. 
2) The legislative body should consider amending section 12 of the NTCA 
because the section, as it stands, creates an avenue to circumvent tobacco 
control policies.  
3) The NTCA 2015 would benefit from a procedural guidance that promotes 
clarity. The Bribery Act Guidance issued by the UK Justice Ministry serves as 
an example.    
4) Educating the public and promoting public awareness of tobacco control laws, 
policies and institutions should be considered. This would increase the 
prevalence of the NTCA and other tobacco control regulations and policies. 
5) The findings suggest that the tobacco regulatory institutions lack the necessary 
resources to function adequately, as identified by the Ministry of Health in the 
Report filed with the WHO FCTC. To meet this challenge, the research 
 
1253 Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh & ors. (1993) 4 Law Reports on Crime 234 (India). 
1254 India Constitution, Article 45 provides that the state shall endeavour to provide within a period of ten 
years from the commencement of the Constitution, free and compulsory education for all children until they 




recommends an increase in taxation on tobacco products. The tax income 
should be directed towards enhancing tobacco control institutions, including the 
Tobacco Control Committee and the Tobacco Control Fund. Research 
suggests that increasing tax on tobacco products could result in declining 
demand:1255 tobacco consumption is reduced by about 8% in low- and middle-
income countries for every 10% increase in the retail price.1256    
6) The National Tobacco Control Committee should establish guidelines on how 
it would evaluate projects to be funded. It should also provide details of the 
approved projects, the organisations behind them, the level of funding and the 
publication of annual reports of the Tobacco Control Fund's, thus, providing 
access to the public on all necessary framework documents, information, and 
tools.  
7) The research findings suggest government agencies are still interacting with 
the TTCs, which is contrary to s27 and s28 of the NTCA and article 5.3 of the 
WHO FCTC. The government should therefore cease to have any interaction 
with the industry. This would prevent TTCs from interfering in tobacco control 
policies.  
8) The WHO FCTC have informed parties to adopt measures beyond those 
required by the Convention. It follows on that the adoption of the requirements 
proposed by the Convention could be regarded as the first step before attaining 
the ‘beyond’ status. However, the identification of these inadequacies suggest 
that Nigeria has not yet attained the first level, and, consequently, still a long 
way from attaining the ‘beyond’ status.  
9) The NTCA and the general tobacco regulatory framework should be consistent 
with the objectives of the WHO FCTC, which it purports to represent. Smoking 
occurs in public places contrary to the 100% smoke-free environmental policy 
promoted by the WHO FCTC. In addition, managers of smoke-free buildings 
could be exempted from the indoor smoking ban, again, contrary to the WHO 
FCTC guidelines.  
 
1255 Article 6 WHO FCTC; DD Blake and Vera da Costa e Silva (eds), Tobacco Control Legislation: An Introductory 
Guide (2nd edn, WHO, 2004) 100; SD Golden & ors, ‘Comparing projected impacts of cigarette floor price and 
excise tax policies on socioeconomic disparities in smoking’ (2016) 25(1) Tobacco Control i60-i66. See also 
World Health Organization, Mpower: A Policy Package to Reverse the Tobacco Epidemic (WHO 2008) 26-9.  




10) Regarding the environment, the NTCA should conform with the objectives of 
Article 18 of the WHO FCTC. The NTCA has limited environmental policies that 
protects the environment from the activities of the tobacco industry. It is 
recommended that environmental provisions could be added to the NTCA, or 
the NTCA could refer to other environmental laws and regulations, like those 
highlighted in chapter four.    
11) The manager of smoke-free premises should have their ‘enforcement’ role 
clarified. For this reason, the NTCA would benefit from a supplementary 
guidance note. 
12) Monitoring and data collection should be undertaken to measure the success 
of the NTCA and tobacco control efforts. There is a need to improve the data 
and research gap on tobacco control regulation in Nigeria. At present, non-state 
actors, such as non-governmental organisations and donors, have played the 
leading role in this area. However, government stands to benefit from the 
availability of quality data and evidence-based policy design. It is key for 
government to allocate human and financial resources to this end. 
13) The NTCA is silent on electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS) and 
electronic non-nicotine delivery systems (ENNDS), such as e-cigarettes, 
contrary to the decision adopted under the WHO FCTC. It is recommended that 
there should be a consistent approach with the decision of the WHO FCTC. 
This could be achieved by (a) amending the NTCA to address ENDS and 
ENNDS products; (b) establishing a specific new law or legal instrument to 
regulate ENDS and ENNDS products; (c) or by a combination of (a) and (b). 
 
CORRUPTION  
1) A reduction in corrupt practises would enhance the regulatory framework. For 
this reason, this study recommends consistent anti-corruption measures and 
public awareness; a well-informed citizen plays an active role in accountability 
and the elimination of corruption. Regular training of public officials on the 
impact of corruption on tobacco regulation is also beneficial.  
2) Economic improvement could also reduce corrupt practices.   
3) The government should not intervene in anti-corruption investigations and 




There should be an unbiased recommitment of political will in the anti-corruption 
effort. In safeguarding the regulatory framework, Government should also 
address other challenges faced by the anti-corruption bodies such as judicial 
corruption and inefficiency, inadequate personnel, inadequate funding, poor 
working conditions, and reward system. 
4) EFCC and ICPC have overlapping functions in the investigation and 
prosecution of corrupt persons despite having different mandates. This has led 
to suggestions that both bodies should amalgamate as a single entity. In 
addition, there is the issue of conflict amongst different governmental bodies 
due to an overlap of duties. The EFCC, ICPC, the police force and the Attorney 
General of the Federation all have assigned powers to investigate and 
prosecute corruption cases without a clear scope. A clear scope between these 
investigative bodies is recommended to eliminate conflict and jurisdictional 
overlap.   
5) Laws and processes should be evaluated consistently in accordance with 
article 5(3) of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), 
which requires states to periodically evaluate relevant legal instruments and 
administrative measures to determine their adequacy at preventing and fighting 
corruption. The research findings suggest certain legal instruments have not 
been evaluated. Section 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act, for instance, 
prescribes 7 years imprisonment for any person who corruptly obtains any 
property or benefit of any kind, while section 112 of the Criminal Code Act 
prescribes 3 years imprisonment for the same offence. Most often, the latter 
option is used to decide corruption cases, as evidenced in some corruption 
judgments. This demonstrates the duplicity of the two legal instruments which 
could have been avoided if article 5(3) of the UNCAC were implemented.  
6) The African Union Anti-Corruption Convention lacks provisions on the liability 
of corporations. It recognises the need to curb corruption in the private sector 
without making provisions for the direct liability of multinational corporations. 
The Convention is also silent on the issue of bribery of foreign public officials 
despite its reference to various public and private acts of corruption. Addressing 
these challenges will help reinforce the Convention’s capacity to tackle 




7) It is recommended that government agencies collaborate with non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), media and international communities on 
anti-corruption matters. Anti-tobacco NGOs should be enabled to monitor and 
hold TTCs and regulatory bodies accountable.    
GOVERNMENT 
To achieve an enhanced regulatory framework, the research recommends all arms 
of government to act in one accord, guided by the recommendations and principles of 
the WHO FCTC.  
1) Executive: government should address weak enforcement of tobacco 
regulations, with the aim of improving institutional structures and administrative 
competence. It is also recommended that a tobacco control commissioner be 
established to investigate any infringements arising out of the activities of the 
tobacco industry.  
2) Judiciary: to advance tobacco regulation, the research recommends the 
judiciary to lend itself to a degree of judicial flexibility and innovation, since there 
is a dearth of case laws involving TTCs in Nigeria.1257 The thesis took insights 
from litigations initiated by TTCs in other jurisdictions, where the judiciary have 
demonstrated judicial flexibility and, perhaps, judicial activism in support of 
tobacco control legislation and policy.1258 One of the contributions of this 
research is the supply of successful counterclaims from foreign jurisdictions that 
would aid the judiciary and tobacco control advocates in litigation against 
TTCs.1259   
3) Legislature: The legislature and other government agencies should prevent the 
tobacco industry from interfering in tobacco control laws and policies. The 
legislature should expeditiously ratify regulations emanating from the Ministry 
of Health.  
 
 
1257 Maria Cahill and Sean O Conaill, 'Judicial Restraint Can Also Undermine Constitutional Principles: An Irish 
Caution' (2017) 36(2) University of Queensland Law Journal 259; PN Bhagwati, ‘The role of the judiciary in a 
democratic process: balancing activism and judicial restraint’ (1992) 18(4) Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1262; 
See also p92-3 of this thesis. 
1258 British American Tobacco Australasia Ltd (BAT) & ors v Commonwealth of Australia, [2012] HCA 43; 250 






An analysis of the domestic forum, Nigeria, reveals gaps in the tobacco control 
legislation and other relevant domestic laws. Weak enforcement of the laws and issues 
of corruption have all amplified the importance of CSR. The absence of an enforceable 
international framework for controlling TTCs, considering that the enforcement of the 
foremost international tobacco control treaty—WHO FCTC—has been entrusted to 
individual member states, has only tend to justify the significance of CSR. Therefore, 
having claimed to adhere to CSR principles, TTCs should use their influence to drive 
positive changes over the environment, their supply chain, and other areas of 
influence. 
Another recommended area where CSR can play an active role is around 
international law. On matters such as the environment and human rights, international 
law does not have any real mechanisms to hold TTCs accountable. For this crucial 
reason, the WHO FCTC had to be domesticated by party members. An indication that 
protecting human rights against the activities of TTCs are best protected within the 
confines of a national normative framework,1260 a framework (in a corporate context) 
that is usually driven by corporate law, and, to some degree, appears to be incomplete. 
Having adopted international human rights initiatives under their CSR policy 
framework,1261 TTCs have an opportunity to fill the gap by promoting environmental 
and human rights standards, especially in host countries with weak human rights 
enforcement. 
Furthermore, this research argues that CSR have driven innovative changes in 
TTCs, such as the production of alternative tobacco products that are less harmful 
compared to traditional cigarettes.1262 However, for a complete form of CSR practice 
in the tobacco industry, the study suggests CSR should go beyond innovative changes 
to products; it should be expanded to also drive ethical changes.  
 
1260 See also JL Cernic ‘Corporate Responsibility for Fundamental Human Rights’ (Doctoral Thesis, University of 
Aberdeen, 2008). 
1261 BAT (note 1175). 




It is vital to reiterate that this study does not advocate self-regulation as a sole 
form of tobacco control, considering that it is ineffective.1263 Instead, it centres on the 
context-specific form of CSR in driving internal ethical values, and this in turn lends 
itself to the broader regulatory framework. Furthermore, based on certain questionable 
corporate conduct revealed in the study, TTCs should consider a forthright 
commitment1264 to the ‘social contract’ of corporate social responsibility.     
Finally, the findings and the recommendations have important implications for 
the broader domain of tobacco regulation. They are insightful to inform practice, 
improve policy and decision-making, which could ultimately save lives, considering the 
morbidity risks and other risks associated with the industry. This thesis also contributes 
to the knowledge and academic discourse of CSR in a legal perspective. 
   
 
 
1263 RW Pollay, ‘Promises, promises: self-regulation of US cigarette broadcast advertising in the 1960s’ (1994) 
3(2) Tobacco Control 134.  
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